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It is no exaggeration to say that the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea was one of the most important law-making events of the twentieth 
century.  It heralded the beginning of a revolution in international law by introducing 
a new law-making technique based on consensus decision-making and universal 
participation.  It also produced a comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea. The 
resulting Law of the Sea Convention is commonly claimed to provide a universal 
legal framework for all ocean activities.  
 Upon this background, it is pertinent to ask, what is the future for the LOS 
Convention and the law of the sea in the twenty-first century? How does the 
Convention evolve to take into account changing values, policies and preferences of 
the international community?  How have developments in law-making techniques 
influenced the way in which the law of the sea is created and changed? 
This thesis initially establishes the legal basis for the LOS Convention as a 
universal framework for the law of sea. It shows how the negotiation of the 
Convention substantially influenced customary international law so that it is possible 
to speak of a universal law of the sea.  Yet, the status of the Convention as universal 
law poses problems for its future development because it cannot be considered solely 
from the perspective of the law of treaties. The thesis will therefore consider the 
mechanisms for change contained within the Convention alongside other law-making 
processes out-with the formal treaty framework.  Central to this analysis is the role of 
institutions in modern international law-making.  The thesis looks at the part played 
by political and technical institutions in developing the law of the sea through 
interpretation, modification, and amendment, as well as at the ways in which these 
institutions have utilised and developed the consensus decision-making techniques 
first seen at UNCLOS III.  It will also analyse the role of courts and tribunals in 
maintaining and developing the legal order of the oceans.   
This analysis shows that the Convention provides the legal framework for the 
modern law of the sea for all states.  In this context, institutional processes have 
largely replaced unilateral state practice in law-making.  Moreover, states have shown 
a preference for flexibility and pragmatism over formal amendment procedures. The 
greatest achievement of the LOS Convention is the creation of a stable legal order for 
the oceans. To ensure this stability is maintained, continued discussion, deliberation 
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An Introduction to International Law-Making 
 
 
1. Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea 
“Stability and the protection of acquired rights are essential functions of any 
legal system, but no legal system can protect itself against revolution except by 
providing adequate scope for evolutionary change.”
1   
All legal systems contain rules determining the way in which law is made and 
subsequently modified, amended or abolished.  The international legal system is no 
different in this respect.  However, it may be more problematic for international 
lawyers to identify these so-called “secondary rules”.2  Unlike many national legal 
systems, international law does not have a written constitution which specifies the 
sources of law or the division of law-making powers.3    Nor is there a supreme 
legislative organ in the international legal order which can impose laws on a state 
without its consent.  Pauwelyn notes that the international legal system has essentially 
as many law-makers as there are states.4  Thus, international law-making is often a 
complex and fragmented process which can be difficult to decipher. 
It is the category of universal international law5 that poses the greatest 
challenge for international law-making. In the absence of a global legislature, how are 
universal rules or principles made and how do they change? 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider the processes and procedures of 
international law-making in the law of the sea.  From very early in the history of the 
law of the sea, it was established that no state has exclusive control over the oceans.  
It was recognised that the seas provide valuable means of communication and 
                                                 
1 Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (Stevens, 1958) at p. 85. 
2 Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961) at p. 91.  See also International Law 
Commission, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law,  UN Document 
A/CN.4/L.682, 2006, at para. 27. 
3 See e.g. Kammerhofer, "Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary 
International Law and Some of its Problems", (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law at p. 
552; Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2003) at p. 1. 
4 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at p. 
15. 
5 Oppenheim differentiates universal international law from general and particular international law; 
See Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law,  9 ed., vol. 1 (Longman, 1992) at p. 4. 
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transportation for all states.  At the same time, the oceans and the ocean floor are also 
sources of valuable resources, living and non-living.  In order to promote the peaceful 
use of the seas, a universal and stable legal framework is needed.  That framework 
must clearly define the rights and responsibilities of all the relevant actors.   
Various attempts have been made over the last century to lay down a legal 
framework for the seas and the oceans.  Today, the principal legal instrument is the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.6  Yet, the promulgation of 
this Convention raises a number of questions about the progressive development of 
international law.  Firstly, on what basis can it be claimed that the LOS Convention 
has created a universal legal order for the oceans, given its formal status as a treaty?  
Secondly, how will the law of the sea further evolve following the conclusion of the 
LOS Convention?   
This introductory chapter has three main aims.  Firstly, it will clarify the 
theoretical assumptions that are made for the purposes of this study.  Secondly, it will 
introduce some of the major themes that will be explored in this thesis.  Thirdly, it 
will outline the overall structure of the thesis and how these themes will be addressed.     
       
2. The Theoretical Approach of the Thesis 
Many of the issues raised by this thesis concern the constitutional 
underpinnings of international law.  In the absence of a settled constitutional structure 
within which law-making takes place, the role of theory in international law is 
particularly significant.  Theories attempt to answer some of the basic questions of 
how international law is made.  There are numerous competing theories of 
international law, including natural law, positivism, the policy-science approach, and 
critical legal studies.7 Each theory offers its own framework for the study and analysis 
of international law.8   
                                                 
6 Hereinafter, “LOS Convention”. 
7 See e.g. Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) at pp. 
10-19.  See also the contributions in “Symposium: Method of International Law”, (1999) 93 American 
Journal of International Law, at pp. 291-423. 
8 Scobbie, "Wicked Heresies or Legitimate Perspectives? Theory and International Law", in 
International Law, ed. Evans (Oxford University Press, 2006) at p. 89; Boyle and Chinkin, The Making 
of International Law, at p. 10. 
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This thesis will adopt a positivist approach to international law.  Accordingly, 
the starting point for the discussion of international law-making is Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice9 which provides:   
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as 
are submitted to it, shall apply: 
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the 
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of the rules of law. 
 
On the face of it, this article simply sets out the law to be applied by the ICJ in 
deciding cases brought before it.10  Nevertheless, it is commonly treated by states and 
commentators alike as a quasi-authoritative catalogue of the sources of international 
law.11  The advantage of the so-called “sources doctrine” is that it provides a degree 
of certainty desperately needed by international law.  It sets out a clear list of sources 
against which international claims can be judged.  There are also practical arguments 
in favour of the sources doctrine.  Danilenko argues that “there is a strong 
presumption that Article 38 should contain a complete list of sources.  It is hardly 
conceivable that states would establish a major international judicial institution 
without providing procedural guarantees that it would have access to all the available 
sources of law governing relations between the contesting states.”
12
  It follows that 
treaties, custom and general principles are the primary sources of international law.  
 
3. Challenges of Modern International Law -Making 
Positivism provides some certainty over the sources of international law.  
However, it does not necessarily settle the question of how international law is made.  
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute says nothing of the processes, procedures or techniques 
                                                 
9 Hereinafter, the “ICJ”. 
10 See Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, at p. 5.  
11 See Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, at p. 24.  C.f. Thirlway, "The Sources 
of International Law", in International Law, ed. Evans (Oxford University Press, 2006) at pp. 134-138; 
Jennings, "The Identification of International Law", in International Law: Teaching and Practice, ed. 
B. Cheng (Stevens, 1982) at p. 9. 




for creating international law.  It is this question which this thesis will address.  How 
is the modern law of the sea created and changed?   
Perhaps the most significant development in international law-making in the 
last fifty years has been the proliferation of international institutions.  These bodies 
have been created in an ad hoc fashion, rather than according to a fixed or rigid plan.  
They co-exist in the same legal system although there is rarely a systematic 
relationship between them.  Nevertheless, international institutions facilitate law-
making by providing a permanent forum for discussion, as well as administrative and 
technical support for law-making initiatives.13  Whilst no institutions possess 
legislative powers per se, no modern study of international law-making can ignore 
their activities.  
Several key questions will be addressed in this context.  How do international 
institutions contribute to international law-making, in particular to the creation of 
universal international law?  What are the most important characteristics of these 
institutions?  What types of law-making techniques do they use? 
   The increasing role of institutions in international law-making attracts claims 
from some quarters that we are witnessing a gradual constitutionalisation of 
international law.14  Constitutionalism in this context can have a number of meanings.  
Sometimes, it simply refers to a system of shared values which shape the creation and 
development of international law.15  A stronger form of constitutionalism asserts the 
concentration of power in institutional structures, indicating a step away from 
traditional conceptions of international law based on state sovereignty and consent.  
This involves a “realignment of relationships” between states, individuals and 
international institutions.16  According to this view of constitutionalism, government 
is shifting to the international level where there are insufficient checks and balances 
on how power is wielded.  
The notion of constitutionalism must be treated with care in the context of 
international law.  Direct analogies to domestic constitutional structures should be 
                                                 
13 The institutionalisation of law-making also makes it easier for other actors to participate in the law-
making process, e.g. campaign organizations, companies; see chapter five, at p. 121. 
14 See e.g. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization, (Oxford University Press, 
2005).  Ultimately, Cass rejects the idea of the constitutionalisation of the WTO. 
15 De Wet, “The International Constitutional Order”, (2006) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 51; see discussion in Chinkin and Boyle, The Making of International Law, at pp. 15-19. 
16 Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization, at pp. 44-45. 
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approached tentatively given the fundamental differences between international law 
and law within the nation state.17  Moreover, it is not clear that there has been a 
fundamental shift away from state sovereignty or the traditional sources of 
international law which warrants the notion of a new international constitutional 
framework.   
Nevertheless, the rise of institutions does raise questions over their legitimacy.  
One author explains that, “as international institutions gain greater authority … and 
their consensual underpinnings erode, questions about their legitimacy are beginning 
to be voiced.”
18  Similar concerns are addressed in the debate over “global 
administrative law” which is defined by its leading proponents as “comprising the 
structures, procedures, and normative standards for regulatory decision-making 
including transparency, participation, and review, and the rule-governed mechanisms 
for implementing these standards…”
19   
These challenges associated with institutional law-making will also be 
addressed in this thesis.  Who should participate in the law-making process?  Which 
institutions should make law in a particular area?  How should competing values and 
interests be balanced in the process of making international law, as well as in its 
interpretation, application and amendment?     
The diversity of international law-making also poses challenges for the 
international legal system.  A large number of institutions offer themselves as a forum 
for law-making. Boyle and Chinkin point out that “the choice of process depends 
upon context, political preference and purpose.”
20  Yet, the availability of several 
law-making institutions may also lead to fragmentation where substantive norms are 
developed in distinct international fora without any central co-ordination.  This threat 
has increased with the creation of ever more specialized regimes with a narrow 
perspective on international law.  Thus, according to one study, “the result is the 
emergence of regimes of international law that have their basis in multilateral treaties 
and acts of international organizations, specialized treaties and customary patterns 
                                                 
17 See Wood, The UN Security Council and International Law, (2006) Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial 
Lectures, lecture 1, at para. 18.   
18 Bodansky, "The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International 
Environmental Law?" (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law at p. 597.  For a general 
discussion of legitimacy, see Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, at pp. 24-35 
19 Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative Law”, (2005) 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems at p. 5. 
20 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, at p. 9. 
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that are tailored to the needs and interests of each network but rarely take account of 
the outside world.”21  A further threat of fragmentation is posed by the proliferation of 
international courts and tribunals which may potentially give differing interpretations 
of the same rules and principles.22  Overall, fragmentation of the law-making process 
poses a challenge to the coherent development of international law.   
Fragmentation of law-making is particularly pertinent in a field such as the 
law of the sea which covers a wide range of substantive concerns such as 
environment, trade, human rights, as well as specific maritime issues.  Moreover, 
there are numerous institutions involved in law-making in this field.  The 
fragmentation debate has largely focussed on how to solve potential difficulties that 
may arise given the decentralised nature of the international legal system.  How are 
conflicts of norms solved at the international level?  How do states co-ordinate law-
making activities in a system without any institutional hierarchy?     
   
4. Outline of the Study 
This thesis will address many of these larger questions of international law-
making in the specific context of the law of the sea. 
Chapter two will consider the process of making the law of the sea from a 
historical perspective.  It traces the shift from customary international law-making to 
treaty-making, culminating in an analysis of the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea.23  This Conference was one of the most important law-making 
events of the twentieth century, heralding a revolution in law-making techniques, as 
well as producing for the first time a comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea.   
Today, the LOS Convention is commonly claimed to provide the universal 
legal framework for the law of the sea – a “constitution” for the oceans.24  The basis 
of this claim will be assessed in chapter three.  The law of treaties and customary 
international law will be analysed to determine whether they provide a foundation for 
the universal application of the LOS Convention.   
                                                 
21 International Law Commission, Report on the Fragmentation of International Law, at para. 482. 
22 See e.g. Guillaume, "The Future of Judicial Institutions", (1995) 44 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly, 848-862. 
23 Hereinafter, “UNCLOS III”. 
24 See Koh, "A Constitution for the Oceans", in The Law of the Sea - Official Text of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea with Annexes and Index (United Nations, 1983). 
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Twenty-five years after its conclusion, it is pertinent to ask, what is the future 
for the LOS Convention?  Will it fall victim to overwhelming pressure for radical 
change as did previous efforts at law-making in this field?  How can the Convention 
evolve in light of the changing values, policies and preferences of the international 
community, whilst at the same time maintaining its universal appeal?   
Chapters four and five consider the contribution of international institutions to 
the evolution of the law of the sea.  Chapter four is concerned with the development 
of the Convention through political institutions such as the Meeting of the States 
Parties and the United Nations General Assembly.25  Chapter five focuses on specific 
issues of the law of the sea which are dealt with through organizations with a 
technical mandate.  It will concentrate on the regulation of shipping through the 
International Maritime Organization and the management of deep seabed minerals by 
the International Seabed Authority.  These chapters will consider the role of 
international institutions in the interpretation, modification and amendment of the 
LOS Convention.  They will also address questions of co-operation and co-ordination 
between international institutions in the law-making process.     
In a horizontal system of law, normative conflicts are likely to occur.  Chapter 
six deals with the interrelationship of various treaty regimes.  It analyses general 
principles of law, as well as the substantive provisions of the LOS Convention and 
other specific treaties to see how conflicts of law are addressed at the international 
level.   
Chapter seven looks at the development of the LOS Convention by 
international courts and tribunals.  It will consider what contribution judicial 
institutions have made to the progressive development of the law of the sea through 
the interpretation and application of the Convention in the context of dispute 
settlement.  It also considers potential obstacles faced by judicial organs in developing 
the law. 
Overall, this thesis aims to analyse how, if at all, coherence and universality 
can be maintained in the ongoing development of the law of the sea. 
 
 
                                                 








The adoption of the LOS Convention on 30 April 1982 marked a milestone in 
the development of the law of the sea.  For the first time, there was a single, 
comprehensive treaty governing all uses of the seas and oceans.  Moreover, the 
Convention represented a revolution in the manner in which international law is 
made.     
This chapter seeks to sketch the way in which the law of the sea has developed 
over the past century.  It focuses on law-making techniques, rather than substantive 
rules, tracing the shift from customary international law to the codification and 
progressive development of international law by international conferences. Finally, it 
will outline the procedures and processes utilised at UNCLOS III, identifying the 
significant characteristics of the Conference which distinguish it from more traditional 
law-making techniques.   
The trends of law-making in the law of the sea reflect wider changes in the 
international legal system itself and moves towards an increasing institutionalisation 
of law-making techniques.  However, the subject finds its origins in the practice of 
individual states which contributed to the gradual formation of customary 
international law through a process of claim and counter-claim. 
   
2. The Origins of the Law of the Sea 
Many authors identify the foundations of the modern law of the sea in 
seventeenth century Europe.26  An early milestone for the subject was undoubtedly 
the publication in 1609 of Mare Liberum, the seminal thesis on the law of the sea by 
the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius.  Grotius famously argued that the seas are not 
                                                 
26 Brown, "Law of the Sea, History", in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. Bernhardt 
(North-Holland, 1989) at p. 192.  C.f. Anand, Origin and Development of International Law (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1983) at p. 226.  See also the sources discussed by Jenks, The Common Law of 
Mankind (Stevens, 1958) at pp. 74-76. 
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susceptible to appropriation, thereby setting the foundations for the principle of the 
freedom of the seas. His thesis prompted other scholarly contributions advocating 
competing theories on the general principles of the law of the sea.27  Although largely 
written by academics, these texts often provided support for the position of a 
particular state.28  Nevertheless, many of these seventeenth century scholars found 
much of their inspiration in natural law theories or principles of Roman law.29   
From the beginning of the eighteenth century and the onset of the enlightenment 
period, natural law began to lose favour amongst European scholars.30 At this time, 
positivism became the dominant theory of international law.    According to positivist 
theory, states could only be bound on the basis of their consent.  A classic exposition 
of this theory is found in The S. S. Lotus, where the PCIJ held that, “the rules of law 
binding upon States … emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions 
or by usages generally accepted as law.”
31   
 
3. Customary International Law of the Sea 
Throughout this period, customary international law was the principal source of 
the law of sea.  The traditional conception of customary international law is based on 
consistent trends of state practice and it was to such practice that courts, tribunals and 
other decision-makers had to turn in order to determine the substance of the law.   
At this time, few international courts and tribunals existed and maritime cases 
were chiefly dealt with by national admiralty courts.32  Although they were national 
institutions, the law applied by these courts was largely of an international character. 
Sir Charles Hedges, a seventeenth century Judge of the English High Court of 
                                                 
27 For instance, O’Connell traces the notion of land-kenning to the Scots lawyer, Craig; The 
International Law of the Sea (Oxford University Press, 1982) at pp. 3-4.  On the contributions of 
Welwood and Selden, see Whitty, "Water Law Regimes", in The History of Private Law in Scotland 
ed. Zimmerman and Reid (Oxford University Press, 2005).  For a more detailed discussion of the 
debate that took place between Grotius and Welwood, see Van Ittersum, "Mare Liberum versus the 
Propriety of the Seas?" (2006) 10 Edinburgh Law Review 239.   
28 For instance, O’Connell says that “it is believed that Grotius’ treatise Mare liberum was originally 
part of a legal opinion which he gave professionally to the directors of the Dutch East India Company 
early in the seventeenth century on the question of their right of access to the trade of the Indies”; 
O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea  at p. 9.  See also Brown, The International Law of the Sea 
(Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994) at p. 7. 
29 See e.g. Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 1999) at p. 4. 
30 See e.g. Ibid.,  at p. 5. 
31 The Case Concerning the S. S. Lotus, (1927) Series A, No. 10, PCIJ Reports at p. 18, 
32 Colombus, The International Law of the Sea (Longmans, 1967) at p. 7. 
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Admiralty, made this clear when he said, “the Court of Admiralty is a Court of 
Justice, and the judge who is sworn to administer it is as much obliged to observe the 
laws of nations as the Judges of the Courts of Westminster are bound to proceed 
according to the statutes and the common law.”
33  The admiralty courts drew on a 
variety of sources, including ancient codes of maritime law34, as well as the 
contemporary practices of states35 in order to determine customary international law. 
For instance, in The Paquete Habana, the US Supreme Court traced the history of 
prize jurisdiction from 1403 onwards, examining several international treaties, the 
work of scholars, and prize court decisions of various countries.36 
The task of courts in determining the content of the customary international law 
of the sea was by no means straightforward.  Judges were faced with a mass of 
evidence, often contradictory, as to what the prevailing customs were.  Needless to 
say, the reliance on the claims and counter-claims of states left much to be desired in 
terms of the precise formulation of rules.  The Paquete Habana again provides a 
good example.  In that case, the US Supreme Court was faced with the question 
whether there was a rule of international law prohibiting small coastal fishing vessels 
which were flying the flag of an enemy state from being captured as prize.  Although 
the justices seemingly agreed on the material sources which contribute to the 
formation of customary international law, they profoundly disagreed on their 
assessments of the prevailing state practice.  The majority of the Court concluded that 
the available evidence supported the existence of an exemption for small coastal 
fishing vessels.  A minority of the Court, led by Chief Justice Fuller, dissented, 
arguing that the practice was inconclusive and “in truth, the exemption of fishing craft 
is essentially an act of grace, and not a matter of right and it is extended or denied as 
the exigency is believed to demand.”
37  A similar division over the conclusions to be 
drawn from state practice can be seen in The S.S. Lotus.  In a decision adopted by the 
casting vote of the President38, the majority of the Court denied the existence of a 
                                                 
33 Cited by Ibid.,  at p. 11.  In Currie v M’Knight, the UK House of Lords held that the Scots admiralty 
law was the same as that applied by the English Court of Admiralty; Currie v. M'Knight, (1896) 4 
S.L.T. 161. 
34 For instance, the Rhodian maritime laws, Il Consolato del Mare and the Laws of Oleron. 
35 Prentice, ed., Treatise of the Law Relative to Merchant Ships and Seamen, 12 ed., (Shaw, 1881) 
preface. 
36 The Paquete Habana, (1899) 175 US Reports 677. 
37 Ibid., at p. 719. 
38 Judge Moore, however, notes that he agreed with the reasoning of the majority on this aspect of the 
decision so in reality it was adopted by 7 votes to 5.   
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principle of international law prohibiting Turkey from prosecuting the Master of a 
French vessel which had collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas.  The majority 
reasoned that the applicable rules of customary international law “must be 
ascertained by examining precedents offering a close analogy to the case under 
consideration; for it is only from precedents of this nature that the existence of a 
general principle applicable to the particular case may appear.”
39  Yet, the evidence 
of state practice was itself ambiguous and there were precedents pointing in both 
directions.  In the words of Judge Weiss, the record of the case demonstrates 
“controversial doctrine and contradictory judicial decisions … invoked by both 
parties.”
40  The actual result of the case largely turns on the assumption made by the 
majority that states may exercise jurisdiction unless there is a positive rule which 
prohibits such action.  As France was not able to adduce sufficient evidence of such a 
rule, its arguments failed. 
The traditional techniques of deducing customary international law also 
accorded a significant role to powerful maritime states.  In The Scotia, decided by the 
US Supreme Court  in 1871, it was said that “many of the usages which prevail, and 
which have the force of law, doubtless originated in the positive prescriptions of a 
single state, which were first of limited effect, but which, when generally accepted, 
became universal obligations.”
41  The Court described how the Merchant Shipping 
Regulations promulgated by the British Government in January 1863 became 
generally accepted and applied by all the major maritime states of the world and 
therefore formed part of the international law of the sea.42   
It can be seen from these few illustrations that traditional conceptions of 
customary international law, as a means of regulating the activities of a large number 
of states, suffers from a number of weaknesses.  Firstly, divergences in state practice 
mean that it is often difficult to identify the applicable law at any one time.  The more 
states there are, the more difficult the process.  Perhaps one of the greatest weaknesses 
of custom as a method of law-making is the uncertainty which accompanies the 
promulgation of new norms.  Any evolution in an existing rule requires a breach of 
                                                 
39 The Case Concerning the S.S. Lotus, at p. 21. 
40 Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weiss. 
41 The Scotia, (1871) 81 US Reports 170, at p. 187.  
42 The Court cited thirty-three countries which had adopted regulations closely following the 1863 
Order in Council; Ibid., at p. 186.   
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that rule.  Therefore, until a stable pattern of state practice has emerged, it is 
impossible to predict the legality of a state’s actions.   
It has also been suggested that customary international law is unsuitable for the 
promulgation of detailed rules or regulations in technical fields.  Thus, Oxman says 
that “because it is so difficult to prove a level of state practice and opinio juris 
beyond generalities sometimes barely distinguishable from mere labels, customary 
international law is a much more blunt instrument than written law.”
43  However, 
cases such as The Scotia would suggest that this assumption is not always valid.    
What this case demonstrates is the way in which written texts can inspire and 
influence the formation of customary international law.  This fact has major 
implications for modern law-making techniques. 
   
4. The League of Nations: Early Attempts at Codification 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, there was an increasing interest in 
the idea of codifying international law.  It was widely believed at the time that the 
codification of international law on major topics would contribute to the maintenance 
of international peace and security.44  It was thought that the reduction of rules to 
writing would promote clarity and certainty in the applicable law.  The Second Hague 
Peace Conference had adopted a resolution which called for the codification of topics 
which were "ripe for embodiment in international regulation”45, but the outbreak of 
the First World War had prevented this initiative from being further pursued.  
Nevertheless, Rosenne suggests “that recommendation is the seed which was 
ultimately to burgeon forth, first as the Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law, and later as the International Law Commission of 
the United Nations.”
46 
Amongst the first topics considered suitable and necessary to codify was the law 
of the sea.  Specific aspects of the law of the sea had already been the subject of treaty 
                                                 
43 Oxman, "Customary International Law in the Absence of Widespread Ratification of the Law of the 
Sea Convention", in 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, ed. Oxman and Koers (Law of the Sea Institute, 
1983) at p. 677. 
44 Rosenne, Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law (1925-1928) 
(Oceana Publications, 1972) at p. xxix.  
45 Ibid.,  at p. xxix. 
46 Ibid.,  at p. xxx. 
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negotiations.  The 1856 Declaration of Paris sought to establish international rules on 
naval warfare, neutrality, blockades and privateering. This aspect of the law of the sea 
was further developed by several treaties adopted at the two Hague Peace 
Conferences in 1899 and 1907 and subsequently at the International Naval 
Conference held in London in 1909.  Non-military aspects of the law of the sea, 
however, were neglected until after the First World War. 
The 1920s saw several codes on the law of the sea produced by private 
institutions and individuals, including the International Law Association, the Institut 
de Droit International, the American Institute of International Law, the German 
Society for International Law, the Japanese Society for International Law, and 
Harvard Law School.47  These private initiatives were swiftly followed by 
governmental attempts at codification.  In 1924 the Council of the League of Nations 
initiated a process for the codification of international law.  To reflect the 
international character of the project, it was to be carried out by “a body representing 
the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world.”
48 The 
Council duly established a Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of 
International Law.  Participation in the Committee was not restricted to individuals 
from member states of the League of Nations.49  This Committee was charged with 
investigating which topics or fields of law were suitable for codification.50       
The initial list of topics for potential codification considered by the Committee 
included the status of territorial waters, the status of government ships engaged in 
commerce, the suppression of piracy, and the exploitation of the products of the sea.51  
Following a series of debates, the Committee of Experts narrowed down the list to 
those topics of international law which it considered were “sufficiently ripe” for 
codification by a general international conference.  Of the above topics, only the 
subject of territorial waters was considered to meet this criterion.52   
                                                 
47 See O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea  at pp. 20-21; Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the 
Sea at pp. 13-14. 
48 Rosenne, Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law  at p. xxxv. 
49 The seventeen members of the Committee were selected by the League Council following 
consultations with governments.  Membership of the Committee included the United States although 
the Soviet Union chose not to participate.   
50 For a copy of the resolution, see Rosenne, Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of 
International Law  at p. vii. 
51 Ibid.,  at p. lxi. 
52 Ibid.,  at p. lxx. 
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In response to this recommendation, the League convened the 1930 Hague 
Codification Conference, which was attended by delegates from forty-seven 
governments, including states which were not members of the League.  The issue of 
territorial waters was considered by the Second Committee of the Conference.  
Despite prolonged discussions, delegates failed to agree a treaty on territorial waters, 
although they did produce a set of draft articles that were subsequently circulated to 
governments. This text itself did not create legal obligations.  Nevertheless, one 
commentary explains that it “later exerted influence to the extent that Governments 
accepted them as a statement of existing international law.”
53
  The draft articles once 
again demonstrate the influence that a written text can have on the formation of 
customary international law.   
The 1930 Codification Conference was to be the only major multilateral attempt 
to codify international law during the lifetime of the League whose attention was 
consumed with more fundamental political crises during the 1930s.  Although the 
Conference had failed to produce substantial results, many lessons were learned 
which would subsequently influence future attempts at codification.54 
  
5. The United Nations: A New Era of Codification 
The codification of international law was to become a much more prominent 
and permanent feature of the international system following the Second World War.  
The International Law Commission was established by the UN General Assembly in 
1947 for the purposes of advancing the codification and progressive development of 
international law.55 The ILC is composed of thirty-four independent experts on 
international law appointed by the General Assembly. 
At its first meeting in 1949, the Commission identified a provisional list of 
fourteen topics as suitable for codification.  This list included the regime of high seas 
and the regime of territorial seas. It decided to prioritise the codification of the regime 
of the high seas and J.P.A. François was appointed as special rapporteur on the 
                                                 
53 United Nations, The Work of the International Law Commission (United Nations, 1988) at pp. 3-4.  
See also Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea  at pp. 14-15. 
54 Rosenne, ed., League of Nations Conference for the Codification of International Law (1930), 
(Oceana Publications, 1975) at pp. xliii-xlvi. 
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subject.  Following a recommendation from the General Assembly56, the Commission 
started work on the regime of the territorial sea at the third session of the Commission 
in 1951 and François was appointed as special rapporteur on this topic as well.   
The Commission proceeded with these two topics simultaneously, albeit 
continuing to treat them as separate subjects on its work programme.  In furtherance 
of its work on the high seas, the Commission submitted draft articles on the 
continental shelf and fisheries to the General Assembly in 1953.  The Commission 
recommended that the General Assembly adopt the articles on the continental shelf in 
the form of a resolution.  In addition, the Commission proposed that the articles on 
fisheries should be forwarded to the FAO for adoption.  The General Assembly, 
however, refused. Citing “the physical, as well as the juridical, linking of the 
problems related to the high seas, territorial waters, contiguous zones, the continental 
shelf and the superjacent waters”, the General Assembly resolved that “it would not 
deal with any aspect of the regime of the high seas or of the regime of territorial 
waters until all problems involved has been studied by the Commission and reported 
by it to the General Assembly.”
57  In this way, the General Assembly made it clear 
that it preferred a comprehensive and coherent approach to codifying the law of the 
sea.  Following this recommendation, the ILC duly submitted a single set of draft 
articles on the law of the sea to the General Assembly in 1956 along with a detailed 
set of commentaries.   
The draft articles formed the basis for discussions at UNCLOS I which was 
convened by the General Assembly in order to “examine the law of the sea, taking 
account not only of the legal but also of the technical, biological, economic and 
political aspects of the problem, and to embody the results of its work in one or more 
international conventions or such other instruments that the conference may deem 
appropriate.”
58  The mandate of the conference is important in a number of respects.  
Firstly, the General Assembly recognized that the law of the sea raised issues of a 
political or technical nature, as well as pure questions of law.  Secondly, the General 
                                                 
56 General Assembly Resolution 374 (IV), 1949. 
57 General Assembly Resolution 798 (VIII), 1953, cited in Sinclair, The International Law Commission 
(Grotius Publications, 1987) at pp. 45-46.  This stance was confirmed in 1954 when nine states once 
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topic of the continental shelf.  By Resolution 899 (IX), 1954, the General Assembly again deferred the 
issue until the International Law Commission had submitted its final reports on the law of the sea; see 
United Nations, The Work of the International Law Commission  at p. 40. 
58 General Assembly Resolution 1105 (XI), 1956.   
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Assembly, in a significant u-turn, also abandoned its determination to treat the law of 
the sea as a coherent whole.  The mandate foresaw the adoption of more than one 
international convention on the subject.  Indeed, the General Assembly left open the 
question of whether the outcome of the Conference would be legally binding at all by 
indicating that the Conference could adopt other such instruments that it deemed 
appropriate.   
UNCLOS I took place in Geneva in 1958.  In accordance with Resolution 1105 
(XI), an invitation was sent to all Members of the United Nations.   The final list of 
participants included eighty-six states59 as well as observers from seven specialized 
agencies.60  Like the previous attempt at codification through the League of Nations, 
it was recognized that the rules of the law of the sea should be developed with the 
involvement of as many states as possible.  Four principal treaties were negotiated, 
dealing with the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the high 
seas and fishing.61  The Conference also adopted an optional protocol on dispute 
settlement.  All substantive decisions of the Conference were subject to a vote of a 
two-thirds majority.62       
Although the draft articles had been prepared by the ILC as a single and 
coherent text, the four substantive treaties were not linked in any way, so that a state 
could choose which instruments it would accept.  Thus, the balance of rights and 
obligations crafted by the Commission was weakened at UNCLOS I.  As O’Connell 
notes “that opened up the possibility for States to adhere to parts only of what was 
intended to be an over-all scheme, and so distortions and exaggerations became 
inevitable.”
63  Only those states bound by all four Conventions are subject to the 
package as it was intended to apply. Even then, states could make reservations to 
many of the articles upon ratification.64  Nevertheless, UNCLOS I had taken a 
                                                 
59 At the time, only eighty-two states were members of the United Nations. 
60 See Official Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol. 2, at p. xiii. 
61 See O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea  at p. 22.  The work of the fifth committee on free 
access to the sea by land-locked states did not result in a separate convention but aspects of its work are 
contained in the Territorial Sea Convention and the High Seas Convention; United Nations, The Work 
of the International Law Commission  at p. 42.  The Continental Shelf Convention was adopted by 57 
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62 Rule 35, Rules of Procedure, in Official  Records of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, vol. 2, at p. xxxiii. 
63 O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea  at p. 22. 
64 See 1958 Continental Shelf Convention, Article 12; 1958 Fisheries Convention, Article 19. 
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significant step forward.  Where there had been previously only customary rules, there 
were now four substantive treaties on the law of the sea.   
The success of UNCLOS I was marred by the failure to solve some small, yet 
highly significant issues, in particular the width of the territorial sea and the important 
question of fishing rights.  A resolution was adopted requesting the General Assembly 
to study the advisability of convening a second international conference65, which it 
did in 1960.66   
The mandate of UNCLOS II was to fill in the gaps in the legal framework left 
by the first conference.  It was not intended to consider new issues or reconsider 
issues that had been concluded at UNCLOS I.  However, the eighty-eight states which 
attended UNCLOS II were not able to agree on an acceptable formula.67  The 
Conference was only able to conclude that “the development of international law 
affecting fishing may lead to changes in practices and requirements of many states.”
68  
Thus the issues were left to the vagaries and uncertainties of customary international 
law. 
   
6. Success or Failure?  The Impact of the 1958 Conventions   
The overall reception of the 1958 Conventions was underwhelming.69 The High 
Seas Convention, with 62 ratifications, was the most widely accepted of the four 
treaties.  The Fisheries Convention, on the other hand, only managed to attract 37 
contracting parties.  
However, it is certainly not true that they had no normative impact.  Many of 
the rules in the 1958 Conventions would be reproduced in some form in the 1982 
LOS Convention. Moreover, some of the proposals on which states could not come to 
an agreement would have an impact on the formation of customary international law.  
At the same time, some of the more controversial provisions of the 1958 Conventions 
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would be the catalyst for a more wide-ranging reformulation of the law of the sea in 
the following decades.   
During the 1960s, the process of decolonisation saw the creation of several new 
states70, many at lower levels of development. Some of these newly independent 
states were demanding changes in the law to take into account their special interests.  
As O’Connell notes, some states, “inspired more by emotion than legal analysis, 
purported to find their hands tied by the Convention in the interests of the great 
powers, and were disposed to overthrow the whole Geneva system as having been 
contrived without their consent and against their interests.”
71  In this way, the law of 
the sea became caught up with more general demands for a New International 
Economic Order which was being promoted by developing countries within the 
United Nations at that time.   
Although the 1958 Conventions did contain amendment clauses, no attempts 
were made to invoke these procedures in order to make changes to the legal regime.  
The relatively low number of contracting parties to these instruments may have 
contributed to the failure to pursue this option.  Moreover, many states had in mind a 
more revolutionary change to the legal regime, rather than tinkering with what was 
already there.   
In the meantime, the widely perceived weaknesses of the 1958 regime led to a 
return to unilateralism as a means of asserting legal claims.  State practice continued 
to develop to the degree that the ICJ held in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases that 
coastal states could claim a twelve mile exclusive fisheries zone, a “tertium genus 
between the territorial sea and the high seas”, as well as preferential fishing rights on 
the high seas, despite the principle of freedom of fishing as found in the 1958 High 
Seas Convention.72      
By the time the judgment was rendered in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, 
negotiations at UNCLOS III were already underway.  Indeed, the Court took note of 
these multilateral law-making activities.73  The Court recognized that it could not 
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render judgment sub specie legis ferendae and it clearly acknowledged the advantages 
of negotiated outcomes at the international level.74 
 
7. The Politicisation of the Law of the Sea: UNCLOS III  
In 1967, the Maltese ambassador Arvid Pardo addressed the First Committee of 
the General Assembly, demanding urgent action to ensure the peaceful development 
of the law of the sea and in particular the legal regime relating to the deep seabed.  In 
response to this speech, the General Assembly created the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of the Seabed75 whose initial mandate was to prepare a survey of state practice 
on the deep sea-bed and the ocean floor, an account of the scientific, technical, 
economic, legal and other aspects of the issue, and an indication of practical means of 
promoting international co-operation in the exploration, conservation and exploitation 
of the ocean floor.76     
The work of the Committee led to the adoption by the General Assembly of the 
1970 Declaration of Deep Seabed Principles.77  In the words of one author, these 
principles “obviously filled a void created by the rampant technological revolution in 
this rampant area.”
78  The promulgation of the Declaration differed drastically from 
the process of codification because the Committee was faced with completely new 
issues where there was no settled state practice.79  Formally, the Declaration was non-
binding, although the principles therein were to have a significant influence on the 
future LOS Convention and international law generally.80  Indeed, the Declaration 
was not an end in itself and it foresaw the establishment of an international regime to 
implement the principles in a more concrete form.   
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In 1970, the General Assembly also decided to convene another conference on 
the law of the sea.  The mandate of the Conference was not limited to the deep 
seabed.  UNCLOS III was instructed to “adopt a convention dealing with all matters 
relating to the law of the sea.”
81  Thereby, the General Assembly sanctioned the 
reform of the whole law of the sea in order to address the concerns of states over the 
1958 Conventions.  According to one author, “nothing was now to be taken for 
granted; everything was to be looked at again in the light of new political, economic 
and technological realities.”
82 
UNCLOS III was described by one of its participants as “the most 
comprehensive political and legislative work undertaken by the United Nations in its 
38 years of existence.”
83
  Clearly there was a lot at stake for all states concerned and 
UNCLOS III was “as much a daring venture of international politics and 
international relations as an exercise in international law.”
84  The politically charged 
atmosphere also affected the methods of law-making to be adopted by UNCLOS III. 
From the start, it was a drastically different process from previous attempts at 
codifying the law of the sea. 
The politicisation of the law of the sea is partially reflected in the preparatory 
process of UNCLOS III.  In contrast to UNCLOS I, the task of preparing for the 
conference was not delegated to the International Law Commission.  It was thought 
the balancing of competing state interests could not be undertaken by a body of 
independent legal experts.  As one commentator says, “states were simply unwilling 
to leave the promotion of their vital interests to the International Law Commission 
because they reasoned that only governmental representatives could effectively 
formulate solutions.”
85  In particular, developing countries doubted the 
representativeness of the Commission and they had serious reservations about its 
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conservative approach to codification.86  Instead, the preparatory work for the 
Conference was entrusted to the Seabed Committee, whose membership was 
increased in size to ninety-one members for this purpose.  General Assembly 
Resolution 2750 (XXV) mandated the Committee to prepare draft treaty articles 
embodying the international regime for the deep seabed area and resources of the 
seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as well as a comprehensive list of 
subjects and issues relating to the law of the sea to be dealt with by the Conference, 
including draft articles on such subjects and issues.87  The Seabed Committee met for 
six sessions between 1971 and 1973. Its final report consisted of six volumes of 
proposals and counter-proposals submitted by states, as well as a number of studies 
prepared by the UN Secretariat at the behest of the Committee.  Crucially, it failed to 
produce a draft treaty text.88 
A further reflection of the political character of UNCLOS III was the fact that 
oversight of the Conference was undertaken by the First (Political) Committee of the 
UN General Assembly, rather than the Sixth (Legal) Committee.89 
Many commentators have stressed the enormity of the task with which 
UNCLOS III was charged.90 It is true that the scope of the issues had grown since the 
first serious attempt at codification through the International Law Commission.91  
Deep seabed mining, the marine environment and the transfer of marine technology 
were now key issues in the discussions.  More significantly, perhaps, the number of 
states involved in the negotiations had dramatically increased.  Whereas 86 states had 
attended the 1958 Conference, over 160 states participated at various stages of 
UNCLOS III.92  Resolution 3067 (XXVIII) explicitly called for universality of 
participation at the Conference and it mandated the UN Secretary General to invite all 
Members States of the United Nations or its specialised agencies, members of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, contracting parties to the ICJ Statute, as well as 
Guinea-Bissau and North Viet-Nam, who at the time were not yet members of the 
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United Nations.93  In addition, invitations were sent to certain inter-governmental and 
non-governmental organisations and the UN Council for Namibia.94  In other words, 
this was intended to be an attempt at law-making by the international community as a 
whole.   
The negotiations at UNCLOS III were politically charged.  Traditional 
groupings, such as the G77 or the geographical groups inherited from the UN system, 
did play a role in the negotiations.  More importantly, several interest groups 
spontaneously emerged from the negotiating process such as the coastal states, the 
strait states, the archipelagic states, and the landlocked and geographically 
disadvantaged states.   
The conflict between the developing countries and industrialised states was one 
of the most striking dynamics at the Conference.  The chief area of controversy 
between these two factions was the somewhat unusual topic of deep seabed mining, 
an issue that would ultimately cause the failure of the Conference to agree a text by 
consensus.95  However, political alliances and divisions often varied depending on the 
issues under discussion.  Whilst the industrialised states were largely unified on the 
issue of deep seabed mining, divisions arose over questions of maritime pollution 
depending on whether a state identified itself as a coastal state or a maritime state.  
The challenge for the Conference was to balance all of these diverse interests. 
   
8. A Revolution in Law-Making: Consensus Decision-Making 
The procedures for decision-making would clearly be a vital component in the 
ability of the Conference to reconcile the conflicting claims and counter-claims of 
states at UNCLOS III.  In the words of one participant, “from the outset it was 
acknowledged that it would be an exercise in futility to draw up a draft convention 
unacceptable to one or more of the major groupings within the United Nations.”
96  
Universal agreement was the aim and it was the negotiating process and procedures 
which would facilitate its achievement.    
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It is no surprise then that questions of procedure dominated the first session of 
the Conference in 1973 and it was only after intense inter-sessional negotiations that 
the second session was able to reach agreement on an acceptable formula.  It was 
clear that majority voting would not be an appropriate method of decision-making as 
the developing countries would be able to outvote the industrialised states on matters 
of substance.  Even the two-thirds majority employed at UNCLOS I would not 
safeguard the interest of all states.  The compromise reached at the second session of 
the Conference was on a process of consensus decision-making.   
According to Buzan, the formalisation of the consensus decision-making 
procedures was one of the most important innovations of UNCLOS III.97  The Rules 
of Procedure themselves do not mention consensus98, rather they require procedural 
decisions to be made by a simple majority whilst substantive decisions required a 
two-thirds majority.99  However, the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement, adopted as an 
annex to the Rules of Procedure, mediates the use of the voting procedures and 
explicitly calls for consensus decision-making: “the Conference should make every 
effort to reach an agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus and there 
should be no voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus have been 
exhausted.”  
Consensus is to be distinguished from unanimity which requires the affirmative 
vote of all negotiating states.  In contrast, consensus simply requires that there is “a 
very considerable convergence of opinions and the absence of any delegations in 
strong disagreement.”
100  Evensen describes the consensus principle as “the 
cornerstone of the Conference… it meant the adoption of articles – and the text of the 
Convention as a whole – by general agreement (or understanding) without resorting 
to a vote and, in effect, without requiring an unanimous decision.”
101  In other words, 
                                                 
97 Buzan, "Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea", (1981) 75 American Journal of International Law at p. 328.  See also Plant, 
"The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Preparatory Commission: 
Models for United Nations Law-Making?" (1987) 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 
pp. 526-527. 
98 Plant, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Preparatory 
Commission",  at pp. 532-533. 
99 The Rules of Procedure are reproduced by Buzan, "Negotiating by Consensus",  at pp. 347-348. 
100 Vignes, "Will the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea Work According to Consensus Rule?" 
(1975) 69 American Journal of International Law at p. 124. 
101 Evensen, "Keynote Address",  at p. xxvi. 
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the consensus decision-making procedure was concerned with achieving an outcome 
which would balance the interests of all the states involved.   
Vignes observes that consensus does not stand alone as a decision-making 
procedure, rather it is linked to a majority vote, “as a threat [or] an inducement to 
achieve consensus.”
102  However, several procedural safeguards were agreed in order 
to ensure that a vote could not be taken before efforts at consensus had been 
exhausted.  These safeguards included the deferral of the vote during which time the 
President of the Conference would make every effort to facilitate an agreement.  A 
deferral of up to ten days could be requested by fifteen delegates of the Conference 
and a further deferral could be agreed by a majority vote of the plenary.103  It should 
be noted that these safeguards did not apply to the adoption of the Convention as a 
whole.  Rather, the Rules provide that “the Convention shall not be put to the vote 
less than four working days after the adoption of its last article.”
104  This gives some 
breathing space to allow a last attempt at bringing reluctant states on board.  Even 
with the procedural safeguards, there is an obvious tension between the voting 
procedures and the principle of consensus.105  In the end, effective implementation of 
the consensus procedures relies to a certain extent on the good faith of the negotiators 
and a strong political will to reach a compromise. 
The Gentlemen’s Agreement was only one aspect of the consensus decision-
making procedure adopted at UNCLOS III. Buzan also identifies what he calls an 
“active consensus procedure” which was intended to push forward the process of 
consensus formation by removing the role of proposing solutions from the 
participants themselves and seeking to prevent the hardening of negotiating 
positions.106 Thus, following a failure to make progress in the negotiations, the 
Conference agreed at its third session in 1975 to mandate the chairs of the three main 
committees to produce what were known as the Informal Single Negotiating Texts.107  
As its name suggests, the ISNT had no official status and it simply acted as a focus for 
the negotiations.  In the words of the President of UNCLOS III, “the texts would not 
                                                 
102 Vignes, "Will the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea Work According to Consensus Rule?", at 
p. 120. 
103 Rule 37. 
104 Rule 39(2). 
105 Vignes, "Will the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea Work According to Consensus Rule?"  at 
p. 120. 
106 Buzan, "Negotiating by Consensus",  at pp 328-329. 
107 Hereinafter, “ISNTs”. 
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prejudice the position of any delegation, and would not represent any negotiated text 
or accepted compromise.”
108 
As well as the official negotiation process, a number of unofficial negotiating 
groups operated on the sidelines of the Conference, contributing to its success.109  
These informal groups brought together the important delegations from special 
interest groups in a private forum which was more conducive to fruitful negotiations.  
The best known of these was the Evensen Group, which dealt with a variety of issues 
including the EEZ, the marine environment, marine scientific research and the 
continental shelf.  Many of the compromises produced in this group were to 
substantially influence the official negotiating texts.110 
The interrelatedness of the law of the sea was an important factor during the 
Conference negotiations where the need to identify compromises between competing 
state interests was vital to its success.  The interrelationship was expressly recognized 
in General Assembly resolutions from 1969 onwards and ultimately in the preamble 
to the LOS Convention itself which says, “the problems of ocean space are closely 
related and need to be considered as a whole.” 
How this interrelationship was to be achieved in practice was not clear when the 
Conference opened in 1973.  UNCLOS III continued the organizational set-up 
adopted by the Sea-Bed Committee so that the work was divided into three main 
committees, covering the seabed regime, the general law of the sea, and the marine 
environment and marine scientific research.  Whilst the work was split on thematic 
grounds, the issues discussed in the three committees continued to be interlinked.  As 
Paul Bamela Engo, chair of the First Committee, explains, “some matters under 
consideration in other Main Committees had significant repercussions in the First 
Committee”
111 and the same was clearly true for the other two committees.112  Given 
                                                 
108 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. IV, at p. 26, paras. 
92-93. 
109 See Buzan, ""United we stand..." - Informal negotiating groups at UNCLOS III", (1980) 4 Marine 
Policy 183. 
110 See Koh and Jayakumar, "An Overview of the Negotiating Process of UNCLOS III",  at pp. 106-
107.  
111 Engo, "Issues of the First Committee", in The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, ed. Oxman and 
Koers (Law of the Sea Institute, 1983) at p. 40. 
112 Yankov, "The significance of the 1982 Convention for the protection of the marine environment - 
Third Committee Issues", in The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, ed. Oxman and Koers (Law of the 
Sea Institute, 1983) at p. 72. 
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these de facto linkages, states were only willing to make compromises in one 
committee contingent on the outcome of debates in other committees.     
Whilst linkages between particular provisions of a treaty are common113, it is 
the linking of the Convention as a whole that characterises the package deal concept 
that arose at UNCLOS III.114    Evensen, a key participant in the Conference, 
describes the package deal as “the notion that all the main parts of the Convention 
should be looked upon as an entity, as a single negotiated package, where the laws of 
give and take presumably had struck a reasonable balance between participating 
states considered as a whole.”
115  It was the objective of the Conference to resolve the 
outstanding issues in the law of the sea to the satisfaction of as many states as possible 
and it became clear that compromises between the principal protagonists would be 
crucial to the its success.   
In a significant step, the ISNTs which had been produced by the committee 
chairs were combined in 1977 into a single document, the so-called Informal 
Composite Negotiating Text.116  Evensen explains the significance of the ICNT: “for 
the first time, the Conference prepared a treaty text where the different parts were co-
ordinated and where obvious contradictions and unnecessary repetitions had been 
remedied.”
117  All the same, the ICNT remained a negotiating text subject to further 
compromise.  Thus, delegates continued to refine the issues over which there were 
disagreements, forming seven negotiating groups at its seventh session in 1978 to 
concentrate on key divisive topics.  In another significant step, it was agreed at the 
same session that “any modifications to be made in the [ICNT] should emerge from 
the negotiations themselves and should not be introduced on the initiative of any 
single person, whether it be the President or a Chairman of a Committee, unless 
presented to the Plenary and found, from the widespread and substantial support 
prevailing in Plenary, to offer a substantially improved prospect of a consensus… the 
revision of the [ICNT] should be the collective responsibility of the President and the 
Chairmen of the main committees, acting together as a team headed by the 
                                                 
113 Lee, "The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States", (1983) 77 American Journal of 
International Law at p. 567. 
114 What Plant calls the “grand-package”’; "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea and the Preparatory Commission",  at p. 528. 
115 Evensen, "Keynote Address",  at p. xxvii. 
116 Hereinafter, “ICNT”. 
117 Evensen, "Working Methods and Procedures in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of 




118  This move made it much more difficult to change the negotiating text 
and it was, according to one author, “a recognition that a heavy burden of proof 
[was] necessary for any proposal to change any one of the large majority of articles 
that already [enjoyed] widespread and substantial support.”
119  At the close of the 
ninth session in 1980, the title of the document was changed to a “draft convention”, 
although its status as a negotiating text remained unaffected until its final adoption in 
1982. 
Negotiations, however, began to turn sour with the election of Ronald Reagan 
as President of the United States in 1980.  President Reagan immediately ordered a 
root and branch review of the draft convention.  Determined to oppose the treaty, the 
US demanded a vote on the adoption of the treaty at the final session of the 
Conference on 30 April 1982.  As a result, the final text of the LOS Convention was 
adopted by 130 votes in favour, 4 against, and 17 abstentions.  The list of those 
countries which did not vote in favour of the Convention includes most industrialised 
states and Soviet states.120   
As noted above, the principal objection of the industrialised states was to the 
provisions on the International Seabed Area in Part XI of the Convention.121  In the 
final speech to the Conference, the US delegate stressed that whilst those parts dealing 
with the traditional aspects of the law of the sea reflected prevailing international 
practice, the deep seabed mining regime was largely unacceptable.122  Despite last 
minute efforts to persuade the US to participate, it refused to sign the Convention and 
many other industrialised states resolved that they would not consent to be bound by 
the Convention as it stood in 1982.123   
Turkey, Israel and Venezuela also voted against the Convention, albeit for 
different reasons.  Turkey and Venezuela both objected to the methods outlined in the 
                                                 
118 Cited by Buzan, "Negotiating by Consensus",  at p. 337. 
119 Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Seventh Session 
(1978)", (1979) 73 American Journal of International Law at p. 5. 
120 The Soviet and Eastern European states changed their position and signed the Convention when it 
was opened for signature in December 1982. 
121 See Larson, "The Reagan Rejection of the U.N. Convention", (1985) 14 Ocean Development and 
International Law 337. 
122 See statement of the United States, 192nd meeting, Official Records of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol. 17, at pp. 116-117.  See also the statement of the United 
Kingdom, 189th meeting, Ibid., at pp. 79-80.   
123 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea  at p. 23. 
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Convention for delimiting the continental shelf and the EEZ.124  Israel, on the other 
hand, principally opposed the provisions on straits contained in Part III of the 
Convention.125 
 
9. Conclusion   
The package deal, combined with the consensus decision-making procedures 
described above, were negotiating tools which were aimed at achieving a treaty text 
that was acceptable to as many states as possible.  These procedures represent a novel 
method of law-making which seeks to bring together states in a deliberative process in 
order to achieve a compromise across the board.   
Writing before the conclusion of the Conference, Buzan argues that “actual 
resort to [a vote] would in all likelihood have indicated a breakdown of the 
negotiations… [and] the only sensible conclusion to the negotiating techniques 
evolved at UNCLOS is to adopt the final revision by consensus.”
126  Applying this 
analysis to the actual events of the Conference, the recourse to a vote at the final 
session of UNCLOS III indicates the failure to accommodate a number of important 
interests.  If the goal of the Conference was to conclude a treaty covering all aspects 
of the law of the sea which met with the general approval of all states, the outcome 
was disappointing.   
The Conference did manage to produce a clear and comprehensive set of rules 
and principles on the law of the sea.  Indeed, apart from Part XI, most other sections 
of the LOS Convention garnered the support of an overwhelming majority of states.  
The Conference was therefore successful in forging a consensus on many aspects of 
the law of the sea, including many issues that had evaded settlement since the first 
attempts at codification. 
The Conference was also successful in introducing new law-making techniques.  
The drafting of an instrument through an international conference has advantages over 
creating law through custom as it promotes transparency and inclusiveness in the law-
                                                 
124 Statement of Turkey, 189th meeting, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, vol. 17, at pp. 76-78; statement of Venezuela, 192nd meeting, Ibid., at pp. 118-119. 
125 Statement of Israel, 190th meeting, Ibid., at pp. 84-85. 
126 Buzan, "Negotiating by Consensus",  at p. 332. 
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making process.  Thus, this method of law-making can make a major contribution to 
promoting stability in international relations.   
Law-making techniques and the status of a legal instrument are of course two 
separate concepts that should not be confused.  The outcome of UNCLOS III was a 
treaty which formally creates legal obligations only for those states which consent to 
be bound.  However, there are ways in which treaties can have an impact on non-
parties.  To what extent the LOS Convention succeeded in creating a universal 












Towards a Universal Law of the Sea? 
 
1. The Limits of the LOS Convention as a Treaty Instrument 
From the outset, the object of UNCLOS III was to conclude a treaty covering all 
aspects of the law of the sea.1  At its final session in 1982, the Conference fulfilled this 
aim by adopting the LOS Convention which was subsequently opened for signature on 
10 December 1982.   
The LOS Convention aspires to universal participation.  It is open to formal 
acceptance by all states, as well as a range of non-state actors which had attended the 
Conference.2  The target of universal participation has been endorsed by the General 
Assembly which regularly urges states that have not done so to become parties to the 
Convention.3   
States can consent to be bound by the Convention through ratification or 
accession.4  The LOS Convention required sixty ratifications or accessions in order to 
come into force.  It finally did so on 16 November 1994.5  States accepting the 
Convention following its entry into force will become bound thirty days after indicating 
their acceptance.6   As of May 2007, the number of States Parties was 155.   Whilst this 
includes a significant proportion of the international community, it still falls short of the 
192 states who are currently members of the United Nations. 
                                                 
1 General Assembly Resolution 2750 (XXV), 1970, at para. 3. 
2 LOS Convention, Article 305. 
3 E.g. General Assembly Resolution 61/30, 2006, at para. 3. 
4 LOS Convention, Articles 306-307. 
5 Guyana deposited the sixtieth ratification on 16 November 1993.  The Convention entered into force as 
modified by the 1994 Part XI Agreement, which was necessary to ensure the participation in the 
Convention of the group of industrialised states which objected to the deep seabed provisions of the 
original Convention.  See also chapters three and four for further discussion of the deep seabed regime, at 
pp. 69-71 and 97 ff.. 
6 LOS Convention, Article 308(2). 
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According to the fundamental doctrine of pacta tertiis nec nocent prosunt, a 
treaty only creates legal obligations for states which have consented to be bound.7  The 
International Law Commission describes this doctrine as “one of the bulwarks of the 
independence and equality of States”
8, whilst McNair says that “both legal principle 
and common sense are in favour of the rule … because as regards States which are not 
parties … a treaty is res inter alios acta.”
9     
The limitations of treaties as instruments for the creation of universal law are 
thus plain.  From the strict perspective of the law of treaties, it is necessary for all states 
to become party to the Convention in order for it to successfully create a universal 
framework for the law of the sea.   
Given these inherent limitations, it may seem strange that states continue to use 
treaties as a way of developing international law.10  The answer may be a lack of any 
viable alternative.  As McNair noted as long ago as 1930, the treaty is “the only and 
sadly overworked instrument with which international society is equipped for the 
purpose of carrying out multifarious transactions.”
11  Little has changed since that time.  
More than sixty years later, another author similarly concludes, “law-making by treaty is 
the only organized procedure for the conscious, rational positing of legal rules, at least 
at the universal level.”
12   
International legislation has occasionally been mooted13, but the idea of an 
instrument capable of binding all states ipso facto without their consent is not yet 
                                                 
7 Article 34 provides that “a treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent.”  There are exceptions to this rule which will be discussed below at p. 41 onwards. 
8 International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly", (1966 - II)  Yearbook of the International Law Commission at p. 227.   
9 McNair, Law of Treaties (Oxford University Press, 1961) at p. 309.  See also Tomuschat, "Obligations 
arising for states without or against their will ", (1993) 241 Receuil des Cours at p. 242. 
10 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p. 233. 
11 McNair, "The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties", (1930) 11 British Yearbook of 
International Law at p. 101. 
12 Tomuschat, "Obligations arising for states without or against their will ",  at p. 239. See similar 
comments by Simma, "From bilateralism to community interest in international law", (1994) 250 Receuil 
des Cours at p. 323. 
13 For instance, Chodosh contends the emergence of what he calls “declaratory international law” which 
differs from customary international law because it is not necessarily accepted as law by a generality of 
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generally accepted.  Danilenko, for one, says "there is no evidence that by entering into 
negotiations leading to treaty norms expressing general interests, members of the 




One possible exception is the power of the UN Security Council to impose 
obligations on Members of the United Nations.  Whilst most Security Council 
resolutions deal with specific threats to international peace and security involving a 
small number of states, some are drafted in general terms.15  These resolutions come 
close to legislation.  Nor is the Security Council alone in possessing the ability to bind 
states by its decisions.  Some other institutions have powers to create and amend 
standards which are binding on states without the need for their further consent.16  
However, it should be remembered that all of these law-making powers are conferred by 
treaty in the first place.  Moreover, they can only be exercised within strict limits.  Such 
powers are better understood as delegated law-making than legislation per se.   
It is inappropriate to describe the LOS Convention as a legislative act.  Yet, there 
may be other ways to account for the transition of the Convention from treaty instrument 
to universal law.  The first stage of the analysis is to look to the law of treaties for any 
exceptions to the pacta tertiis principle which would allow the application of the LOS 
Convention to third states without them being a party.  Secondly, it is necessary to 
inquire whether the conclusion of a treaty such as the LOS Convention can influence the 
creation of customary international law.   
 
                                                                                                                                                
states; "Neither Treaty Nor Custom: The Emergence of Declarative International Law", (1991) 26 Texas 
International Law Journal 87. 
14 Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) at pp. 67-
68.  See also Oppenheim, concluding that international legislation is not a development “which 
governments are at present prepared to accept”; Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, 
9 ed., vol. 1 (Longman, 1992) at pp. 114-115. 
15 E.g. Security Council Resolution 1373.  The legislative function of the Security Council is much 
debated; e.g. Rosand, “The Security Council as Global Legislator: Ultra Vires or Ultra-Innovation”, 
(2005) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 101; Wood, “The UN Security Council and International 
Law”, (2006) Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, lecture 1, at paras. 23-27. 
16 E.g. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Article 2(9). 
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2. Treaty Rights and Obligations for Third States 
The first question is to what extent can states have rights or obligations under a 
treaty without being a party.  The general principle is that treaties are only binding on 
states that have consented to be bound.17 
One exception to this principle is that a treaty can confer rights on third states, 
sometimes referred to as “stipulation pour autrui”.18  In the Free Zones Case, the PCIJ  
confirmed that third states could enjoy rights under a treaty without becoming a party to 
the treaty itself.19  The Court emphasised the importance of the intention of the 
contracting parties to this effect, as well as the consent of the third state.  On the 
evidence, the Court held that the parties to the 1815 Treaty of Paris and associated 
instruments had intended to extend to Switzerland a right to the withdrawal of the 
French customs barrier behind the political frontier and that Switzerland could rely on 
that right in the proceedings against France.20   
The rules relating to the rights of third states under treaties are now found in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article 36 provides in part, “a right 
arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the 
provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it 
belongs, or to all States, and the third State assents thereto.”
21  According to this 
provision, there are two conditions which must be satisfied before a right is conferred on 
                                                 
17 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 34. 
18 Whether this is correctly classified as an exception was the subject of intense debate in the International 
Law Commission; see International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Report of 
the Commission to the General Assembly",  at p. 226. 
19 Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex, (1932) Series A/B, No. 46 PCIJ Reports 96 at p. 147.  
For the background of the dispute, see Weber, "Free Zones of Upper Savoy and Gex Case", in 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. Bernhardt (North-Holland, 1981). 
20 France had argued that it could unilaterally abrogate the prescription in the 1815 treaties because 
Switzerland, it claimed, had no legal right thereunder.  In fact, the Court primarily held that the creation of 
the free zones had the character of a contract.  It then went on to consider whether a treaty could confer a 
right on a third state; Free Zones Case, at p. 147.  It has been argued that the decision of the Court on third 
party rights was therefore obiter dicta; see McNair, Law of Treaties  at p. 312. In contrast, Chinkin argues 
that common law concepts such as obiter dicta have no application in international law as there is no 
system of precedent; Third Parties in International Law (Clarendon Press, 1993) at p. 28, footnote 13.   
21 The source of such rights, whether in the treaty itself or in a collateral agreement, was hotly contested 
within the Commission; see e.g. International Law Commission, "736th Meeting, Tuesday 2 June 1964", 
(1964 II) Yearbook of the International Law Commission at p. 80. 
 
 42 
a third state.  Firstly, the parties to the treaty must have intended to confer a right on a 
third state.  Secondly, the third state itself must consent to the conferral of the right.  The 
consent of third parties to accept a right under a treaty to which it is not a party shall 
however be “presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated.”22     
As well as conferring rights, a treaty can also create obligations for third states 
without those states actually becoming party to the whole treaty.  This situation is 
covered by Article 35 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  Article 35 
again stresses the importance of the intention of the parties to the treaty to create an 
obligation for a third State and the consent of the third state to that obligation.  The 
principal difference between the treatment of rights and obligations in this context is the 
form of consent.  According to Article 35, a third party must accept an obligation under 
a treaty in writing.23  The ILC commentary confirms that such obligations are not strictly 
speaking based upon the treaty itself but on a second collateral agreement between the 
parties to the treaty and the third state.24 
The intention of the contracting parties to confer a right or obligation is central to 
these provisions.  In these circumstances, the parties to the treaty may be characterised 
as offering a right to a third state or inviting a third state to undertake an obligation.   
                                                 
22 The commentary to Article 35 notes that the issue of consent in relation to third party rights is 
controversial and a treaty cannot impose a right on a third state because “a right can always be disclaimed 
or waived.”  According to the commentary, the text of Article 35 is intended to leave open the question of 
whether juridically the right is created by the treaty or by the beneficiary state’s act of acceptance; 
International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly",  at pp. 228-229.   
23 There was much discussion about the form of consent to an obligation in the discussions of the ILC; see 
733rd meeting to 735th meeting, (1964 I) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, at pp. 64-80.  
The condition that acceptance must be in writing was added at the Vienna Conference following a 
proposal by Vietnam; see Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University 
Press, 1984) at p. 101. 
24 International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly",  at p. 227.  The Commission again cite as authority for the rule the decision of the 
PCIJ in the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex Case, where the Court held that the 1919 
Treaty of Versailles was not binding on Switzerland “who is not a Party to the Treaty, except to the extent 
to which that state has accepted it.”  In this context, France was arguing that the 1919 Treaty imposed an 
obligation on Switzerland to agree to the abrogation of the “free zones”.  In its commentary on Article 35, 
the International Law Commission also cited the Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia, 
(1923) Series B, No. 5 PCIJ Reports 7; Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International 
Commission of the River Oder (1929) Series B, No. 14 PCIJ Reports 4. 
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How one identifies the intentions of the parties is an important issue. The 
standard of proof is a high one – in the words of the PCIJ, “it cannot be lightly presumed 
that stipulations favourable to a third State have been adopted with the object of 
creating an actual right in its favour.”
25
     
The principal means of identifying intention should be the text of the treaty itself 
and the normal rules of treaty interpretation apply.26  A third state which is afforded 
rights or obligations under a treaty need not be specifically named; a treaty may direct 
itself to all states or to a specific class of states belonging to an identifiable category.27  
Further evidence of intention may also be found in travaux préparatoires.  Such 
evidence, however, should not be used to infer an intention that cannot be supported by 
the text of the treaty.       
In the case of the LOS Convention, there are no express stipulations which 
clearly and unambiguously confer rights or obligations on third states.    It is true that 
many provisions in the Convention refer to “States” or to “all States” as opposed 
specifically to “States Parties”.  For example, Article 2(1) says that “the sovereignty of a 
coastal State extends, beyond its land and territory and internal waters and, in the case 
of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as 
the territorial sea.”  This provision seemingly refers to coastal States in general rather 
than coastal States Parties.  Similar phrasing is found throughout the Convention with 
the exception of Parts XI, XV, and XVII which are largely addressed to States Parties 
alone.   
Does this generic terminology demonstrate the intention of the drafters to grant 
rights to third states?  St Skourtos thinks so.  He asserts that “with regard to the 
comprehensive objective, the universal aim and the system applied by the Convention 
concerning the conferment of rights and the imposition of obligations … it cannot be 
                                                 
25 Free Zones Case, at p. 147.  The Court goes on to say that “the question of the existence of a right 
acquired under an instrument drawn between other States is therefore one to be decided in each particular 
case: it must be ascertained whether the States which have stipulated in favour of a third State meant to 
create for that State an actual right which the latter has accepted as such”; at pp. 147-148.   
26 Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law, at p. 33. 
27 See International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties",  at p. 228.   
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lightly presumed that this differentiation of terms is to be regarded as meaningless.”
28  
However, it is not obvious that this conclusion is supported by other evidence.  Lee 
argues that “the intent may most appropriately be ascertained from official statements 
made by representatives of states participating in [UNCLOS III].”
29  A survey of the 
travaux préparatoires of the LOS Convention reveals strong disagreement amongst 
states over the precise impact of the Convention on third states with many delegates 
arguing that the Convention is a package deal which cannot be selectively applied by 
states.  The issue of interconnecting rights and obligations was stressed, for instance, by 
Deputy Foreign Minister Gouzhenko of the Soviet Union, who said at the closing 
session of the Conference that “the Convention is not a basket of fruit from which one 
can pick only those one fancies.  As is well known, the new comprehensive Convention 
has been elaborated as a single and indivisible instrument, as a package of closely 
interrelated compromise decisions.”
30   
It is the interconnection of the LOS Convention that causes problems for the 
application of Articles 35 and 36 of the Vienna Convention.  These provisions allow 
third states to selectively choose individual rights and obligations under a treaty.  Yet, 
this possibility would appear to have been against the wishes of many states at UNCLOS 
III.  Further support for this view can be found if one considers the wider context of the 
Convention.  Article 309 of the Convention prohibits reservations which are not 
expressly permitted.  Allowing third states to selectively claim rights and obligations 
under the LOS Convention would undermine this provision.  
                                                 
28 N. St. Skourtos, "Legal Effects for Parties and Non-Parties: The Impact of the Law of the Sea 
Convention", in Entry into Force of the Law of the Sea Convention, ed. Nordquist and Moore (Kluwer 
Law International, 1995) at p. 167; Wolfrum says “this choice of wording seems to indicate, if this 
differentiation of terms is not to be regarded as meaningless, that the LOS Convention not only creates or 
codifies rights and obligations for States Parties, but does so for non-parties as well”; Wolfrum, "The 
Legal Order for the Seas and the Oceans", in Entry into Force of the Law of the Sea Convention, ed. 
Nordquist and Moore (Kluwer Law International, 1995) at p. 167.  Wolfrum also suggests that third states 
can accept obligations in the LOS Convention by implementing its provisions into their national 
legislation and that this will satisfy the requirement of written consent in Article 35.  Although 
implementation may amount to state practice for the purposes of determining customary international law, 
it is dubious whether it constitutes acceptance in written form.   
29 Lee, "The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States", (1983) 77 American Journal of International 
Law at p. 547. 
30 Cited by Caminos and Molitor, "Progressive Development of International Law and the Package Deal", 
(1985) 79 American Journal of International Law at p. 877. 
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Indeed, the differential treatment of rights and obligations could be problematic 
for many multilateral treaties.  In his analysis, Sinclair notes that most treaties confer 
rights and obligations simultaneously and the two can often be intertwined.31  Moreover, 
although Article 36(2) allows conditions to be attached to rights conferred on third 
states, Chinkin notes that “onerous conditions could, in the opinion of a third party, 
transform such a right into an obligation.”
32  These issues are not satisfactorily resolved 
by the Vienna Convention. 
There is a further question of whether the provisions on third states are 
applicable to general multilateral treaties such as the LOS Convention.  Third state is 
defined by the Vienna Convention as “a State not party to a treaty”.33  This is a very 
broad definition and it makes no distinction between those states which can become a 
party and those states which cannot.  Nevertheless, the underlying policy of these 
provisions suggests that they should have a limited application.  It is submitted that the 
concept of stipulation pour autrui, literally “for other persons”34, only applies where a 
state is not able to become a party to the treaty by signature, ratification or accession.   
This argument finds some support in the fifth report on the law of treaties by 
Fitzmaurice where he suggests that the presumption that a treaty has no effects for third 
states is “enhanced, and may become absolute, in the case of these treaties which 
contain specific provision for the participation of third states, either by leaving the 
treaty open for signature or subsequent ratification by states other than the original 
signatories, or by the inclusion of an accession clause or its equivalent.”
35  Fitzmaurice 
admits there is no authority for this position, but he asserts that it is correct as a matter of 
principle.  He explains, “it seems clear that when a treaty itself makes provision for the 
admission of third states, then the correct method of procedure, if those third States wish 
                                                 
31 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties at pp. 102-103.   
32 Chinkin, Third Parties in International Law at p. 40.  Lachs suggests that if such a situation arises, the 
criteria applying to obligations must prevail; 736th meeting, (1964 - I) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission 80, at para. 28.  See also the comments of Ago at para. 41, and Waldock at para. 70. 
33 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 2(h). 
34 See Garner, ed., Black's law Dictionary, 8 ed., (Thomson West, 2004) at p. 1455. 
35 Fitzmaurice, “Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties”, (1960 II) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, at p. 77. 
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to benefit from, or to enjoy the rights provided by the treaty or if they are prepared to 
assume obligations, is for them to avail themselves of the faculty of becoming parties.”
36   
These comments raise questions over when the provisions on third states apply?  
The concept of stipulation pour autrui is aimed at the situation where a group of states 
concludes a treaty which has ramifications for other states who are not able to become a 
party to the treaty.  Examples are the 1815 Treaty of Paris and the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles, which were considered by the PCIJ in the Free Zones Case.  These 
instruments were both peace treaties concluded by a small number of powerful states 
following the cessation of international conflicts.  Despite the limited number of parties 
to the negotiations, the outcome nevertheless had the character of an international 
settlement that affected numerous third states who had not been involved in the 
negotiations and who could not become a full party to the treaty. It was therefore 
necessary to invoke the rules on third states in order to give full effect to the treaty.        
Many modern multilateral treaties, on the other hand, are negotiated in very 
different circumstances.   As Tunkin pointed out during the ILC discussions on this 
issue, “if a state had a legitimate interest in the subject-matter of a treaty, it should be 
invited to the Conference formulating the treaty or at least consulted during its 
formulation.”
37  All states and many other interested actors were involved in the drafting 
of the LOS Convention.  Moreover, any state, whether or not it attended UNCLOS III, is 
free to become a party to the Convention.  It is submitted that the participation of all 
states in the drafting of most modern multilateral treaties negates the need for invoking 
the principles on third party rights and obligations.  Similar observations were made by 
several members of the ILC in their discussion on Articles 35 and 36.38  The special 
                                                 
36 Ibid., at p. 89.  Similar reasoning, albeit in a different context, can be seen in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Cases, (1969) ICJ Reports 3, at para. 28. 
37 736th meeting, (1964 I) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, at p. 85. 
38 E.g. the comments of Bartos, (1964 I) Yearbook of the International Law Commission, at p. 67; Lachs, 
Ibid., at p. 70; Tabibi, Ibid., at p. 74; El-Erian, Ibid., at p. 75.  c.f. Rosenne who “agreed with Mr Lachs 
that all interested States should, as a matter of principle, be given the opportunity of participating in 
negotiations on matters of interest to them.”  He continues, “even if this desirable state of affairs were 
achieved, a provision of the kind set out in paragraph 1 would still be needed because, without wishing to 
become parties to an instrument, states might nonetheless wish to assume certain obligations in regard to 
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rapporteur himself noted that “it was unlikely that the parties to a general multilateral 
treaty would resort to devices of the kind envisaged…”
39
  Thus, on the basis of these 
arguments, the application of the provisions on third states to general multilateral treaties 
such as the LOS Convention is not appropriate. 
 
3. The LOS Convention as an Objective Regime? 
Another doctrine supporting the application of a treaty to non-parties is that of 
objective regimes.40  Support for the doctrine is found in the judgment of the PCIJ in the 
Case of the S.S. Wimbledon where the Court considered the implementation of Part XII, 
Section VI of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles which sets up a treaty regime for the Kiel 
Canal.    The S.S. Wimbledon was a ship flying the flag of the United Kingdom.  It had 
been chartered by a French company to carry munitions to the port of Danzig at the time 
when Poland was at war with Russia.  The ship was stopped from passing through the 
Kiel Canal by the German authorities because Germany claimed that it was bound by its 
status as a neutral state not to allow the transit of weapons to a warring party.  The UK, 
France, Italy and Japan brought a claim before the PCIJ claiming that Germany was 
under a duty to guarantee free access through the Kiel Canal under the terms of the 
Treaty of Versailles.  The Court held that the terms of Article 380 created an 
international waterway “intended to provide easier access to the Baltic for the benefit of 
all nations of the world.”
41  It is clear from this decision that Part XII, Section VI of the 
Treaty of Versailles creates a set of rights that are invocable by all states, whether or not 
                                                                                                                                                
it.”  Yet, even Rosenne deemed that there may be some difficulty in determining how the principles on 
third states apply to general multilateral treaties; Ibid., at p. 75. 
39 Ibid., at p. 78. 
40 For a historical account of the doctrine, see Subedi, "The Doctrine of Objective Regimes in International 
Law and the Competence of the United Nations to Impose Territorial or Peace Settlements on States", 
(1994) 37 German Yearbook of International Law 162. 
41 Case of the S.S. Wimbledon, (1923) PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 1, at p. 22; the Court continues “under 
its new regime, the Kiel Canal, must be open, on a footing of equality, to all vessels, without making any 
distinction between war vessels and vessels of commerce, but on one express condition, namely, that these 
vessels must belong to nations at peace with Germany.”  For comment, see Ragazzi, The Concept of 
International Obligations Erga Omnes (Clarendon Press, 1997) at pp. 24-27. 
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they are party to the treaty.   Nor was it a matter of a single right being conferred on 
these states; the Court treated Part XII, Section VI of the Treaty as an inseparable whole.    
The doctrine of objective regimes was considered by the International Law 
Commission in its codification of the law of treaties, although ultimately the 
Commission decided not to include it in the draft articles because it was deemed 
unlikely to meet with the general acceptance of states.42  Nevertheless, Sinclair insists 
that “it must not be assumed that the deliberate decision of the Commission and the 
Conference not to make special provision for treaties creating ‘objective regimes’ in the 
series of articles on treaties and third states in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties constitutes a denial of the existence of this category of treaty.”43  Indeed, the 
doctrine can still find support in the writings of many commentators.44  Aust writes that 
certain treaties have been held to create a status or regime valid erga omnes, including 
demilitarisation treaties45, waterway regimes46 or a regime for a special area, for 
example Antarctica.47   
Although the draft articles on objective regimes prepared by the special 
rapporteur were not ultimately submitted to the Vienna Conference on the Law of 
                                                 
42 International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly",  at p. 231, para. 4. 
43 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties at pp. 105-106.  C.f. Danilenko, Law-Making in 
the International Community at p. 63. 
44 Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford University Press, 1963) at pp. 326-327; Simma, "From bilateralism 
to community interest in international law",  at pp. 358-364;  Shaw, International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) at p. 836; Subedi, "The Doctrine of Objective Regimes in International Law",  at 
p. 836. 
45 The Committee of Jurists appointed by the League of Nations Council in 1920 describe the 1856 
Convention for the Demilitarization of the Aaland Islands as “true objective law”; see inter alia McNair, 
"The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties",  at p. 114.  
46 In the S.S. Wimbledon, by way of analogy to the Kiel Canal, the PCIJ refer to Panama Canal and Suez 
Canal  as “illustrations of the general opinion according to which when an artificial waterway connecting 
two open seas has been permanently dedicated to the use of the whole world, such waterway is assimilated 
to natural straits.” 
47 Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2000) at pp. 208-209.  For a 
contrary view on the status of Antarctica as an objective regime, see Charney, "The Antarctic System and 
Customary International Law", in International Law For Antarctica, ed. Francioni and Scovazzi (Kluwer 
Law International, 1996) at pp. 62-71; Simma, "Le Traite antarctique: cree-t-il un regime objectif ou 
non?" in Ibid..  Chinkin suggests that the doctrine of objective regimes was particularly controversial at 
the time of the ILC discussions because of the situation in Antarctica and the drafting of the Antarctic 
Treaty; Third Parties in International Law at p. 36. 
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Treaties, this work nevertheless provides a useful account of the scope of the doctrine.  
Waldock, as special rapporteur on the law of treaties, describes a treaty as creating an 
objective regime “when it appears from its terms and from the circumstances of its 
conclusion that the intention of the parties is to create in the general interest general 
obligations and rights relating to a particular region, State, territory, locality, river, 
waterway, or to a particular area of sea, sea-bed, or air-space; provided that the parties 
include among their number any State having territorial competence with reference to 
the subject matter of the treaty, or that any such State has consented to the provision in 
question.”
48  Waldock’s draft article on objective regimes required states to expressly or 
impliedly accept the objective regime. Failure to oppose the treaty within a certain time 
limit amounts to tacit acceptance.49   
It can be seen from this short analysis that the concept of objective regimes 
shares many similarities with third state rights and obligations under Articles 35 and 36 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  The creation of an objective regime 
must be clear from the intention of the parties to the treaty. Consent also plays a central 
role in Waldock’s conception of objective regimes.  Yet, there are several aspects of the 
doctrine of objective regimes which differentiate it from Articles 35 and 36 of the 
Vienna Convention.  Firstly, as noted above, it applies to a whole regime50 as opposed to 
individual treaty articles.  Furthermore, the doctrine of objective regimes as proposed by 
Waldock would only appear to be applicable to certain types of territorial regimes.   
Can this doctrine be invoked to support the universal application of the LOS 
Convention?  Unlike Article 35 and 36, it cannot be argued that the doctrine of objective 
regimes undermines the package deal achieved at UNCLOS III.  Indeed, this doctrine 
emphasises the interconnection of certain treaty articles.  
                                                 
48 Waldock, "Third Report on the Law of Treaties", (1964) II Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission at p. 26, Article 63(1). 
49 Draft Article 63(2).  The idea of a deadline was only tentatively proposed by Waldock in order to 
remove doubts over the acceptance of an objective regime; Ibid.,   at p. 33, para 22. 
50 In the Case of the S.S. Wimbledon, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that the drafters of 
the Treaty of Versailles took care to place the provisions on the Kiel Canal in a special section and in this 
sense, they describe it as a “self-contained” regime;  S.S. Wimbledon, at pp. 23-24. 
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Notwithstanding the controversial question of the intention of states attending 
UNCLOS III, it is not clear that Waldock considered the doctrine was applicable to 
treaties such as the LOS Convention.  In his commentary, he makes clear that his 
conception of objective regimes would not apply to general law-making treaties51, a 
category into which the LOS Convention arguably falls.  Waldock explains, “it excludes 
from the article cases where the parties have a general treaty-making competence with 
respect to the subject-matter of the treaty but no greater competence than any other 
state; in other words, it excludes law-making treaties concerned with general 
international law or with areas not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of any state.”
52  
Therefore, this doctrine, like the provisions on third states generally, are not intended to 
be applied to general multilateral treaties to which any state can become a party through 
ratification or accession.   
It follows that the law of treaties cannot account for the application of a general 
multilateral treaty such as the LOS Convention to non-parties.  Therefore, it is necessary 
to look beyond the law of treaties in order to account for any law-making impact that 
they might have. 
                                                                         
4. Customary International Law as a Source of Universal Law? 
It is accepted that custom can create universal rights and obligations, although 
how this source of international law is formed is not always clear.  In what ways can the 
negotiation of a written instrument such as the LOS Convention influence the 
development of customary international law?   
Custom is defined in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute as “general practice 
accepted as law”.  Thus, customary international law is generally considered as having 
two aspects, commonly referred to as state practice and opinio juris.  Beyond these basic 
                                                 
51 Waldock, "Third Report on the Law of Treaties",  at p. 33, paras. 18 and 19. 
52 Ibid.,   at p 33. 
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criteria, however, the requirements for the creation of custom are highly ambiguous.53  
As the ILA Committee on the Formation of Customary International Law concludes, 
“given the inherently informal nature of customary law, it is not to be expected, neither 
is it the case, that a precise number or percentage of States is required.”
54  Akehurst 
similarly argues that context is the overriding consideration and the threshold for the 
formation of a customary norm depends on the status of the norm that it is alleged has 
become custom, and whether it is a new norm or it replaces an existing norm.55   
Some guidance can be gained from decisions of the ICJ on the subject.  
However, the Court has not adopted a uniform approach to custom.  For instance, the 
Court declared in one case that state practice must be “constant and uniform”56 whilst in 
another case it cited the standard as “extensive and virtually uniform”.57  Again, it 
would appear that context is all important.   
From the case-law of the Court, it would also seem that the determination of 
whether there is sufficient state practice and opinio juris is as much a matter of quality 
as quantity.58  In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the Court held that a 
conventional rule could create a customary rule relatively rapidly provided that state 
practice included that of “States whose interests are specially affected.”59  This 
approach was developed by the Court in the Legality of Nuclear Weapons Advisory 
Opinion, where it decided that there was no prohibition of the possession of nuclear 
                                                 
53 In this regard, the editors of Oppenheim say, “this question is one of fact, not of theory.  All that theory 
can say is this: Wherever and as soon as a line of international conduct frequently adopted by states is 
considered by states generally legally obligatory or legally right, the rule which may be abstracted from 
such conduct is a rule of customary international law”; Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim's 
International Law, at p. 30.  Wright lists the numerous difficulties in ascertaining customary international 
law; "Custom as a Basis for International Law in the Post-War World", (1966)  Texas International Law 
Forum at p. 147.   
54 International Law Association, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, (2000) International Law Association London Conference at p. 25. 
55 Akehurst, "Custom as a Source of International Law", (1974-5)  British Yearbook of International Law 
at p. 17.  On this basis, he distinguishes the higher standard set in the Asylum case which involved a local 
custom; at p. 20. 
56 Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru), (1950) ICJ Reports 266 at pp. 276-277. 
57 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, at para. 73. 
58 International Law Association, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, at p. 26. 
59 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, at para. 73. 
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weapons in customary international law, despite the fact that such a prohibition was 
favoured by a majority of states.  In the opinion of the Court, the opposition of those 
states possessing nuclear weapons was a significant factor mitigating against the creation 
of a customary norm.60  Of course, determining which states are specially affected is 
also a question of context.  Highlighting the vagueness of the concept, Boyle and 
Chinkin suggest that “in a globalised world many states can claim to be especially 
affected in different ways by the actions of other states, making the concept of ‘specially 
affected’ state unhelpful.”
61  The concept is perhaps best understood as emphasising that 
a simple majority of states cannot make international law for the international 
community as a whole.  In this sense, questions of participation and legitimacy are 
inherent to the formation of customary international law.62 
Despite these ambiguities in the process of custom formation, it is accepted that 
treaties and other international instruments can have a significant influence.63  A 
traditional analysis of the interrelationship between treaty and custom starts with the 
judgment of the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.  Contemplating Article 6 
of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf as a reflection of customary 
international law, the Court said that “it was necessary to examine the status of the 
principle as it stood when the Convention was drawn, as it resulted from the effect of the 
Convention, and in light of state practice subsequent to the Convention.”
64
  Thus, the 
Court recognised that there are at least three different ways in which treaties can interact 
with custom: codification, crystallisation and the creation of new customary norms. 
                                                 
60 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, (1996) ICJ Reports 226, at 
para. 73.  C.f. the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantray.   
61 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, at p. 30. 
62 In a similar vein, the ILA Committee on the Formation of Customary International Law concluded that 
there was a need for “representativeness” in state practice and opinio juris; Statement of Principles 
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, principle 14.  They further note 
there are positive and negative aspects to representativeness. 
63 D’Amato cites the Nottebohm case as an example of a decision where the International Court of Justice 
relied exclusively on treaties; D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (1971) at p. 113. See 
also Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahariya v. Malta), (1985) ICJ Reports at 
para. 27.  The principle is confirmed in Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 38. 
64 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, at para. 60. 
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Firstly, a treaty can codify customary international law.  Codification involves 
recording the existing rules of the customary rules in the text of a treaty or other written 
instrument.  However, in the process of reducing customary rules to writing, the codifier 
is inevitably faced with discretionary decisions as to the use of certain words or phrases 
which will to some extent change what had been flexible concepts in the practice of 
states.65  Commentators have long noted the difficulty of separating codification from 
the progressive development of international law66 and the International Law 
Commission itself has found the distinction problematic.67  Baxter argues that “to the 
extent that the codifier progressively develops the law, his text ceases to be ‘declaratory 
of established principles of international law.”
68 According to this argument, any 
statement that an instrument codifies custom can only be treated as a presumption which 
can be overturned where there is evidence to the contrary. Thus, codification does not 
negate the need to consider subsequent state practice and opinio juris. 
Secondly, treaties can generate new rules of customary international law by 
inspiring subsequent state practice.69  In the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Judge 
Sørenson described how treaties can serve as “a nucleus around which a new set of 
generally recognised rules may crystallise.”
70  In this situation it is the accumulation of 
subsequent state practice and opinio juris which creates the new rules of customary 
international law, not the conclusion of the treaty per se.   
                                                 
65 See Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, at p. 34; Jennings, "The Discipline of 
International Law", in ILA Conference Report 1976, ed. International Law Association (1976) at p. 624.  
Baxter notes that “it is only exceptionally that a so-called “codification treaty” concluded under United 
Nations auspices on the basis of a draft prepared by the International Law Commission asserts on its face 
that it codifies existing international law”; "Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International 
Law", (1967)  British Yearbook of International Law at p. 287. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sørenson in 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, at pp. 242-243. 
66 For instance, de Visscher, cited by Shabtai Rosenne, Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law (1925-1928) (Oceana Publications, 1972) at pp. lii-liii. 
67 The International Law Commission has noted that its work on the law of the sea was “an amalgam of 
progressive development and codification and that, in the field of the law of the sea at any rate, it was not 
possible to maintain the distinction between the two categories”; cited by Sinclair, The International Law 
Commission (Grotius Publications, 1987) at p. 7. 
68 Baxter, "Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law",  at p. 289-290 
69 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, at para. 71. 
70 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sørenson in Ibid., at p. 244.  His use of the term “crystallise” is somewhat 
confusing in this context. 
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Thirdly, the ICJ noted that the negotiation of a treaty instrument can also have a 
much more direct influence on the creation of custom through the process of 
crystallisation.  Very little attention is given to the concept of crystallisation in the 
judgment of the ICJ which simply concludes that such a process of crystallisation was 
possible but that it had not occurred in the case of Article 6.  It was noted that the 
negotiation of Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention was “impromptu” and this 
particular provision was the subject of “long continued hesitations.”71  The Court 
concluded that “whatever validity this contention may have in respect of at least certain 
parts of the Convention, the Court cannot accept it as regards the delimitation 
provision.”
72     
From these statements, the concept of crystallisation is somewhat puzzling.  How 
is it different from the process of codification or the generation of new customary 
norms? 
The concept of crystallisation has its origins in the contention of the Netherlands 
and Denmark in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases that “the process of the 
definition and consolidation of the emerging customary law took place through the work 
of the International Law Commission, the reaction of governments to that work and the 
proceedings of the Geneva Conference … and this emerging customary law became 
crystallized in the adoption of the Continental Shelf Convention.”
73  From this short 
resumé by the Court, the concept of crystallisation appears to stress the negotiation 
process of a treaty or other instrument as a substantial factor in the formation of the 
custom, as opposed to previous or subsequent state practice.  This can be seen from the 
                                                 
71 Ibid., at paras. 49-53.   
72 Ibid., at para. 62.  The Court suggest that Article 1 to 3 of the Convention may be regarded as 
“reflecting, or as crystallising, received or at least emergent rules of customary international law relative 
to the continental shelf”; at para. 63. Thus, it does not decide whether these articles crystallise or codify 
custom.  Arguably, there was sufficient state practice on the continental shelf prior to the negotiation of 
the Convention to support the customary status of coastal state rights over the seabed and subsoil of the 
continental shelf.  The Court itself recalls the Truman Proclamation and subsequent state practice as the 
origins of the practice; at para. 47.   
73 Ibid., at para. 61. 
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pleadings of Denmark and the Netherlands who substantiated their claims that the 1958 
Continental Shelf Convention had crystallised customary international law by saying:74 
Throughout the period during which the codification and progressive development of the law of 
the sea was under consideration by the International Law Commission the whole doctrine of the 
coastal State’s rights over the continental shelf was still in course of formation.  The unilateral 
claims which had been made by individual States varied in their nature and extent; and many 
coastal States, including all Parties to the present dispute, had not yet promulgated any claim.  
The work of the Commission both helped to consolidate the doctrine in international law and to 
clarify its content … Thus, just as the work of the Commission and the contribution to that work 
made by governments were important factors in developing a consensus as to the acceptability of 
the doctrine and its nature and extent, so also were they important factors in developing a 
consensus as to the acceptability of the equidistance principle as the general rule for the 
delimitation of continental shelf boundaries. 
    
One problem with this conception of customary international law is that many 
commentators are wary of ascribing too much weight to what states say in the 
international sphere.  For instance, D’Amato asserts that only physical acts count as state 
practice and “[claims] cannot constitute the material component of custom.”75   
Yet, this view does not necessarily reflect the reality of what has traditionally 
counted as state practice for the purposes of customary international law.  Brownlie lists 
amongst the material sources of custom: diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, 
press releases, the opinions of official legal advisers, executive decisions and practices, 
state legislation, national judicial decisions, replies by governments to the International 
Law Commission, and recitals in treaties amongst other sources of evidence of 
customary international law.76  Many of these sources are verbal or written in nature, 
albeit, largely of a unilateral character.   
It follows that other verbal or written acts taking place on the international stage 
should also be counted as state practice.  Indeed, the way in which states conduct their 
international relations has arguably changed over the years.  Today, diplomacy is 
                                                 
74 Counter-Memorial of the Netherlands, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Pleadings, 1968, vol. 1, 
at pp. 336-337. 
75 D'Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law at p. 88; D'Amato, "Trashing Customary 
International Law",  at p. 102. 
76 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 2003) at p. 6.  He notes that 
the value of these sources varies depending on the circumstances.  See also Akehurst, "Custom as a Source 
of International Law",  at p. 5; Shaw, International Law, at p. 66. 
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conducted as much through international institutions as through bilateral exchanges or 
unilateral statements.   It is important that notions of state practice also reflect these 
developments, in order to acknowledge the increasing importance of multilateralism in 
the modern international legal system.77  In the words of Shaw, “custom can and often 
does dovetail neatly with the complicated mechanisms now operating for the 
identification and progressive development of the principles of international law.”
78  
Abi-Saab sees this phenomenon as “new wine [that] we are trying to put in the old 
bottle of custom.”
79 However, it is submitted that this view of custom does no more than 
recognise that states increasingly interact with one another through international 
institutions and our view of custom must reflect these changes in modes of state practice. 
Moreover, acknowledging that the negotiation of international instruments can influence 
the content of customary international law counters some of the flaws in the customary 
law-making process, as it provides an opportunity for bargaining and trade-offs.80  It also 
promotes the legitimacy of customary international law-making as institutional 
processes tend to be both more inclusive and more transparent.81   
On this view, it is the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty or other instrument 
which counts as state practice.  This conception of crystallisation means that rules of 
customary international law can develop relatively quickly.  If combined with opinio 
juris communis, the negotiation and adoption of an instrument alone may provide 
sufficient evidence of the existence of a rule of customary international law.  There is no 
need for repetition of practice per se82 and the Court has said that “the passage of only a 
short period of time is not necessarily, of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of 
                                                 
77 See Charney, "Universal International Law", (1993) 87 American Journal of International Law at pp. 
543-545. 
78 Shaw, International Law at p. 58.  See also Jiminez de Arechaga in Cassese and Weiler, eds., Change 
and Stability in International Law-Making, (Walter de Gruyter, 1988) at pp. 2-4.  
79 Abi-Saab in Ibid., at p. 10. 
80 C.f. Kelly, "Twilight of Customary International Law", (2000) 40 Virginia Journal of International Law  
at pp. 538-540. 
81 Charney, "Universal International Law",  at pp. 547-548.   
82 See Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, at p. 7. 
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customary international law on the basis of what was originally a purely conventional 
rule.”
83 
In this sense, crystallisation is similar to the concept of “instant custom” as 
proposed by Cheng who ascribes weight to the views of states in the negotiation of 
written instruments.  However, Cheng appears to classify instruments adopted by the 
international community as opinio juris.  He concludes that “international customary 
law has in reality only one constitutive element, the opinio juris.”
84  It is submitted that 
Cheng is mistaken in separating opinio juris from state practice when in fact the two 
elements are intertwined.  Opinio juris serves to determine which practice counts 
towards the formation of custom85  and to distinguish binding state practice from simple 
comity.86 This is clear in the description of Brierly who says that “evidence that a 
custom … exists in the international sphere can be found only by examining the practice 
of states; that is to say, we must look at what states do in their relations with one 
another and attempt to understand why they do it, and in particular whether they 
recognise an obligation to adopt a certain course ... what is sought for is a recognition 
among states of a certain practice as obligatory.”
87  On this basis, the preferable view is 
to characterise instruments that have been adopted by states or international institutions 
as a form of state practice, not as opinio juris.   
It does not follow from this argument that all treaties or other written instruments 
will create customary international law.  It is not simply a case of applying a treaty, a 
UN resolution or other international instrument and mislabelling it customary law.88  
                                                 
83 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, at para. 74. 
84 Cheng, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: Instant Customary International Law?" in 
International Law: Teaching and Practice, ed. Cheng (Stevens, 1982) at p. 251.  This view is doubted by 
many authors, e.g. Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law at p. 227. 
85 D'Amato, "Trashing Customary International Law", (1987) 81 American Journal of International Law 
at p. 102. 
86 The ILA Committee on the Formation of Customary International Law concludes that “it is for the 
purposes of distinguishing practice which generate customary rules from those that do not that opinio juris 
is most useful.”; Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International 
Law, at p. 34. 
87 Brierly, The Law of Nations  at pp. 59-61.  See also Akehurst, "Custom as a Source of International 
Law",  at p. 33; See also Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 1997) at p. 67. 
88 See D'Amato, "Trashing Customary International Law",  at p. 102. 
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The negotiation and adoption of an international instrument will only count as relevant 
state practice if it can be shown that states intended to lay down a rule of customary 
international law.  In other words, it is also necessary to look for opinio juris in support 
of the purported customary rule.  Evidence of the subjective element may be found in 
the text of the instrument itself or in the travaux préparatoires.89  This is confirmed by 
the ICJ itself in relation to the normative impact of General Assembly resolutions, where 
it has held that the simple adoption of an instrument is not sufficient to invest it with 
potential normative force: “it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its 
adoption.”
90   This is a high threshold to meet and it should not be presumed that a treaty 
or other instrument creates a customary norm without “clear-cut and unequivocal” 
evidence.91     
As with codification, crystallisation cannot be seen as a distinct process which 
freezes custom at the time at which the instrument was adopted.  It is always necessary 
to take into account all the relevant state practice in order to determine the customary 
rule, whether or not the negotiation of a treaty has had a codifying or crystallising effect. 
It is rare that there will be no other state practice aside from the adoption of an 
international instrument.  In some cases, other forms of state practice will consolidate 
the rule that is found in an international instrument, confirming its status as customary 
international law.  The situation is more problematic where there is contradictory state 
practice.  In that case, it is necessary to choose which of the competing trends of state 
practice carries more weight.   
This situation was addressed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case. In that case, the 
Court gave significant weight to rules of international law on use of force and non-
                                                 
89 Thus, in the case of the General Assembly resolutions on outer space, Cheng accepts the they were not 
capable of creating customary international law because the language of the resolutions did not purport to 
do so; Cheng, "United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: Instant Customary International Law?"  at p. 
255. 
90 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, at para. 70; see also Higgins, Problems and Process - International 
Law and How We Use It (Oxford University Press, 1994) at p. 24. 
91 International Law Association, Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General 
Customary International Law, principle 19, at p. 42; see also Cheng, "United Nations Resolutions on 
Outer Space: Instant Customary International Law?"  at p. 251 and p. 254; Akehurst, "Custom as a Source 
of International Law",  at pp. 6-7. 
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intervention found in international treaties and General Assembly resolutions which it 
claimed were supported by opinio juris.92  Moreover, the Court appeared to play down 
contradictory practice, holding that “[it] does not consider that, for a rule to be 
established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous 
conformity with the rule ... the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States 
should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct 
inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that 
rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.”
93  In other words, the 
contradictory practice was not accompanied by opinio juris supporting an alternative 
rule.   
In sum, there are several ways in which treaties can interact with customary 
international law.  State practice and opinio juris are central to all of these processes, 
although it is submitted that there is a need to reconsider our conceptions of state 
practice for the modern age of international law-making.  Thus, the adoption of an 
instrument may itself influence the development of customary international law through 
the process of crystallisation.  Additional state practice is not strictly necessary if there is 
unequivocal evidence that states intended to negotiate new legal rules or principles.  
However, it does not negate the need for a court or tribunal to conduct a thorough 
analysis of state practice and opinio juris and to consider all other forms of state 
practice, including the physical acts of states.  Nor do these processes of custom 
formation override the need for state practice and opinio juris to be representative, 
including all “specially affected states”.  Treaties and other instruments will only have 
an impact on universal customary international law if they are supported by a real 
consensus of the international community. 
   
                                                 
92 It cites in particular General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV); Case Concerning Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicaragua v. United States), (1986) ICJ 
Reports 14 at para. 188.   
93 Ibid., at para. 186. 
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5. Customary International Law of the Sea? 
How do these principles of customary international law apply in the case of the 
law of the sea? Can the LOS Convention be seen as codifying, crystallising or creating 
new customary international law?  What evidence of state practice and opinio juris 
would support such a conclusion?  It is not intended to consider in detail which parts of 
the Convention are actually declaratory of customary international law; this issue has 
been dealt with adequately in other works.94  The principal issue is how this process has 
taken place.  
One argument is that the Convention cannot influence customary international 
law because it was adopted as a package deal.  Advancing this view, Caminos and 
Molitor say that “if one assumes that the package deal was solidified at the time that the 
Convention was formally adopted, then those of its provisions that had not attained 
customary status by that date may have been precluded from ever doing so.”
95  They 
cite numerous declarations and statements made by participants at UNCLOS III to 
support their argument.  On closer inspection, this approach does not seem to be 
satisfactory.  Firstly, it does not explain how one identifies what the customary law of 
the sea is.  Vasciannie notes that “it would … require States to deny the independent 
status of custom as a source of obligations in matters falling within the purview of the 
LOS Convention: as this requirement has no basis in law, it cannot be supported.”
96  
More importantly, it is not an argument that has been accepted by states or by 
international courts and tribunals.  Indeed, it may be this argument that a chamber of the 
ICJ had in mind when it said that certain provisions of the LOS Convention, “even if 
                                                 
94 Treves, "Codification et Practique des Etats dans le Droit de la Mer", (1990) 223 Receuil des Cours 9; 
Bernhardt, "Custom and Treaty in the Law of the Sea", (1987) 205 Receuil des Cours, 247; Churchill, 
"The impact of State Practice on the jurisdictional framework contained in the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea", in Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea, ed. Oude Elferink (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2005).  The United Nations has published a series of summaries of state practice; 
United Nations, The Law of the Sea: Current Developments in State Practice No. II (United Nations, 
1989). 
95 Caminos and Molitor, "Progressive Development of International Law and the Package Deal",  at p. 
888. 
96 Vasciannie, "Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention and Third States: Some General Observations", 
(1989) 48 Cambridge Law Journal at p. 94. 
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they in some respects bear the mark of compromise surrounding their adoption may 
nevertheless be regarded as consonant at present with general international law on the 
question.”
97 
Nor can it simply be claimed that the whole LOS Convention has become 
customary international law because it was adopted as a package deal.  This argument 
ignores the subtleties of the customary law-making process and it comes too close to 
advocating the Convention as a form of international legislation.98 
It should not be surprising that an instrument the length and complexity of the 
LOS Convention is not susceptible to a simple analysis in terms of its impact on 
customary international law.  The preamble of the LOS Convention itself indicates that it 
is a “progressive development and codification of the law of the sea”, although it makes 
no attempt to distinguish between which provisions are covered by these two processes.   
Many states have noted the codifying effect of certain provisions on the 
Convention.  The United Kingdom, for instance, stated at the closing session of 
UNCLOS III that “many of the Convention’s provisions are a restatement or 
codification of existing conventional or customary international law and state 
practice.”
99  It is true that several parts of the Convention incorporate provisions found 
in the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea without substantial change.100  
Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the Convention is a codification in the 
traditional sense of the word.  Any provisions that are found in previous instruments 
were incorporated because they continued to be politically acceptable, rather than 
                                                 
97 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (US v. Canada), (1984) ICJ Reports 
246 at p. 294. 
98 Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community at pp. 67-68.  See also Plant who dismisses 
arguments that the package deal is binding on all states who participated in the drafting of the LOS 
Convention; "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Preparatory 
Commission: Models for United Nations Law-Making?" (1987) 36 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly at pp. 540-543.  See also Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, at p. 32. 
99 Statement of United Kingdom, 189th meeting, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, vol. 17, at p. 79, para. 200.  See also statement of Indonesia, 186th meeting, Ibid., at 
p. 25, paras. 23-25. 
100 This has influenced the way in which courts and tribunals have interpreted the Convention; see chapter 
seven at p. 226-227. 
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because they reflected state practice.101  As noted by Cameroon in its final speech to 
UNCLOS III, “this Convention represents for the first time a truly universal law and 
must be seen as such.  Any of its features that bear resemblance in content or form to 
any custom or agreements or treaties recognised by any region or sub-region or among 
maritime nations sharing common interests must be viewed as purely coincidental.”
102  
Moreover, as noted above, the codification of a treaty can only be treated as a 
presumption which should be confirmed by an analysis of subsequent state practice and 
opinio juris.   
Many other provisions in the Convention are without precedent in previous law 
or practice.  Of these new norms, some have undoubtedly inspired subsequent state 
practice which has contributed to their transition into customary international law.  
Indeed, state practice began to coalesce around certain rules before the whole regime 
had been finally agreed.103   
At the same time, state practice in other areas is in fact quite diverse.  An 
analysis of national legislation does not necessarily point to a consistent trend of state 
practice.104  Even those states which are formally bound by the Convention have been 
criticised for apparent divergences from the text of the treaty.105 
                                                 
101 Indeed, it would appear that it was not always clear that provisions from the previous regime would be 
retained.  Anderson describes how in response to several novel proposals submitted to the Seabed 
Committee, the United Kingdom introduced a working paper which included many provisions from the 
1958 Convention on the High Seas in order to “preserve the essential elements of the existing regime, 
including the concepts of high seas and freedoms, especially freedom of navigation, lest they be replaced 
by uncertainty or even chaos.”; Developments in respect of High Seas Navigation, (2005) SLS/BIICL 
Symposium on the Law of the Sea at p. 3.   
102 Statement by Cameroon, 185th meeting, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, vol. 17, at p. 16, para. 84. 
103 Koh and Jayakumar, "An Overview of the Negotiating Process of UNCLOS III", in United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 - A Commentary, ed. Rosenne and Sohn (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1985) at pp. 60-61. 
104 See Churchill, "The impact of State Practice on the jurisdictional framework contained in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea",  at p. 140. 
105 In his separate declaration in the Juno Trader Case, Judge Kolodkin complained that states did not 
heed the calls of the UN General Assembly to harmonise their legislation with the LOS Convention.  In 
that case, Guinea-Bissau had used the term “maritime waters” for both its territorial sea and its EEZ.  
Judge Kolodkin also noted the tendency of some coastal states to demand prior notification of vessels 
entering their EEZ for the purposes of transiting, what he thought to be a violation of the principle of 
 
 63 
Several authors have concluded from this state of affairs that parts of the 
Convention have not made the transition into customary international law.  For instance, 
Orrego Vicna says “while the basic elements of the regime of the territorial sea, 
including the twelve mile limit, can be considered to have been transformed into 
customary law, … not every detail of the Convention will have followed the same 
path.”
106  In the context of the EEZ, Churchill and Lowe conclude that “it would seem 
that what is part of customary international law are the broad rights of coastal and 
other States enumerated in Articles 56 and 58 of the Convention.  It is much more 
doubtful whether the detailed obligations in the articles relating to the exercise of 
coastal State jurisdiction over fisheries, pollution and research have passed or are likely 
quickly to pass into customary international law, partly because of a lack of claims 
embodying duties in the Convention, partly because there is some divergence between 
States practice and the Convention, and partly because some of the Conventional rules 
would not seem to have the ‘fundamentally norm-creating character’ necessary for the 
creation of a rule of customary international law.”
107  The logical conclusion of these 
arguments is that there are two distinct and substantively different regimes for the law of 
the sea, depending on whether a state is a party to the Convention or not.   
An alternative view is that the Convention has in large part succeeded in 
crystallising the law of the sea through the negotiating process at UNCLOS III.  
Discussing customary international law of the sea in the wake of the LOS Convention, 
Moore says “no description of … the customary international law-making process as 
applied to oceans law would be complete without noting that for the last seventeen years 
the UNCLOS process and patterns of practices have been a central feature in the 
                                                                                                                                                
freedom of navigation and Article 58(1) of the LOS Convention.  See The Juno Trader Case (Prompt 
Release) (St Vincent/Guinea-Bissau), (2004) 44 ILM 498 . 
106 Orrego Vicuña, "The Law of the Sea Experience and the Corpus of International Law: Effects and 
Interrelationships", in The Developing Order of the Oceans, ed. Krueger and Riesenfeld (The Law of the 
Sea Institute, 1984) at p. 15. 
107 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 1999) at 161-162.  See also 
Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991) at p. 283; 
Orrego Vicuña, The Exclusive Economic Zone (Cambridge University Press, 1989) at p. 252. 
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customary international law-forming process.”
108  Sohn takes a similar view in saying 
“the interesting thing that happened in the Law of the Sea Conference was that a 
consensus emerged not only that those rules were necessary but that those rules have 
been accepted by states … if states generally agree that it has emerged, this is sufficient, 
for the practice of states is the main of source of international law.”
109  This approach 
implicitly asserts that the international community set out to create a universal regime at 
UNCLOS III.  Is there sufficient evidence of opinio juris to this effect?   
The universal application of the rules is supported in part by the text of the 
Convention itself.  Most of the treaty is directed to “States” or “all States”.110  It would 
have been perfectly possible for participants to indicate their intention to create a treaty 
regime by drafting the Convention in terms of “States Parties”.  Indeed, this approach 
was taken in relation to Parts XI, XV and XVII of the Convention.111  This 
differentiation in terminology may be important for the purposes of determining 
customary international law. 
It is also relevant that large parts of the Convention are supported by a consensus 
of the international community.  An analysis of what states say they consider to be the 
law indicates widespread support for most parts of the Convention as customary 
international law.  The opinion of the United States, as a major maritime state and a non-
party to the Convention, is of particular significance. At the closing session of the 
Conference, the US asserted that “those parts of the Convention dealing with navigation 
and overflight and most other provisions of the Convention serve the interests of the 
                                                 
108 Moore, "Customary International Law After the Convention", in The Developing Order of the Oceans: 
Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute Eighteenth Annual Conference, ed. Krueger and Riesenfeld 
(Law of the Sea Institute, 1984) at p. 42. 
109 Sohn, "Implications of the Law of the Sea Convention regarding the Protection of the Marine 
Environment", in Developing Order of the Oceans, ed. Krueger and Riesenfeld (Law of the Sea Institute, 
1985) at p. 189.  He continues, “that states, of course, are the primary makers of international law, and if 
they decide to make it, they can make it even instantaneously…”; at p. 189.  See also comments of Boyle 
and Chinkin who, although sceptical about instant custom, nevertheless conclude that “once there is 
international consensus on the basic rule, it is highly unlikely that any state will object if it is then 
implemented, however rarely, in state practice”; The Making of International Law at p. 237.  See also 
Ibid., at p. 260. 
110 See above, at p. 43. 
111 See below, at p. 69. 
 
 65 
international community.  These texts reflect prevailing international practice.  They 
also demonstrate that the Conference believed that it was articulating rules in most 
areas that reflect existing state of affairs – a state of affairs that we wished to preserve 
by enshrining these beneficial and desirable principles in treaty language.”
112  This 
statement on the status of the Convention was confirmed by subsequent declarations in 
1983.  Following his decision not to sign the Convention, President Reagan nevertheless 
proclaimed that “the United States is prepared to accept and act in accordance with the 
balance of interests relating to the traditional uses of the oceans – such as navigation 
and overflight.  In this respect, the United States will recognise the rights of other states 
in waters off their coasts, as reflected in the Convention, so long as rights and freedoms 
of the United States and others under international law are recognised by such coastal 
states.”
113  It would be reasonable to conclude from these statements that the US accepts 
the whole Convention framework on the navigational and related uses of the seas and 
oceans as a reflection of customary international law on the subject.  Nor was the US 
alone in recognising the substantial normative impact of the Convention.  Records of 
UNCLOS III reveal concurring opinions of several states.114  
Further support for the customary status of the Convention is found in the 
resolutions and declarations of other international institutions and conferences.   
Although formally non-binding, as noted in the previous section, these instruments may 
provide important means of identifying further state practice and opinio juris communis.   
Of particular importance is the General Assembly which, through its annual 
resolutions on the law of the sea, asserts a substantial and formative influence in this 
                                                 
112 Statement by the United States, 192nd meeting, Official Records of the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol. 17, at p. 116, para. 3. 
113 "United States Ocean Policy",  (1983) 77 American Journal of International Law cited at p. 620. In the 
Gulf of Maine Case, the ICJ itself took into account the Presidential statement in deciding what weight to 
confer on the LOS Convention as a material source of customary international law; Delimitation of the 
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (US v. Canada), at para. 94. 
114 E.g. statement of Kenya, 187th meeting, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, vol. 17, at p. 47, para. 129; statement of Mongolia, 186th meeting, Ibid., at p. 35, para. 
160; statement of Mexico, 185th meeting, Ibid., at p. 19, para. 142; statement of Cameroon, 185th meeting, 
Ibid., at p. 17, para. 84. 
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area.115  It stands out from other international institutions because it was the organ which 
originally convened UNCLOS III. Furthermore, it is one of the few international 
institutions to include all states.  The General Assembly has adopted a number of 
resolutions which support the Convention as a source of customary international law.  
For instance, the preamble of General Assembly Resolution 49/28, adopted in 1994, 
recognises “the universal character of the Convention and the establishment through it 
of a legal order for the seas and oceans.”
116   Since then, the General Assembly has 
regularly proclaimed that “the Convention sets out the legal framework within which all 
activities in the oceans and the seas must be carried out.”
117  Year on year, the General 
Assembly calls on states to harmonise their legislation with the provisions of the 
Convention.118  These statements are clear support for the idea that the LOS Convention 
creates universal law.     
Also important are the activities of other international institutions working in the 
field of the law of the sea which have, at least implicitly, been operating within the 
framework of the LOS Convention since its conclusion.119  General Assembly 
Resolution 40/63, adopted on 10 December 1985, recognised that “all related activities 
within the United Nations system need to be implemented in a manner consistent with 
it.”
120  True to this statement, many of the UN organs and specialised agencies treat the 
LOS Convention as the starting point for all law of the sea issues, regardless of the fact 
that not all states are party to the Convention.  For instance, the 2001 Anti-Fouling 
Convention121 and the 2004 Ballast Water Convention122, both adopted under the 
auspices of the IMO, refer to the LOS Convention as customary international law.   
                                                 
115 See chapter four, at p. 91 ff.. 
116 General Assembly Resolution 49/28, 1994. 
117 General Assembly Resolution 55/7, 2000. 
118 There is a note of impatience in the tone of General Assembly Resolution 59/24, 2004, which “once 
again calls upon states to harmonise, as a matter of priority, their national legislation with the provisions 
of the Convention, to ensure consistent application of those provisions…” 
119 See Anderson, "Legal Implications of the Entry into Force of the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea", (1995) 44 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at p. 322. 
120 General Assembly Resolution 40/63, 1985.  
121 Anti-Fouling Convention, Article 15. 
122 Ballast Water Convention, Article 16. 
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How have courts and tribunals approached the customary international law of the 
sea since the conclusion of the LOS Convention?  A number of judicial decisions on the 
law of the sea appear to attribute weight to the consensus underlying the Convention in 
the formation of customary international law.  The most explicit reference to the 
negotiating techniques employed at UNCLOS III is found in the Gulf of Maine Case, 
where a Chamber of the Court confirmed that the fact that the LOS Convention had not 
entered into force “in no way detracts from the consensus reached on large portions of 
the instrument and, above all, cannot invalidate the observation that certain provisions 
of the Convention, concerning the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone, 
which may, in fact, be relevant to the present case, were adopted without any 
objections.”
123  The Court thus considers that consensus is a critical factor in 
determining the impact of the Convention on customary international law.   
At the same time, courts and tribunals have continued to pay lip-service to the 
practice of states in relation to the LOS Convention.  Thus, in the Continental Shelf 
Case between Libya Arab Jamahiriya and Malta, after attributing weight to the 
adoption of the Convention by “an overwhelming majority of states”, the Court held 
that the institution of the EEZ is also shown, “by the practice of states”, to be part of 
customary international law.124  As noted above, it is true that many states had in fact 
proclaimed an EEZ whilst the negotiations at UNCLOS III were ongoing.  Yet, as one 
author has said, “the most striking element in this reasoning is not that provisions of an 
international agreement are qualified as customary international law but that this was 
                                                 
123 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (US v. Canada), at para. 94. 
124 Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahariya v. Malta), at para. 34.  The Court has 
in other cases held that parts of the LOS Convention are declaratory of custom.  In the Qatar v. Bahrain 
Case, the Court found that both parties agreed that most of the provisions of the Convention relevant to 
the case reflected customary international law; Case Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial 
Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Merits), (2001) ICJ Reports at para. 167.  In its reasoning, the 
Court refers to Articles 5, 7(4), 15, and 121. The parties to the dispute disagreed over the customary status 
of Part IV of the Convention on archipelagic states, although the Court did not find it necessary to make a 
determination on this point in its decision; see paras. 181-183.  In the Nicaragua Case, the Court held that 
the LOS Convention provisions on the sovereignty of the coastal state over its territorial sea codifies one 
of the  “firmly established and longstanding tenets of customary international law”; Case Concerning 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), (1986) ICJ Reports 14 at para. 
212.  It also noted the customary right of innocent passage for ships, reflected in Article 18(1)(b) of the 
LOS Convention, as well as freedom of navigation in the EEZ and on the high seas, at para. 214. 
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done without embarking upon any empirical research as to whether the respective rules 
were recognised as law and reflected in State practice.”
125   
In many contexts, state practice on the law of the sea is mixed, falling a long way 
short of being “widespread and virtually uniform”.  However, it is submitted that any 
inconsistent state practice must be assessed in light of the general acceptance of the 
Convention.  Following the approach of the ICJ in Nicaragua, it is suggested that any 
contrary state practice is not supported by opinio juris in favour of rules which diverge 
from those found in the Convention.  Oxman notes that “there is a fundamental 
difficulty in attempting to prove the continuing validity of rules of law that are directly at 
variance with those in the Convention.”
126  He continues, “it would be difficult to find 
sufficient uniform state practice and opinio juris today to demonstrate convincingly that 
there is some other generally accepted positive restraint of customary law substantially 
more restrictive than, or inconsistent with, the Conventional rule of restraint.”
 127  That 
is not to say that customary international law was frozen at the time that the LOS 
Convention was concluded.  The law can continue to evolve through consistent trends of 
state practice, either unilaterally or equally through institutional processes.  However, 
such practice must also be supported by an indication that states are intending to create 
new rules of customary international law. At present, most of the Convention continues 
to be supported by the international community as the material source of the 
international law of the sea. 
It is possible to conclude that the process of negotiating the LOS Convention had 
a substantial impact on the customary international law of the sea by forging and 
crystallising a consensus on the general rules and principles that apply to most uses of 
the oceans.  Although practice is not in rigorous conformity with the substance of the 
Convention, there is nevertheless clear evidence that states believe the Convention 
                                                 
125 Wolfrum, "The Legal Order for the Seas and the Oceans",   at p. 174.  See similar comments by 
Tomuschat, "Obligations arising for states without or against their will ",  at p. 258. 
126 Oxman, "Customary International Law in the Absence of Widespread Ratification of the Law of the 
Sea Convention", in 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, ed. Oxman and Koers (Law of the Sea Institute, 
1983) at p. 672. 
127 Ibid., at p. 674. 
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provides a repository of the prevailing rules and principles.  The negotiation of the 
Convention has therefore succeeded in promoting a degree of certainty in the applicable 
law of the sea, mitigating the confusion and ambiguity that was prevalent at the time of 
the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases.128 
It does not follow that all parts of the Convention have become customary 
international law.  From the records of UNCLOS III, it is clear that the provisions on 
deep seabed mining were not supported by consensus and there was not sufficient opinio 
juris for their translation into customary international law.  Applying the words of the 
ICJ from a different context, these provisions were the subject of “long continued 
hesitations”.129  The industrialised states consistently raised objections to the regime for 
deep seabed mining both before and after the conclusion of the Convention.  The 
objections were not to the principle of the deep seabed as the common heritage of 
mankind.  States had managed to reach a consensus over this issue in 1970130  and it is 
arguable that these broad principles have become custom.  The same, however, is not 
true for the details of the institutional regime and the conditions attached to deep seabed 
mining which led the industrialised states to reject Part XI of the Convention.  The 
verbal protests of the industrialised states presented at the Conference itself131 were 
further supplemented by state practice which conflicted with the detail of the treaty text.  
Several states, including the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, Germany, France and Italy, 
passed unilateral legislation permitting their nationals to undertake mining.  Further to 
these unilateral acts, Germany, France, the US and the US entered into an Agreement 
concerning Interim Arrangements relating to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Seabed 
in 1982.132  The objections and contrary state practice of these important states were 
fatal for the future of Part XI out-with the treaty framework.     
                                                 
128 See chapter two, at pp. 25-27. 
129 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, at paras. 49-53.   
130 General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV), 1970.  
131 See chapter two, at p. 35. 
132 See Brown, The International Law of the Sea (Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1994) at p. 457.  Note 
that in August 1985, the Preparatory Commission passed a resolution condemning the actions of these 
states and affirming that the Convention was the only legal regime applicable to the Area; see Churchill 
and Lowe, The Law of the Sea  at p. 234. 
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These objections to the deep seabed mining regime were overcome through the 
negotiation of the Part XI Agreement.133  Yet, there are other problems for the transition 
of Part XI into customary international law.   
In order to have this effect, a provision must be of a “fundamentally norm 
creating character.”
134  As Jennings explains, “a treaty is not capable of becoming a 
general rule of custom in a form which belongs essentially to the particular treaty 
context.  This is without prejudice to whether that rule, in abstracto or in another 
context, would be capable of becoming a rule of general law.”
135   
The provisions on deep seabed mining, however, are specifically directed at 
States Parties to the Convention.  In addition, Part XI is largely concerned with creating 
and maintaining an international institution which can only occur through the conclusion 
of a treaty.136  These considerations also apply to the provisions on dispute settlement.137  
Many provisions in Part XV are also addressed to States Parties and they are similarly 
concerned with the creation of institutional procedures.   
These important provisions can therefore only be invoked as treaty provisions.  
Ultimately, the substantial influence of the LOS Convention on customary international 
law does not completely mitigate the need for states to consent to be bound by the 
Convention if it is to be fully effective.  This explains why the General Assembly 
                                                 
133 See chapter four, at p. 95 ff.. 
134 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, at para. 72. 
135 Jennings, "The Discipline of International Law",  at p. 626. 
136 See Treves, "UNCLOS as a non-universally ratified instrument", in The 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention, ed. Oxman and Koers (Law of the Sea Institute, 1982) at p. 685; It is clear that an 
international organisation can only come into existence upon entry into force of the Convention.  
However, Jennings notes that it is possible for the international community to create an international 
organisation which has some competences in respect of third states; Jennings, "The Discipline of 
International Law",   at p. 628.  He cites the Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries where the Court 
held that ‘fifty states, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community, had 
the power … to bring into being an entity possessing objective legal personality, and not merely 
personality recognised by them alone, together with capacity to bring international claims’; Reparations 
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion), (1949) ICJ Reports at p. 
185.   
137 Therefore, apart from the duty to settle law of the sea disputes peacefully, states would not be bound by 
the provisions to submit disputes under the Convention to arbitration or other courts or tribunals.  Of 
course, states could accept these obligations without becoming a party to the Convention and many law of 
the sea disputes have been settled by adjudication or arbitration.  For a further discussion of judicial 
aspects of the law of the sea, see chapter seven. 
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continues to call on all states that have not done so to become a party to the LOS 
Convention.138     
   
6. The Importance of Institutions in Law-Making 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the role that international institutions can 
play in the development of customary international law.  By providing a forum in which 
states can seek to reconcile their competing interests in an acceptable compromise, these 
institutional arrangements can foster a consensus which in turn can contribute to the 
creation of customary international law.  Often this consensus will take the form of a 
written instrument, binding or non-binding. 
Transformations in the traditional customary international law-making process 
would appear to be accepted by several commentators.  Danilenko talks of “an 
increasing formalisation of the customary law-making process” through international 
organizations139, whilst Judge Tanaka, in his Dissenting Opinion in the South West 
Africa Cases, stated that “in the contemporary age of highly developed techniques of 
communication and information, the formation of custom through the medium of 
international organisations is greatly facilitated and accelerated.”
140   
                                                 
138 E.g. General Assembly Resolution 61/30, 2006, at para. 3. 
139 Danilenko, Law-Making in the International Community at p. 79.  See also Charney, "Universal 
International Law",  at p. 547.  Jennings and Watts comment that “members of the international 
community have in a short space of time developed new procedures through which they can act 
collectively. While at present this can be regarded as merely providing a different forum for giving rise to 
rules whose legal force derives from the traditional sources of international law, there may come a time 
when the collective actions of the international community within the framework provided by 
international organisations will acquire the character of a separate source of law”; Oppenheim's 
International Law, at p. 46. 
140 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, South West Africa Cases (Second Phase), (1966) ICJ Reports 3 at 
p. 177, cited in Higgins, Problems and Process  at p. 23.  See also Wright who says that international 
organisations fulfil the two functions of formulating norms of customary international law better than 
traditional methods; "Custom as a Basis for International Law in the Post-War World",  at pp. 157-158. It 
is interesting to note that Wright does not concentrate on state practice and opinio juris, rather he 
considers procedures for formulating and publicising norms likely to be generally acceptable to states and 
procedures for facilitating the observance, recognition or acquiescence in such norms by all states.  In the 
early development of international law, these functions were performed through diplomacy and state 
practice. They are now primarily fulfilled through the opportunities provided by international 
organisations.     
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Such institutional processes are arguably indispensable in an increasingly 
complex international community composed of diverse and often conflicting interests 
where issues affect all states.    Jennings and Watts conclude that “to some extent the 
growth in the role of international organisations as a factor in international life 
contributes to a more rapid adjustment of customary law to the developing needs of the 
international community.”
141 
The role of international institutions in law-making should not be overstated and 
they should not be mistaken for prototype legislative organs.  Far from it.  Such 
institutions are successful in creating universal law only if they are able to successfully 
foster an opinio juris communis.  Formal adoption alone is meaningless.142  The 
characteristics of an institution and the types of decision-making procedures it utilises 
are key factors in whether or not it will be able to influence customary international law. 
 
7. Beyond the Law of the Sea Convention?   
UNCLOS III successfully managed to settle many of the outstanding 
controversies that had precipitated the collapse of previous attempts to codify the law of 
the sea.  As a consequence, the LOS Convention is hailed as a milestone in the 
international legal order.  It has been described by one author as “a shining example of 
international cooperation, diplomacy and the role of international law in the regulation 
of international affairs and is considered to be one of the most complex and ultimately 
successful international diplomatic negotiations that took place in the twentieth 
century.”
143   
                                                                                                                                                
In the age of international organisations, states also have much more notice of emerging norms and many 
more opportunities to dissent.  On the role of protest in the formation of custom, see Anglo-Norwegian 
Fisheries Case, (1951) ICJ Reports 116. 
141 Jennings and Watts, eds., Oppenheim's International Law, at p. 31. 
142 J. Brunnee, "COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements", 
(2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law at p. 37. 
143 Rothwell, "Oceans Management and the Law of the Sea in the Twenty-First Century", in Oceans 
Management in the 21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and Responses, ed. Oude Elferink and 
Rothwell (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004) at p. 329. 
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Whilst the LOS Convention has had huge success in stabilising state claims to 
jurisdiction over the oceans, it is also true that “the law needs to be flexible and able to 
change to reflect new circumstances whether it be increased national sovereignty, 
greater environmental protection, or enhanced global security.”
144  The LOS 
Convention cannot be seen as a fait accompli.  The law of the sea, like all international 
law, must be able to balance the need for stability with the desire for change.   
How the LOS Convention evolves in light of the ever-changing challenges facing 
the international community will be considered in the following chapters.  In doing so, it 
will be necessary to take into account the interplay of written instruments and custom, as 
well as the role of international institutions in the law-making process.   
The fact that the Convention reflects a consensus of the international community 
may pose challenges to the future development of the law of the sea.  As Treves notes, 
“the impact of the Convention on customary international law, on whose crystallisation 
and development it exercises a powerful influence, makes the Convention, as well as the 
main substantive questions it addresses, a matter of interest for all states even beyond 
the circle of States Parties.”
145  It is in this context that questions of participation, 
decision-making procedures and other aspects of legitimacy are relevant.   
What is clear from this chapter is that international institutions are a vital aspect 
of modern law-making techniques and they will form a central part of the analysis of the 
ways in which the law of the sea evolves.  There are many institutions which have an 
interest in maritime affairs.  Their characteristics vary from general political 
organizations such as the UN General Assembly to technical organizations such as the 
International Maritime Organization.  Moreover, some institutions are created by the 
LOS Convention itself.  The role that these types of institutions play will be considered 
over the following chapters.  Many of the issues that have been addressed in this chapter 
will be further considered in the context of these other institutions.  What role does 
                                                 
144 Ibid.,   at p. 350. 
145 Treves, "The General Assembly and the Meeting of States Parties in the Implementation of the LOS 
Convention", in Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: the role of the LOS Convention, ed. Oude 
Elferink (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at p. 66. 
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consensus play in law-making by international institutions?  How do written instruments 
influence the development of universal international law?  The analysis will also 
demonstrate to what extent the law-making techniques utilised at UNCLOS III have 
survived or been further developed by other institutions in order to maintain the balance 






The Institutional Development of the LOS Convention 
 
 
1. Evolution in the Law of the Sea 
Through the negotiation of the LOS Convention, states attempted to “settle, in 
a spirit of mutual understanding and cooperation, all issues relating to the law of the 
sea.”
1 Yet, in no sense was the adoption of the Law of the Sea Convention the end of 
the law-making process.  The Convention, like all law, is not exempt from “the 
imperious necessity of the process of change, that categorical imperative of the 
universe.”
2  The delegate of Sri Lanka summed up the transience of the Convention at 
the closing session of UNCLOS III: “it is in the nature of all things that they do not 
remain static, that there will be growth and there will be decay.  The march of 
technology and changing perceptions and aspirations will, in time, place pressures 
upon the regimes we establish today.”
3  It follows that if the LOS Convention is to 
provide an enduring legal framework, it must be able to evolve in light of its shifting 
legal, political and technological environment.  This chapter will begin to consider 
how this is achieved. 
As noted in the previous chapter, most modern law-making takes place 
through institutional fora where states can collectively discuss issues and resolve 
problems in a spirit of mutual co-operation.  This is particularly true of the law of the 
sea, where a myriad of organizations are active.  Some of these institutions were 
active prior to the conclusion of the Convention.  Others were created by the LOS 
Convention itself.  Still others have subsequently come into being to address a 
particular threat or challenge faced by the international community.  The LOS 
Convention does not attempt to impose a single institutional framework on the 
                                                 
1 LOS Convention, preamble. 
2 Fischer Williams, International Change and International Peace (Oxford University Press, 1932) at 
p. v. 
3 Statement of Sri Lanka, 187th meeting, Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, vol. 17, at p. 48, para. 161. 
 
 76 
development of the law of the sea.  Rather, it is subject to what Hey describes as “a 
multifaceted and multi-localized process of normative development.”
4   
Many international institutions have a very specific mandate in a technical 
field of regulation such as the International Seabed Authority and the International 
Maritime Organization.  The work of these organizations will be considered in the 
following chapter.   
The focus of this chapter is on the general development of the law of the sea 
regime.  The contracting parties to a treaty are usually at the centre of any procedures 
to modify and change its provisions. General international law confers on them wide 
powers of interpretation and review for these purposes.  The chapter will first consider 
the role of the States Parties in the development of the Convention regime.  The status 
of the law of the sea as customary international law, however, means that any analysis 
of law-making cannot concentrate exclusively on treaty mechanisms for modifying 
the Convention.  Doing so, ignores the wider consequences of the Convention for all 
states, whether or not they are a State Party. Taking these considerations into account, 
the analysis will consider the continued involvement of the General Assembly in 
maritime affairs and how it contributes to the maintaining a consensus on the law of 
the sea. 
     
2. The Convention Amendment Procedures 
The primary mechanism for the development of treaties is through amendment 
procedures.  The power of amendment is found in general international law.  The 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties sets out the principle that “a treaty 
may be amended by agreement between the parties.”
5  This skeletal provision 
specifies who should be involved in the amendment process, whilst leaving the details 
of adoption and approval to be worked out for each individual treaty, taking into 
account its particular needs. 
                                                 
4 Hey, "Reviewing Implementation of the LOS Convention and Emerging International Public Law", in 
Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: the Role of the Law of the Sea Convention, ed. Oude 
Elferink (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at p. 81. 
5 Article 39.  It sets out several residual rules which are to apply to the amendment of treaties “except 
in so far as the treaty may otherwise provide.” 
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As with most modern multilateral treaties6, the LOS Convention lays down its 
own specific amendment procedures.  The formal process of amending the LOS 
Convention is dealt with in a series of articles found in Part XVII.  These articles 
distinguish between amendments to the deep seabed mining provisions in Part XI of 
the Convention and amendments to the other parts of the Convention.  The former 
articles fall within the competence of the International Seabed Authority and they will 
be considered in the following chapter.7  The current focus is on the ordinary 
amendment procedures.  
The Convention sets out two ways in which amendments can be made to its 
substantive provisions.  They both distinguish between adoption and acceptance.  
Both procedures confer the power to adopt amendments on the States Parties to the 
Convention, whilst acceptance is left to individual States Parties.  
A simplified amendment procedure is set out in Article 313.  This procedure 
permits any State Party to circulate an amendment proposal to all other States Parties 
through the UN Secretariat.  A proposal which is circulated in this way is considered 
to be adopted if no State Party objects to the proposal within twelve months of the 
date on which it was circulated.  Adoption is subject to further acceptance by 
individual states, which will be discussed below. 
There are several key characteristics of this procedure which are worthy of 
note.  Firstly, although the simplified procedure provides for the tacit approval of the 
States Parties, it only requires the objection of a single State Party to frustrate the 
process of adoption.  In effect, each State Party wields a veto over any proposal.  
Secondly, Article 313 does not require the States Parties to meet in formal session in 
order to adopt the proposed amendment.  As a consequence, the procedure is cost-
effective.8  At the same time, there are disadvantages to the lack of institutional 
oversight because it does not allow for any substantive discussion of proposed 
amendments.  Therefore, it would seem that Article 313 is most appropriate for purely 
technical changes of a de minimis nature.  Even for technical issues, the need to wait 
for one year for the adoption of a proposal, as well as the subsequent need for 
                                                 
6 Aust explains that before the Second World War, it was relatively rare for a multilateral treaty to have 
its own amendment procedure and if it did, it would usually incorporate the unanimity rule; Modern 
Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2000) at p. 212. 
7 See chapter five, at pp. 167-168. 
8 Cost-effectiveness appears to be a factor that increasingly influences developments in this area; see 
Part XI Agreement, section 1, at para. 2. 
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acceptance by individual states, make this procedure less attractive for adopting quick 
fixes to the Convention regime.9  Another disadvantage of Article 313 is that there is 
no opportunity for non-parties to participate in the adoption process or to express 
concerns over proposed amendments.  Thus, the simplified procedure is not 
appropriate for maintaining the universal consensus underlying the Convention.   
An alternative amendment procedure is set out in Article 312 of the 
Convention.10  Under this procedure, a proposal for an amendment is circulated to all 
the States Parties by the UN Secretary General in the same way as under Article 313.  
The crucial difference is that States Parties are asked to approve the convening of an 
amendment conference in order to discuss the proposal.11  At least fifty per cent of the 
State Parties must communicate their consent within twelve months.  As with the 
other procedure, there is no formal involvement from non-parties who would be 
unable to propose changes to the law of the sea framework without the support of a 
State Party.  This provision can be contrasted with the amendment procedures in the 
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea where the decision on whether to 
call an amendment conference was conferred on the General Assembly.12   
If an amendment conference is convened, Article 312 permits a full discussion 
and debate over the proposed amendments to take place.  This is an improvement over 
Article 313 in terms of promoting co-operation and compromise.  Moreover, Article 
312 promotes the adoption of amendments by consensus.  It specifies that “the 
conference should make every effort to reach an agreement on any amendments by 
way of consensus and there should be no voting on them until all efforts at consensus 
                                                 
9 In practice, Article 313 has been superseded by regular Meetings of the States Parties; see below, at p. 
80 ff..   
10 It only became possible to invoke this procedure ten years after entry into force of the Convention; it 
was therefore activated on 16 November 2004.   
11 See Freestone and Elferink, "Strengthening the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea's 
regime through the adoption of implementing agreements, the practice of international organisations 
and other means", in Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: the Role of the LOS Convention, ed. 
Oude Elferink (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at p. 176. 
12 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 30; the Continental Shelf Convention, Article 13; High Seas 
Convention, Article 35; and Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas 




13  It is clear that consensus is preferred, but voting remains an 
option of last resort.14   
The text of the Convention makes no reference to participation of non-parties 
at amendment conferences.  Nevertheless, it is likely that most states would be invited 
to participate, at least as observers.15  Thus, it is possible that the interests of non-
parties could be taken into account in formulating amendments and a wider consensus 
could be maintained.  However, this outcome is dependent on the successful operation 
of consensus decision-making techniques.  Ultimately, the participation of non-parties 
in the adoption of amendments is limited, as they possess no voice if it comes to a 
vote.   
A further limitation on both procedures is that amendments only become 
binding once they have been accepted by individual states.  Once amendments have 
been adopted under Article 312 or Article 313, they are again circulated to the States 
Parties by the UN Secretariat.  Article 316(1) provides that an amendment will come 
into force thirty days after the deposit of instruments of acceptance by two-thirds of 
the States Parties or sixty States, whichever is greater.  No amendments will be 
applicable to States Parties which have not accepted them.  This provision reflects the 
principle found in Article 40(4) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties which provides that “the amending agreement does not bind any State 
already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending 
agreement.”16  Whilst such a process places a high value on consent and the 
sovereignty of states, it poses a threat to the unity of the law of the sea.  As a 
consequence, the formal amendment procedures threaten a fragmentation in the law of 
the sea, not only as customary international law, but also as a treaty instrument.  It is 
possible for two alternative provisions to exist side-by-side: an amended text 
applicable to the relations between those States Parties which have accepted it and the 
original text applicable to all other States Parties.  This possibility is confirmed by 
Article 316(4) of the LOS Convention which provides that:  
                                                 
13 LOS Convention, Article 312(2). 
14 Article 312 also specifies that the amendment conference shall utilise the same decision-making 
procedure as UNCLOS III, unless otherwise agreed.  For a discussion of the procedures applied at 
UNCLOS III, see chapter two, at p. 30 ff.. 
15 It is likely that the ordinary Rules of the Procedure for Meetings of the States Parties will be used for 
amendment conferences.  For discussion of participation of observers at Meetings of the States Parties, 
see below, at pp. 86-87. 
16 See also the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 34. 
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A State which becomes a Party to this Convention after the entry into force of an 
amendment … shall failing an expression of a different intention by that State: 
(a) be considered as a Party to this Convention as so amended; and 
(b) be considered as a Party to the unamended Convention in relation to any State 
Party not bound by the amendment. 
 
Whilst the LOS Convention seeks to facilitate the entry into force of 
amendments, in doing so, it endangers the integrity and unity of the Convention.  
Freestone and Elferink conclude that, in the context of its amendment procedures, 
“the Convention is thus not particularly geared towards maintaining the package-
deal intact.”
17   
The Convention has been in force for more than twelve years and these 
procedures have not yet been invoked.  Given the threat to the universal legal 
framework, it is questionable whether states would want to rely on the formal 
amendment procedures found in the Convention.  In these circumstances, it is 
necessary to ask, in what other ways the law of the sea framework can be changed or 
modified. 
 
3. Informal Law-Making by the States Parties  
A Conference of the Parties18 is a common arrangement in many modern 
multilateral agreements.  In assessing their law-making function, Werksman describes 
how “many COPs are empowered by the underlying treaty to take decisions or 
actions that may be required for the achievement of the agreement’s objective or 
purposes.”
19  The creation of COPs allows the States Parties to continuously monitor 
the implementation of a treaty, ensuring its evolution in light of changing legal and 
political environment.20   
                                                 
17 Freestone and Elferink, "Strengthening the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea's 
regime through the adoption of implementing agreements, the practice of international organisations 
and other means",  at p. 10. 
18 Hereinafter, referred to as a “COP”. 
19 Werksman, "The Conference of the Parties to Environmental Treaties", in Greening International 
Institutions, ed. Werksman (Earthscan Publications, 1996) at p. 63.  
20 See J. Brunnee, "COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements", (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law at p. 4, footnote 12, citing Article 7.2 of 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.  See also Biodiversity Convention, Article 23(2). 
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The LOS Convention does not follow this model although it does confer some 
powers on the States Parties.  References to the States Parties are scattered throughout 
the Convention.  Aside from the adoption of amendments, mention of the States 
Parties is also made in the provisions relating to the election, administration and 
financing of the ITLOS and the Commission on the Outer Limits on the Continental 
Shelf.21   
In order to fulfil these tasks, Meetings of the States Parties take place in 
accordance with Article 319 which confers on the UN Secretary General, the power to 
“convene necessary meetings of the States parties in accordance with this 
Convention.”
22  Yet, the precise character of the Meeting of the State Parties is not 
clear from the Convention alone.   
The role of the States Parties must be considered in light of general 
international law which confers wide powers of interpretation and review on the 
contracting parties of a treaty.  For instance, Article 31(3) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties acknowledges that subsequent agreements and 
subsequent practice of contracting parties shall be taken into account in interpreting a 
treaty.  It follows that the States Parties may be able to play an incidental law-making 
role by adopting decisions which fill in the gaps in the Convention regime.   
The States Parties meet annually at the headquarters of the United Nations in 
New York.  Given the lack of detail in the Convention itself, the States Parties have 
adopted Rules of Procedure which govern the conduct of their meetings.  The Rules 
of Procedure address issues such as the convening of Meetings, attendance, 
participation, and decision-making procedures.23  The Rules of Procedure fill in many 
of the gaps found in the Convention on the way in which the States Parties fulfil their 
functions. 
Many of the functions of the States Parties are concerned with the setting up 
and the administration of the Tribunal and the Commission in accordance with the 
provisions of the Convention24, as well as other budgetary and administrative affairs 
                                                 
21 Hereinafter, referred to as “the Commission”. 
22 LOS Convention, Article 319(2)(e). 
23 Rules of Procedure of the Meeting the States Parties, Document SPLOS/2/Rev.4. Hereinafter, 
“SPLOS Rules of Procedure”.  They were first adopted at the initial meeting of the States Parties in 
1994.  They have been amended on several occasions since in order to address specific issues. 
24 See LOS Convention, Annex II, Article 2; Annex VI, Articles 4, 6, 18, 19. 
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relating to the organization of the Meeting itself.  Some of the decisions taken by the 
States Parties may contribute to the progressive development of the law of the sea.  A 
few examples will be considered. 
The Meeting of the States Parties has adopted a series of decisions on the 
administration and functioning of the Tribunal.25  Some of these decisions have been 
adopted in accordance with the Convention itself.  For instance, Article 18(7) of 
Annex VI provides that “regulations adopted at meetings of the States Parties shall 
determine the conditions under which retirement pensions may be given to members 
of the Tribunal and to the Registrar and the conditions under which members of the 
Tribunal and Registrar shall have their travelling expenses refunded.”  It was in 
pursuance of this mandate that the States Parties adopted the Pension Scheme 
Regulations at their ninth meeting in May 1999.26  The normative value of these 
decisions is uncontroversial as they are authorised by the Convention.   
Other decisions have been adopted without an express mandate.  Despite the 
lack of a legal basis, such decisions have complemented the rules set out in the 
Convention, providing additional detail or resolving any ambiguity.   
One such decision is the procedures adopted by the States Parties for the 
election of Members of the Tribunal.  The Convention itself sets out basic criteria for 
the election of judges to the Tribunal.  It requires that the composition of the Tribunal 
shall assure “representation of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable 
geographical distribution”
27 and there should be no fewer than three representatives 
from each of the five geographical regions of the United Nations.28  Beyond these 
stipulations, it appears that the composition of the Tribunal is flexible.  At its fifth 
meeting in 1996, following informal consultations conducted by the President of the 
Meeting, the States Parties agreed by consensus on the allocation of all of the seats on 
the Tribunal between the geographical regions of the United Nations.29  In doing so, 
the States Parties went beyond the basic conditions of the Convention, agreeing on the 
way in which these particular provisions should be implemented.  The decision of the 
                                                 
25 See e.g. Document SPLOS/8, at para. 9; Document SPLOS/48, at para. 38; Document SPLOS/48, at 
para. 40. 
26 Document SPLOS/48, at para. 40. 
27 LOS Convention, Annex VI, Article 2(2). 
28 LOS Convention, Annex VI, Article 3(2). 
29 The decision provided for 5 judges from the African Group, five judges from the Asian Group, four 
judges from the Latin American and Caribbean Group, four judges from the Western Europe and Other 
Group, and three judges from the Eastern European Group; Document SPLOS/14, at para. 15. 
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States Parties resembles the understanding on the composition of the International 
Court of Justice which guarantees a seat to the five permanent members of the 
Security Council and allocates the remaining seats according to the pattern of 
equitable geographical distribution applied to Security Council.30  There is no explicit 
legal basis for the decision of the States Parties in the Convention who are only 
empowered to elect the members of the Tribunal in accordance with the procedure in 
the Convention.31  Nevertheless, the decision has been applied and followed in 
subsequent elections for the Tribunal32, suggesting that it has had a normative effect.  
A similar issue has arisen over the composition of the Commission.  In this 
case, the Convention provides that “no less than three members [of the Commission] 
shall be elected from each geographical region”
33, again leaving the allocation of the 
remaining seats to the discretion of the States Parties.  At the first elections for the 
Commission in March 1997, the States Parties agreed on the allocation of all of the 
seats on the Commission, thus supplementing the text of the Convention.  They 
further agreed to vary the procedures set out in Annex II of the Convention.  In an 
understanding reached through consultations between the President of the Meeting 
and the chairs of the regional groupings, it was agreed that the Group of Eastern 
European States would not fill the third seat to which it was entitled under the 
Convention.  Instead, this seat would be allocated to the Western European and 
Others Group.34  Following this concession, the allocation of all twenty-one seats on 
the Commission was worked out.  In describing the arrangement, however, it was 
stressed by the President of the Meeting that the arrangement was “on a purely ad hoc 
basis and relate only to the first election of the members of the Commission.”
35  He 
continued “they should not be interpreted as derogating from the relevant provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  They shall not prejudice 
arrangements for future elections and do not constitute a precedent.”
36
  There are two 
interesting aspects to this clarification.  Firstly, the arrangement clearly does derogate 
from the Convention, although the President is keen to downplay this.  His statement 
can perhaps be seen as stressing the consensual nature of the derogation. Secondly, 
                                                 
30 See Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (Cambridge University Press, 1998) at pp. 137-138. 
31 LOS Convention, Annex VI, Article 4. 
32 Document SPLOS/48, at para. 29; Document SPLOS/135, at para. 36.   
33 LOS Convention, Annex II, Article 2(3). 





and more importantly, the disclaimer was intended to make abundantly clear that the 
decision had no normative effect for future elections.  In other words, the President 
was denying any law-making intent.  By implication, it is admitted that decisions of 
the States Parties can create law in this way. 
At the second elections for members of the Commission in 2002, the 
distribution of seats was adjusted so that it was in conformity with the provisions of 
Annex II of the Convention.37 This time, the decision was not accompanied by any 
disclaimer on its value as a precedent.   
Comparison of these cases suggests that the States Parties are aware that their 
decisions can have legal value, even though they have no formal status under the 
Convention.   Not authorised by the Convention, such decisions could nevertheless be 
classified as subsequent agreements or subsequent practice of the parties under Article 
31(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Arguably some other decisions of the States Parties have gone further than 
interpreting the Convention by actually modifying its provisions.  For instance, at the 
first meeting of the States Parties in 1994, a question arose over the timing of 
elections to the Tribunal.  The Convention provides that the first elections shall take 
place within six months of the entry into force of the Convention.38  However, given 
the number of states which had indicated that their acceptance of the Convention was 
imminent, it was decided to postpone the first election of the Tribunal to 1 August 
1996.39  In addition, the decision extended the eligibility for election to candidates 
from states which were in the process of becoming a party to the Convention.40  The 
decision specified that it was a “one-time deferment” to the election schedule and that 
no further changes would be made unless the States Parties agreed by consensus.41  A 
similar decision was adopted at the third meeting of the States Parties, postponing the 
                                                 
37 The following allocation was agreed: four from Africa, six from Asia, three from Eastern Europe, 
four from Latin America and Caribbean, four from Western Europe and Other; Document SPLOS/91, 
at para. 97. 
38 LOS Convention, Annex VI, Article 4(3). 
39 Document SPLOS/3, at para. 16.  This was based on a recommendation from the Preparatory 
Commission; see Statement by the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, Document 
LOS/PCN/L.115/Rev.1, dated 8 September 1994, at para 43, specifically citing the object of universal 
participation.   
40 Document SPLOS/3, at para. 16.  For a description of the revised procedure, see Election of 
Members of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea – Note by the Secretariat, Document 
SPLOS/9. 
41 Document SPLOS/3, at para. 16(a) and (f). 
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first election of the members of the Commission.42  Both decisions stress their one-off 
nature, but they clearly modify the dates prescribed in the Convention. 
A further illustration of a decision seeking to modify the Convention is the 
postponement of the date from which the ten-year period for making submissions to 
the Commission would be calculated.  According to the Convention, a coastal state 
must submit particulars of its proposed outer continental shelf “as soon as possible, 
but in any case within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that 
State.”
43  However, the States Parties decided that the ten-year time limit should start 
from 13 May 1999.44 Accordingly, states for which the Convention entered into force 
before that date will not have to make submissions until 13 May 2009.45  When 
making the decision, the States Parties discussed the form of any change to the text of 
Annex II.  Possibilities included an amendment under Articles 312 or 313, an 
agreement relating to the implementation of Article 4 of Annex II or a decision of the 
States Parties.46 It was decided that a decision of the States Parties, following the 
precedents for the postponements of elections, was appropriate to effectuate the 
necessary change.  The report of the Meeting summarises: “Many delegations were of 
the view that it fell within the competence of the Meeting of the States Parties to adopt 
by consensus a decision expressing general agreement on the starting date for 
calculating the 10-year time period.”
47   
One commentator has suggested that the modifications of the Convention that 
have been implemented through decisions of the States Parties to date are simply of 
an administrative nature, concerning time limits that are to be applied on only one 
occasion.48  Whilst this is true of the postponement of the elections for the Tribunal 
and the Commission, the decision to delay the commencement of the ten year period 
for submissions to the Commission is of a slightly different character.  Firstly, the 
delay was for a longer period, almost five years, as opposed to just over one year in 
                                                 
42 Document SPLOS/5, at para. 20. 
43 LOS Convention, Annex II, Article 4. 
44 Document SPLOS/72.  This issue of the timeframe for submissions to the Commission arose again at 
the sixteenth meeting of the States Parties in 2006 where the possibility of a further extension was 
mooted; Document SPLOS/148, at para. 72. 
45 Document SPLOS/72. 
46 Document SPLOS/73, at para. 78. 
47 Document SPLOS/72, at para. 79. 
48 Treves, "The General Assembly and the Meeting of States Parties in the Implementation of the LOS 
Convention", in Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: the role of the LOS Convention, ed. Oude 
Elferink (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at pp. 71-72. 
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the case of the two elections.  Secondly, the deadline was not imminent; it was ten 
years in the future.  Thus, the changes did not have the same urgency or de minimis 
character.  Moreover, these instances of decision-making by the States Parties do not 
suggest that there is any basis to limit the legal effect of their decisions.  The practice 
of the States Parties in these instances acknowledges consensus decisions as a form of 
law-making, not only for gap filling, but as a way of modifying the legal framework 
in the Convention, circumventing the formal amendment procedures.     
There are certainly advantages of using consensus decisions to modify the 
Convention regime.  Principally, it is quicker than invoking the amendment 
procedures, which not only require the circulation of proposed amendments to States 
Parties, but also formally require individual consent before amendments become 
binding.  By contrast, consensus decisions can have immediate effect.  The 
disadvantage of the consensus decisions is the uncertainty over the legal basis for a 
decision. How much of a problem is this?  As Klabbers asks, “if a healthy majority 
agrees with the activity, then it can hardly be deemed illegal, for, if it were illegal, 
how could a healthy majority possibly accept it?”
 49  This reasoning is persuasive.  
What is clear is that if such informal techniques of law-making are to be utilised, 
widespread participation and consensus decision-making are vital.50 
An inherent limitation of the States Parties as a forum for law-making, noted 
above, is its limited membership.  However, the practice of the States Parties confirms 
a desire to promote universal participation in their proceedings.  Invitations to the first 
meeting of the States Parties in November 1994 were addressed to all States Parties, 
as well as all other states and several international organizations and other entities 
referred to in Article 305 of the Convention.  In issuing such a broad invitation, the 
UN Secretary General acknowledged the desire to achieve universal participation in 
the Convention.51   
At the first meeting, the provisional Rules of Procedure were adopted by the 
States Parties subject to an amendment to allow the participation of non-parties in 
                                                 
49 Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 
p. 160. 
50 Churchill, "The impact of State Practice on the jurisdictional framework contained in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea", in Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea, ed. Oude 
Elferink (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at p. 97; Boyle, "Further Development of the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention",  at p. 574. 
51 Document SPLOS/3, at para. 1. 
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their proceedings.  Rule 15 allowed states that had signed the Convention but were 
not yet parties to attend as observers.52  It provides for extensive rights of 
participation for non-parties, permitting them to take part in discussions and 
deliberations, albeit without a vote.53 The inclusion of this provision at the time was 
vital given the number of states which has indicated their intention to become a party 
to the Convention but had not completed the formalities.  Indeed, observer states 
actually out-numbered States Parties for the first few meetings that took place.54   
The rules on participation of observers were again amended at the seventh 
meeting of the States Parties in May 1997, where it was agreed to further extend 
rights of participation to “States Members of the United Nations or members of 
specialized agencies of the United Nations or the International Atomic Energy 
Agency.”
55  The purpose of this amendment was to permit the participation of states 
which had come into being since UNCLOS III.  In other words, rights of participation 
were universalised so that any state could attend and participate in the proceedings of 
the States Parties as observers.  
Although observer states do not have a right to vote, placing them under a 
potential handicap, voting is in practice rare.  Indeed, the Rules of Procedure 
encourage the States Parties to “work on the basis of general agreement” and the 
Meeting should only proceed to a vote if “all efforts at general agreement have been 
exhausted.”
56  General agreement in this provision is probably to be understood as 
consensus in the sense used at UNCLOS III.  In fact, the types of decision-making 
techniques developed at UNCLOS III to facilitate consensus are regularly put into 
practice by the Meeting of the States Parties.  Informal consultations57 and working 
groups58 are common and the President of the Meeting often takes a leading role in 
forging compromises between various interest groups.   
                                                 
52 Document SPLOS/3, at para. 12. 
53 SPLOS Rules of Procedure, Rules 18(1) and (6).  An equivalent right is given to the International 
Seabed Authority in Rule 18(2) and (6).  Other observers, that is those categories identified in Article 
319(3)(b) of the Convention, may attend but may only make written statements on the invitation of the 
President and with the permission of the Meeting; Rule 18(7). 
54 The President of the fifth Meeting of the States Parties noted that the number of States Parties had for 
the first time exceeded one hundred states at that meeting; Document SPLOS/14, at para. 7. 
55 Document SPLOS/24, at para. 28. 
56 SPLOS Rules of Procedure, Rule 52.   
57 For example, the allocation of seats on the Tribunal; see above, at pp. 82-83. 
58 For example, the consideration of the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities; see below, at p. 88. 
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If a vote is taken, decisions on questions of substance are made by a two-thirds 
majority of States Parties present and voting, and questions of procedure by a simple 
majority.59  Voting in practice has only taken place in the course of elections for the 
Tribunal and the Commission.  From this analysis of the actual practice of the 
Meetings of the States Parties, it is clear that they operate in a way that comes close to 
the procedures at UNCLOS III.     
Another form of law-making undertaken by the States Parties is the 
negotiation and adoption of treaties.60  At the seventh Meeting in May 1997, the 
States Parties adopted the Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. The Agreement fills in the gaps in the 
Convention which simply provides that “the members of the Tribunal, when engaged 
on the business of the Tribunal, shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.”
61 
The Agreement, on the other hand, makes provision for immunity and other privileges 
for the Tribunal itself, as well as provisions covering the treatment of judges, staff 
members, witnesses, experts and advocates appearing before the Tribunal.  Therefore, 
it goes beyond the minimalist provisions in the Convention. 
On what basis was the Agreement adopted?  The Agreement finds its origins 
in the discussions of the Preparatory Commission which was charged by Resolution I 
of UNCLOS III with preparing “a report containing recommendations for submission 
to the meeting of the States Parties … regarding practical arrangements for the 
establishment of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.”
62  The draft 
prepared by the Preparatory Commission was introduced at the second Meeting of the 
States Parties63 and it was debated over several meetings, through informal 
consultations, working groups, as well as plenary discussions.  The Agreement was 
informally adopted ad referendum by the Working Group at the seventh Meeting and 
submitted to the plenary for further consideration.  At this stage of the proceedings, 
                                                 
59 SPLOS Rules of Procedure, Rules 53 and 55.  At the ninth Meeting, a proposal to change the 
necessary majority for decisions on budgetary and financial matters from two-thirds to three-quarters 
was introduced; Document SPLOS/48, at para. 41.  Following extensive discussions, during which 
opposing opinions were aired, the proposal was withdrawn at the eleventh Meeting; Document 
SPLOS/73, at para. 46. 
60 Treaty-making powers are not expressly conferred on the States Parties by the Convention but this 
has not stopped them!   
61 LOS Convention, Annex VI, Article 10. 
62 Resolution I, at para. 10. 
63 Document SPLOS/4, at para. 32.  At that stage, it was called a “draft protocol”.  It was changed to a 
“draft agreement” at the third Meeting; Document SPLOS/5, at para. 15. 
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the States Parties turned to the question of the appropriate procedure for the adoption 
of the Agreement and in particular whether it should be adopted by the States Parties 
or the General Assembly.64  Ultimately, it was agreed that the States Parties would 
adopt the Agreement, although reservations were expressed by two states that they did 
not have a mandate to do so.65     
Unlike the authority for its adoption, the legal status of the Agreement is not 
controversial.  As a treaty, it is binding on those states who become a party to it.  
Although negotiated by the States Parties, participation is not limited to this group of 
states.  The Agreement is open to all States.66  Thus, it aspires to universality.  The 
General Assembly has called on “states that have not done so to consider ratifying or 
acceding to the Agreement.”
67 
As well as formal acceptance, the Agreement provides a number of additional 
ways in which states can indicate their consent to be bound without becoming a full 
party.  Special procedures allow for provisional application by states which intend to 
ratify or accede to the Agreement in the future68, as well as ad hoc application  of the 
Agreement, allowing any state to accept the Agreement for the duration of a particular 
dispute.69  In this way, the Agreement attempts to promote its application as widely as 
possible.   
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the practice of the States Parties on 
the issue of implementing and modifying the provisions of the Convention has been 
pragmatic.  They have adopted various decisions and instruments which can be seen 
to have a normative impact.  These meetings provide an opportunity for the States 
Parties, as well as other states attending as observers, to discuss any issues related to 
the interpretation and application of the Convention and arrive at common 
understandings.  Those decisions which do not fall within powers conferred by the 
Convention itself arguably fall within inherent powers of interpretation and 
implementation possessed by the parties to a treaty, stemming from general 
international law .   
                                                 
64 Document SPLOS/24, at para. 26. 
65 Russia and Brazil; Document SPLOS/24, at para. 27. 
66 Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, Articles 27 and 29. 
67 General Assembly Resolution 61/30, 2006, at para. 33. 
68 Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, Article 31. 
69 Agreement on Privileges and Immunities, Article 32. 
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Not everyone accepts a wider role for the States Parties in implementing the 
LOS Convention.  It has been argued by states that the Meeting of the States Parties 
does not possess general powers of interpretation or implementation in connection 
with the Convention.  For instance, when the Commission asked for advice on the 
interpretation of certain provisions of the Convention, one delegate stressed that “the 
Meeting of the States Parties did not have the competence to give a legal opinion.”
70  
In discussions on the role of the States Parties in reviewing the implementation of the 
Convention, other delegations have said that the Meeting it limited to fulfilling those 
functions ascribed to it by the text of the treaty.71  Further to this argument, it has been 
said that the use of the terms “necessary” and “in accordance with this Convention” 
in Article 319 point towards a restrictive interpretation of the powers of the States 
Parties.72   
The controversy over the role of the States Parties has not been finally 
resolved.  At the fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties, it was agreed that the UN 
Secretary General would submit his report on the law of the sea, which also serves as 
a report to the General Assembly and other institutions, to the Meeting of the States 
Parties under the title “Report of the Secretary General under article 319 for the 
information of States Parties on issues of a general nature relevant to States Parties 
that have arisen with respect to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.”73  Debates continue, however, over what action the States Parties can take in 
relation to this report. 
From a legal perspective, it is submitted that arguments in support of limiting 
the powers of the States Parties are not convincing.  The text of the Convention is 
ambiguous and it can be interpreted in a number of ways.74  Indeed, it must be 
                                                 
70 Document SPLOS/31, at para. 52. 
71 Document SPLOS/135, at para. 82. 
72 Treves, "The General Assembly and the Meeting of States Parties in the Implementation of the LOS 
Convention",  at p. 58. 
73 It had been suggested that a separate report should be submitted by the Secretary General to the 
States Parties; Document SPLOS/119, at para. 82.  At the fourteenth Meeting, the Director of the 
Division for Oceans Affairs admitted that “there is an omission in that the comprehensive annual report 
of the Secretary-General on oceans and the law of the sea presented before the General Assembly does 
not make reference to the fact that it also contains information submitted pursuant to Article 319 of the 
Convention”; Document SPLOS/119, at para. 83.  
74 For a discussion of these arguments, see Treves, "The General Assembly and the Meeting of States 
Parties in the Implementation of the LOS Convention", at p. 58.  The General Assembly agreed in 1994 
that the report on the law of the sea that the Secretary General makes annually to the General Assembly 
would also suffice as the report required under Article 319(a) to the States Parties; General Assembly 
Resolution 49/28, 1994, at para. 15(a). 
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remembered that the States Parties are not restricted to purely administrative and 
budgetary tasks, as they are also responsible for adopting most amendments to the 
Convention regime.   
A strict legal analysis does not explain the debate that has taken place over the 
role of the States Parties in overseeing the implementation of the Convention. These 
discussions reflect wider political concerns over how the legal order of the oceans 
develops and who is involved in that process.  It is as much a question of legitimacy, 
as it is of law.  For most treaties, a meeting of the contracting parties is the most 
appropriate forum to decide on the implementation and development of a treaty as it 
includes all the interested actors.  However, this assumption does not necessarily hold 
true in the case of the LOS Convention.  There are several reasons why the States 
Parties are not always the most appropriate forum for overseeing the progressive 
development of the law of the sea.   
Firstly, the Meeting of the States Parties was not created in an institutional 
vacuum.  There are a number of other international institutions which are active on 
specific aspects of maritime affairs.  The powers of these institutions are not curtailed 
by the LOS Convention.  In many cases, the Convention confirms the role of 
competent international organizations in fleshing out its skeletal legal framework.  
The role of other organizations is recognised inter alia by Article 319(2)(a) of the 
Convention which requires the Secretary General to report on developments in the 
law of the sea to “all States Parties, the [International Seabed Authority] and 
competent international organizations”.  The law-making role of these organizations 
will be considered in the following chapter.  For present purposes, it suffices to say 
that given their specialist, and often technical, remit, these organizations often offer a 
more appropriate forum than the States Parties for overseeing particular developments 
in the law of the sea.   
A second and more general limitation on the role of the States Parties arises 
from its restricted membership.  Although the States Parties do allow participation of 
non-parties in their meetings, ultimately the formal procedures place such states at a 
disadvantage in any decision-making.  Treves explains how the Meeting of the States 
Parties is potentially “a forum that can be used in order to exercise pressure on non-
parties, in which action can be undertaken that might create political difficulty or 
embarrassment for such non-parties, that might make them regret not being in a 
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position to orient, or hamper, such action.
”75  There is always the threat that the 
interests of non-parties can be overridden by invocation of the voting procedures.   
This inherent limitation of the decision-making procedures of the States 
Parties means that its decisions may not always be considered as legitimate.  Concerns 
over legitimacy cannot restrict the legal powers on the States Parties conferred by the 
Convention.  On the other hand, a lack of legitimacy may prevent it from influencing 
customary international law of the sea.  It follows that other institutions, which place 
all states on the same footing, may be more appropriate for discussing the general 
development of the law of the sea. 
 
4. The General Assembly and the Law of the Sea 
Of the many other institutions which are involved in the law of the sea, the 
General Assembly assumes a special position because of its central place in the UN 
family and its long-standing involvement in this area.   The General Assembly has 
continued to show an acute interest in the law of the sea since the entry into force of 
the Convention.  Although it has no formal powers under the LOS Convention, it has 
assumed an oversight role on the basis of its general powers conferred by the UN 
Charter.76     
The General Assembly is arguably a more appropriate forum than the States 
Parties for any general review of the law of the sea regime because of its universal 
membership.  Debates on the annual General Assembly resolution on the law of the 
sea provide an opportunity for all states to discuss developments in ocean affairs and 
to achieve an ongoing compromise on the interpretation and implementation of the 
general law on this subject.  The debate that takes place in the General Assembly is 
often more detailed than discussions by the States Parties.  As Treves explains, “the 
[law of the sea] debate [in the General Assembly is] just the tip of the iceberg.  
Negotiations for the preparation of the resolution [start] weeks and sometimes 
months in advance and [see] informal and frank discussions between experts, 
ambassadors, legal advisors and law of the sea specialists of the most interested 
                                                 
75 Treves, "The General Assembly and the Meeting of States Parties in the Implementation of the LOS 
Convention", at p. 62. 




77  Indeed, this process of negotiation and networking by the General 
Assembly has been further developed through the creation of the Open-Ended 
Informal Consultative Process on the Law of the Sea78, established by General 
Assembly Resolution 54/33 of 24 November 1999.  The purpose of the ICP is to aid 
the effective and constructive consideration of developments in the law of the sea by 
the General Assembly, concentrating on areas that call for a strengthening of co-
ordination and co-operation between states and international organizations.79 
The product of these discussions is an annual resolution on the oceans and the 
law of the sea.  These resolutions can play several roles in the law-making process.   
Firstly, General Assembly resolutions can provide evidence of state practice 
and opinio juris communis, indicating the content of customary international law.80  
Given the historic role of the General Assembly in relation to the LOS Convention, its 
resolutions can arguably also serve as interpretations of the Convention in a similar 
way to decisions of the States Parties.81   
Resolutions can also serve a more general law-making role, as witnessed in 
the case of the trust funds created in the this field.  Three trust funds have been 
created to date; one is intended to support developing countries which are involved in 
litigation before the Tribunal, whereas the other two relate to the work of the 
Commission.  Proposals for all three funds originated in the Meeting of the States 
Parties.  Indeed, all three funds are connected with the administrative and financial 
responsibilities of the States Parties under the Convention.  Nevertheless, it was not 
the States Parties which created the trust funds.  Rather recommendations were made 
to the General Assembly82 which formally established the trust funds through 
Resolution 55/7 adopted on 30 October 2000.83  It is suggested that the referral of the 
issue to the General Assembly was necessary because of the role played by the UN 
                                                 
77 Treves, "The General Assembly and the Meeting of States Parties in the Implementation of the LOS 
Convention",  at p. 60. 
78 Hereinafter, referred to as the “ICP”. 
79 See General Assembly Resolution 54/33, 1999, at para. 2. 
80 For a discussion of customary international law, see chapter three, at p. 50 ff.. 
81 By way of analogy, General Assembly resolutions have been used by the Court in order to interpret 
the UN Charter.  For instance, in the Nicaragua Case, the Court relied on General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 (XXV) to interpret the phrase “use of force”; (1986) ICJ Reports 14, at para. 228. See 
also the interpretation of “self-determination”, in the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, (1975) ICJ 
Reports 12, at paras. 54-58. 
82 Document SPLOS/57 and Document SPLOS/60, at para. 60.   
83 General Assembly Resolution 55/7, at paras. 9 and 18.  The terms of reference of the Trust Funds are 
found in Annexes I – III of the resolution. 
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Secretariat.  Under the resolutions, it is the UN Secretary General which is 
responsible for administering the trust funds.  The Secretariat is prohibited by the UN 
Charter from receiving “instructions from any government or any other authority 
external to the Organization.”
84
  The States Parties are such an external authority.  
Whilst the UN Secretary General provides secretariat support to the States Parties85, it 
remains under the control of the United Nations organs, in particular the General 
Assembly which has authorised the UN Secretariat to fulfil its functions under the 
LOS Convention.86  Any additional task which is not mandated in the Convention 
must be further authorised by the General Assembly.  Therefore, it is only the General 
Assembly that could have set up the trust funds which are administered by the UN 
Secretariat. 
The role of General Assembly in developing the Convention regime is not 
exclusive.  This task is shared by several other institutions, including the States 
Parties and technical organizations.  However, the General Assembly does have a 
special status because of its universal membership and its place in the UN family.  As 
one commentator has noted, the General Assembly is uniquely placed to further the 
coherence of oceans policy because of its position as the central, plenary organ of the 
United Nations.87  Whilst it does have a key information gathering function, it will be 
seen that its actual powers to co-ordinate the activity of other institutions are in fact 
quite limited.   
The UN Charter foresees that the United Nations shall, through the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, co-ordinate the policies and 
activities of the specialized agencies.88  Article 58 of the Charter provides that “the 
Organization shall make recommendations for the co-ordination of the policies and 
activities of the specialized agencies.”  Such recommendations, as their name 
suggests, are not legally binding. The drafters of the UN Charter did not attempt to 
create a hierarchical infrastructure with one organ able to control the work of the 
                                                 
84 UN Charter, Article 100(1). See Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations : a commentary 2ed., 
2 vols., vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2002) at p. 1230. 
85 General Assembly Resolution 49/28, 1994, at para. 15(g). 
86 General Assembly Resolution 49/28, 1994. 
87 Elferink, "Reviewing the implementation of the LOS Convention: the role of the UN General 
Assembly and the meeting of the States Parties", in Oceans Management in the 21st Century: 
Institutional Frameworks and Responses ed. Oude Elferink and Rothwell (Koninklijke Bill NV, 2004) 
at pp. 305-306.  See also the comments of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development, Decision 
7/1, at para. 40, contained in Report of the Seventh Session, UN Document E/CN.17/1999/20. 
88 UN Charter, Articles 58 and 63(2).   
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others.  Rather, the United Nations is founded on a network of co-operative 
arrangements between the United Nations and several associated, albeit autonomous, 
“specialized agencies” dealing with specific and often technical issues.  This network 
is founded on a series of so-called relationship agreements.89  Many of the provisions 
in these agreements set out reciprocal rights and obligations of the organizations 
bound by the agreement.  As a whole, the system relies on good will and mutual co-
operation rather than coercion.   
Nevertheless, the practical value of General Assembly resolutions on the law 
of the sea and reports of the UN Secretary General on the subject should not be 
underestimated.  There are several ways in which these resolutions contribute to co-
ordinating oceans policy. 
It is the information reported by international organizations formally or 
informally that provides the basis for the review process undertaken by the General 
Assembly.  Nor is it only the specialized agencies and other UN institutions that are 
asked to report on their activities.  General Assembly resolutions regularly call on 
“the competent international organizations, as well as funding institutions … to 
contribute to the preparation of the comprehensive report of the Secretary-General on 
oceans and the law of the sea”
90, regardless of their formal status or position.  The 
report generally contains information on all forms of international co-operation, be it 
through international organizations or informal co-operative mechanisms.  Again, the 
process of co-ordination relies more on mutual co-operation than any formal powers 
possessed by the General Assembly. Nevertheless, information sharing is a vital 
aspect of co-ordination. In this sense, the law of the sea report prepared by the 
Secretary General and the General Assembly debate make a significant contribution 
to achieving a coherent oceans regime. 
The review process not only provides an invaluable source of information, it 
also actively tries to influence co-ordinated law-making.  Resolutions on the law of 
the sea are often targeted directly at international organizations, promoting co-
operation or recommending certain action.91  In general, the General Assembly does 
not identify a particular institution, preferring to address the “competent international 
                                                 
89 See also UN Charter, Article 63. 
90 E.g. General Assembly Resolution 59/24, 2004, at para. 96. 
91 E.g. General Assembly Resolution 59/24, 2004, at paras. 66, 68, 77. 
 
 96 
organization” or simply “global and regional bodies”.  It therefore follows the 
approach of the Convention itself.92   
Occasionally, the resolution will designate or invite a specific organization to 
undertake an activity.  In most instances where a particular organization is named, it is 
in relation to an activity that is already underway.  For example, the 2004 General 
Assembly Resolution invites the International Hydrographic Organization and the 
International Maritime Organization to continue their co-ordinated efforts to jointly 
adopt measures for the transition to electronic nautical charts.93  Therefore, the 
resolutions act as a legitimising tool for activities taking place through other 
institutions.   
Attempts at co-ordination can on occasion be resisted.  In 2003, the UN 
Secretary General convened a meeting of interested international organizations to 
discuss problems with flag state implementation of international standards.94  Several 
UN agencies were invited to attend the meeting, including the IMO, the ILO, the 
FAO, the OECD, the UNEP, and the UNCTAD.  At the meeting, the IMO was highly 
critical of the initiative, arguing that it would be best left to organizations to pursue a 
sectoral approach to the problem.  Following the meeting, the IMO Secretary General 
wrote to the UN Secretary General, stressing that, in the view of the former, “policy 
issues concerning the role, responsibilities and actions of member States which derive 
from their obligations as IMO member States and from their adherence to IMO 
Conventions and regulations are not subjects which need additional coordination at 
inter-agency meetings.”
95  Although such resistance to co-operation is rare, it 
highlights the limitations of a decentralised system that relies on good will for its 
successful operation.  Ultimately, the law-making activities of institutions may take 
place in parallel and the question of the applicable law will be left to be resolved by 
the rules and principles on conflicts of norms.96 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of the General Assembly to the on-going 
development of the law of the sea is the adoption of the so-called implementing 
                                                 
92 See chapter five, at pp. 132-133. 
93 General Assembly Resolution 59/24, 2004, at para. 36. 
94 See United Nations Secretary General, Consultative Group on Flag State Implementation - Report of 
the Secretary General, (2004) at para. 5.  The letter from Greenpeace, the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation and WWF, calling for ‘a concerted multi-agency approach’ to sub-standard 
shipping, is contained in Annex I. 
95 Ibid.,  at Annex III.   
96 See chapter six. 
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agreements.  The term “implementing agreement” is not included in the LOS 
Convention itself, rather it has its origins in the subsequent practice of states in 
developing the legal framework for the law of the sea.  There are two treaties that fall 
into this category: the 1994 Part XI Agreement and the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement.  
These instruments have both had a substantial impact on the LOS Convention, 
arguably modifying the legal framework as it was adopted in 1982.   
Although both the Part XI Agreement and the Fish Stocks Agreement are 
classified as implementing agreements, it is clear that there are fundamental 
differences between the two instruments.  The impact of these two implementing 
agreements on the law of the sea regime will be individually considered before 
looking at what characteristics these two instruments have in common. 
 
5. The 1994 Part XI Agreement 
The 1994 Part XI Agreement deals with the regime for the exploration and 
exploitation of the deep seabed contained in Part XI of the LOS Convention.  Given 
the failure to achieve consensus on this issue at UNCLOS III, it was clear that 
modifications would have to be made to Part XI, if the LOS Convention was to attain 
universal participation.  
In 1989, the General Assembly called on all states to make renewed efforts to 
facilitate universal participation in the Convention.97  In furtherance of this mandate, 
the UN Secretary General initiated a series of informal negotiations between 
interested parties in order to achieve this goal.  The first phase of these negotiations 
involved a small number of key states who defined the problems to be addressed.98  A 
list of nine topics relating to Part XI of the Convention was drafted: costs to States 
Parties, the Enterprise, decision-making, the review conference, transfer of 
technology, production limitation, the compensation fund, financial terms of 
                                                 
97 General Assembly Resolution 44/26, 1989, at para. 3.  The preamble refers to the expressions of 
willingness to explore all possibilities of addressing issues in order to secure universal participation in 
the Convention, made at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission in August/September 1989.   
98 United Nations Secretary General, Consultations of the Secretary-General on outstanding issues 
relating to the deep seabed mining provisions of theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - 
Report of the Secretary General, (1994) UN Document A/48/950, at para. 4. 
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contracts, and the environment.99  All states were able to participate in the second 
phase of the consultation which discussed solutions to the perceived problems.  
Between seventy-five and ninety countries actually attended this phase of 
consultations.   
As at UNCLOS III, an informal group of states emerged which sought to reach 
a consensus solution.  This group produced what was known as the “Boat Paper” 
which included a draft General Assembly resolution and a draft Agreement on the 
Implementation of Part XI.  The Boat Paper became the main focus of negotiations 
and as one commentator describes, “regular revisions of the draft resolution and the 
draft agreement were prepared by a small group of participants in the light of 
discussions in the consultations and in the Boat Group.”
100  Although the 
consultations were less institutionalised than UNCLOS III, many parallels in the 
negotiating process can be drawn, notably, the use of small, informal discussion 
groups and the focus on a single, informal negotiating text.  The whole process was 
overseen by the General Assembly which encouraged states to engage in a productive 
dialogue.101 
A number of possible outcomes for the negotiations were discussed, including 
a protocol of amendment, an interpretative agreement, and a transitional agreement to 
apply until a definitive regime could be negotiated.102  It was accepted by all states 
that the outcome had to be in the form of a legally binding instrument.103  Ultimately, 
it was decided to submit the resulting instrument to the General Assembly for 
adoption.  The Part XI Agreement was duly adopted by the General Assembly on 28 
July 1994, by 121 votes for, 0 votes against, with 7 abstentions.104   
The Agreement has undoubtedly had a considerable impact on the original 
provisions of Part XI of the LOS Convention.  Article 2 of the 1994 Agreement 
addresses the general relationship between the two instruments by saying that “the 
                                                 
99 The environment was subsequently dropped from the agenda.  It was noted by one commentator that 
the environment was “qualitatively different from the eight other issues under consideration”, Nandan, 
"The Efforts Undertaken by the United Nations to Ensure Universality of the Convention", in Law of 
the Sea: New Worlds, New Discoveries, ed. Miles and Treves (Law of the Sea Institute, 1992) at p. 378. 
100 Anderson, "Further efforts to ensure universal participation in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea", (1994) 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at p. 889. 
101 E.g. General Assembly Resolution 46/78, 1991, at paras. 4 and 5. 
102 United Nations Secretary General, Consultations of the Secretary-General, at para. 1. 
103 Ibid.,  at para. 12. 
104 General Assembly Resolution 48/263, 1994.  
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provisions of this Agreement and Part XI shall be interpreted and applied together as 
a single instrument.”  Whilst many of the basic principles underlying the deep seabed 
mining regime remain the same, the detailed provisions are the subject of far-reaching 
reform.  The language of the Agreement is straightforward and uncompromising.  
Several provisions of the Convention are simply “disapplied”.105  They are replaced 
by provisions which seek to improve the rights of investors and to ensure that 
production is undertaken in line with “sound commercial principles.”106  Article 2(1) 
makes this process of revision even more explicit by providing that “in the event of 
any inconsistency between this Agreement and Part XI, the provisions of the 
Agreement shall prevail.”     
Whether or not the Part XI Agreement amounts de facto to an amendment of 
the Convention is controversial.  Scovazzi is of the view that the “politically prudent 
label of an “implementing agreement” is a euphemism for the word “amendment” 
which would have been more correct from the legal point of view.”
107  On the other 
hand, Anderson, who was present throughout the informal consultations, notes that 
“the word “amend” was best avoided” and he points out that the participants in the 
informal consultations rejected the idea of a protocol of amendment which had been 
previously suggested in an Information Note produced by the UN Secretariat.108   
The political context may go some way to explaining the importance attached 
to the title and formal status of the Agreement.  Serious political capital was attached 
to the issue of deep seabed mining by the opposing factions at UNCLOS III.  To 
acknowledge an amendment to the original settlement would have been a concession 
of defeat for those states which had advocated a strong international regime for the 
deep seabed.  The use of an implementing agreement, as opposed to a protocol of 
amendment, it is submitted, seeks to conceal the true impact of the 1994 Agreement - 
a radical reform of the law of the sea regime.     
                                                 
105 Part XI Agreement, section 2, at para. 3 and para.11(b); section 3, at para. 8; section 4; section 5, at 
para. 2; section 6, at para. 7; section 8, at para. 2. 
106 See Part XI Agreement, section 2, at para. 2 and section 6, at para. 1(a). 
107 T. Scovazzi, "Evolution of International Law of the Sea", (2000) 286 Receuil des Cours at p. 125. 
See also in support of this view, D. Nelson, "The New Deep Sea-Bed Mining Regime", (1995) 10 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, at p. 192;  Boyle, "Further Development of the 1982 
Law of the Sea Convention",  at footnote 14.  Churchill and Lowe avoid saying that it amends the 
Convention but accept that it makes substantial changes; The Law of the Sea (Manchester University 
Press, 1999) at p. 238. 
108 Anderson, Written Intervention to the Third Verzijl Symposium, December 2004, at p. 3.  The 
options presented by the UN Secretariat are produced in United Nations Secretary General, 
Consultations of the Secretary-General, at para. 11. 
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The Agreement, as a treaty, is only formally binding on those states which 
have accepted it.  Article 4(2) provides that only those states or entities that are a 
party to the LOS Convention may become bound by the 1994 Part XI Agreement. At 
the same time, it would appear that states becoming a party to the LOS Convention 
after the conclusion of the 1994 Agreement must accept both instruments.  Article 
4(1) of the Agreement provides that “after the adoption of this Agreement, any 
instrument of ratification or formal confirmation of or accession to the Convention 
shall also represent consent to be bound by this Agreement.”  It follows that states 
accepting the LOS Convention after the conclusion of the Part XI Agreement do not 
need to submit any additional instrument agreeing to accept the application of the 
Agreement.109  This is not surprising given that they are to be treated as a “single 
instrument”.  There are obvious parallels between this provision and Article 40(5) of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that states 
becoming party to a treaty after entry into force will be bound by any amendments 
which have been made to that treaty.  There is one important difference.  Whilst the 
Vienna Convention simply creates a presumption that a state accepts an amending 
agreement when it consents to be bound by a treaty, allowing a state to indicate its 
intent not to be bound, the Part XI Agreement does not give states this choice.  States 
becoming party to the LOS Convention after 28 July 1994 will automatically be 
bound by the terms of the Part XI Agreement and there is no opportunity to opt out.       
States which are already party to the LOS Convention must indicate their 
consent to be bound by the Agreement separately. The Part XI Agreement provides 
several alternative ways in which they can do this: signature, signature subject to 
ratification, and accession.110  In addition, Article 5 of the Agreement creates a so-
called “simplified procedure” which aims to facilitate the acceptance of the 
Agreement by as many states as possible.111  This article provides that all States 
Parties to the LOS Convention which have signed the Part XI Agreement are 
presumed to have consented to be bound, unless they notify the UN Secretary General 
to the contrary within 12 months of the adoption of the Agreement.  Thus, Article 5 
                                                 
109 According to UN data, forty states became bound by the Part XI Agreement simply by 
“participation” in the LOS Convention. See www.un.org/dept/los. 
110 Part XI Agreement, Article 4(3)(a) (b) and (c). 
111 Cross-referenced in Part XI Agreement, Article 4(3)(c). 
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creates a presumption in favour of consent112 for those states which have signed the 
Agreement.  The simplified procedure still allows States Parties which signed the 
Agreement a degree of choice and they can opt out if they wish.   
States that have not accepted the Part XI Agreement by any of the mechanisms 
in Articles 4 and 5 will not prima facie be bound.  It follows that, as a matter of treaty 
law, there are a number of States Parties to the LOS Convention for which the 1994 
Agreement is not yet law.113  Indeed, the Secretary General of the International 
Seabed Authority stated in his 2000 report that, “it continues to be a matter of 
concern that, as of 5 June 2000, 35 members of the Authority which became States 
Parties to the Convention prior to the adoption of the Agreement had not yet 
completed the necessary procedural steps to become parties to the Agreement.”114 
Are there other ways in which these states could be bound by the obligations 
contained in the Part XI Agreement?  Has the Part XI Agreement created customary 
international law where the LOS Convention failed?  It is true that the Agreement was 
adopted by an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly, with no dissenting 
votes, and that the Agreement has been repeatedly approved by the General Assembly 
through its resolutions on the law of the sea.  It would appear to have overcome the 
objections of the industrialised states at UNCLOS III.  There is, however, one further 
consideration that may prevent the Part XI Agreement having a law-making character.  
This limitation stems from the fact that the Agreement is largely concerned with the 
creation and operation of an international institution.   Acceptance of a treaty is the 
only way to create institutional obligations.115   
                                                 
112According to data of the UN Division of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, fifteen states became 
bound by the Agreement in this way.  These states were Barbados, Cote d'Ivoire, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Grenada, Guinea, Iceland, Jamaica, Namibia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; see www.un.org/dept/los.  Four states opted out of the 
simplified procedure; Brazil, Cape Verde, Sudan and Uruguay. 
113 As of 31 January 2005 the Part XI Agreement was binding on 117 States in total whilst there were 
145 States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention.  For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina succeeded 
to the Convention on 12 January 1994, before the adoption of the Agreement, but is has not signed, 
ratified or acceded to the Agreement.  The same is true for Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Iraq, Mali, Marshall Islands, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Vietnam, and Yemen.   
114 Document ISBA/6/A/9, Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority 
under article 166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, dated 6 June 
2000, at para. 4.  See also 2001 Law of the Sea Report of the UN Secretary General, at para. 4; 2002 
Law of the Sea Report of the UN Secretary General, at para. 4. 
115 See chapter three, at p. 70. 
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Nevertheless, those states which are party to the Convention but not the Part 
XI Agreement may be deemed to have consented to the Part XI Agreement through 
their participation in the International Seabed Authority.  There is widespread support 
for the theory that the practice of states can modify or amend treaties.116  The ILC 
draft articles on the law of treaties originally provided for this possibility.117  
Although it was removed from the final text of the Convention on the Law of Treaties 
by the Vienna Conference118, Akehurst suggests that “it is difficult to interpret the 
deletion of Article 38 as a clear rejection of the view that existing law allowed a 
treaty to be amended by subsequent practice, especially since the Vienna Convention 
did not exclude the possibility of termination of treaties by desuetude and expressly 
allowed a treaty to be interpreted in light of subsequent practice.”
119  Indeed, the 
process of modification through institutional practice would appear to be confirmed 
by the ICJ in its 1971 Namibia Advisory Opinion.  In that case, South Africa had 
objected to the ICJ dealing with the merits of the question posed by the Security 
Council because, it argued, the resolution containing the question had not been 
adopted by an affirmative vote of nine members of the Council, including the 
concurring votes of the permanent members, as required by the UN Charter.  Whilst 
this was true, the Court held that “the proceedings of the Security Council extending 
over a long period supply abundant evidence that presidential rulings and the 
positions taken by members of the Security Council, in particular its permanent 
members, have consistently and uniformly interpreted the practice of voluntary 
abstention by a permanent member as not constituting a bar to the adoption of 
resolutions.”
120  The Court based its decision on the consistent and uniform practice 
of the states involved.     
                                                 
116 See Akehurst, "The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law", (1974-5)  British Yearbook of 
International Law at p. 275.  
117 International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly",  at p. 236. 
118 By a vote of 53 in favour, 15 against and 26 abstentions. 
119 Akehurst, "The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law",  at p. 277. 
120 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), (1971) ICJ 
Reports 16 at p. 10, para. 22.  As Aust points out, it would seem from the travaux preparatoires that 
this situation was not originally intended by the permanent members; Modern Treaty Law and Practice 
at p. 195.  It is for this reason that the decision of the Court is best seen as an example of amendment 
by subsequent practice, as opposed to an interpretation. 
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There are several similarities between the Namibia Advisory Opinion and the 
situation of the International Seabed Authority.121  Both circumstances concern the 
internal practices of an institution where a procedure has been followed for a number 
of years and there have been no objections by any of the participating states.  The 
practice of the Authority since 1994 is based on the structures outlined in the Part XI 
Agreement.  All Members of the Authority, whether or not they have formally 
accepted the Agreement, are participating in meetings of the organisation according to 
the amended procedures set out in that instrument.122  On this basis, it is arguable that 
the institutional provisions of the Part XI Agreement are binding on all Members of 
the Authority, regardless of whether they have formally consented to be bound by the 
Part XI Agreement.   
This argument does not apply to those states which are not Members of the 
Authority because they have consented to neither the LOS Convention nor the Part XI 
Agreement and they cannot be bound by either instrument with regard to the 
operation of the Authority.  Nevertheless, that is not to say that they are totally free 
and unfettered in their activities in the Area.  There is strong support for the argument 
that the general principles relating to the International Seabed Area contained in the 
1970 Declaration and confirmed in Part XI of the LOS Convention are part of 
customary international law or are general principles of international law.123  These 
principles include the concept of the common heritage of mankind and the prohibition 
on claiming sovereignty or sovereign rights in the Area.124  The Part XI Agreement 
does not disturb these general principles.  According to this argument, those states 
which have not consented to be bound are nevertheless prohibited from exploiting the 
resources of the Area out-with the Part XI regime.125   
   
6. The 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement 
Jurisdiction over fisheries was another issue that caused deep divisions at 
UNCLOS III.  Although the concept of the EEZ solved the question over the extent of 
                                                 
121 Hereinafter, “the Authority”. 
122 For instance, Guyana has had a seat on the Council, as constituted under the Part XI Agreement, 
despite the fact that it has not accepted the Agreement in any of the ways prescribed in Article 4.   
123 See chapter three, at p. 69. 
124 See LOS Convention, Article 137. 
125 See Tomuschat, "Obligations arising for states without or against their will ", (1993) 241 Receuil 
des Cours at pp. 260-261. 
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a coastal state’s fisheries rights, further difficulties arose over what to do about fish 
stocks which crossed the jurisdictional zones created by the Convention.  Ultimately, 
states did manage to reach a compromise on the status of so-called highly migratory 
and straddling fish stocks, albeit at the cost of ambiguity.  The solution arrived at in 
Articles 63 and 64 of the Convention stresses the need for co-operation without 
setting down any more detailed procedural or substantive obligations.126  
Kwiatkowska concludes that the fisheries issue was part of the “unfinished business 
of UNCLOS III.”
127   
The close of UNCLOS III did not signal the end of attempts at law-making in 
the field of fisheries.  During the 1980s, evidence of declining fish stocks increased 
and it was clear that a simple duty to co-operate was not adequate in order to prevent 
over-fishing.  The concern of the international community is reflected, inter alia, in 
General Assembly Resolution 44/26, adopted on 20 November 1989, which called on 
states and other members of the international community to “strengthen their 
cooperation in the conservation of marine living resources, including the prevention 
of fishing methods and practices that can have an adverse impact on the conservation 
and management of marine living resources.”
128 
The issue was given more substantial consideration at the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development129 convened by General Assembly Resolution 44/228 
of 22 December 1989.130  The LOS Convention was accepted as the basic framework 
for the discussions at UNCED, whilst it was recognised that this framework was in 
need of further clarification and development.131  Thus, Programme C of Agenda 21 
                                                 
126 Paul Fauteux, "The Canadian Legal Initiative on High Seas Fishing", (1993) 4 Yearbook of 
International Environmental Law at p. 53.  Nelson nevertheless suggests that Article 63(2) is “not 
necessarily an empty shell” given that the parties are under a duty to conduct negotiations in good faith, 
paying reasonable regard to the fishing rights and interests of each other; "The Development of the 
Legal Regime of High Seas Fisheries", in International Law and Sustainable Development, ed. A. 
Boyle and D. Freestone (Oxford University Press, 1999) at p. 121. 
127 B. Kwiatkowska, "The High Seas Fisheries Regime: at a point of no return?" (1993) 8 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law at p. 327 
128 E.g. General Assembly Resolution 44/26, 1989, at para. 19.  This call was reiterated in subsequent 
resolutions in 1990, 1991, and 1992. 
129 Hereinafter referred to as “UNCED”. 
130 General Assembly Resolution 44/228, 1989, at para. 12(c).  See also concerns advanced by the 
World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press, 
1987)  at p. 268. 
131 During the negotiations, the US advocated the concept of Large Marine Ecosystems as the 
organising principle of Chapter 17 but it was rejected in favour of strengthening the EEZ concept ; see 
Biliana Cicin-Sain and Robert W. Knecht, "Implications of the Earth Summit for Ocean and Coastal 
Governance", (1992) 24 Ocean Development and International Law at p. 339. 
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confirms the application of the LOS Convention – “the provisions of the UN LOS 
Convention on the marine living resources of the high seas sets forth rights and 
obligations of States with respect to conservation and utilisation of these resources” - 
at the same time as noting that management of fish stocks is “inadequate.”132  No 
conclusive agreement could be reached at UNCED; states simply agreed to convene a 
further conference with a view to promoting the effective implementation of the 
provisions of the LOS Convention on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.133   
It was on this basis that the Fish Stocks Conference was convened by General 
Assembly Resolution 47/192 of 22 December 1992.  This resolution once again 
stressed that “the work and results of the conference should be fully consistent with 
the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in particular 
the rights and obligations of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas, and 
that States should give full effect to the high seas fisheries provisions of the 
Convention with regard to fisheries populations whose ranges lie both within and 
beyond exclusive economic zones (straddling fish stocks) and highly migratory fish 
stocks.”
134   
The Fish Stocks Conference was open to all states.135  Somewhat predictably, 
the conference divided into factions familiar to UNCLOS III.  Doulman describes 
how the debate was dominated by fifty to sixty states, with the principal disagreement 
arising between distant water fishing states and coastal states.136  As one author 
comments, “working methods were modelled on those of [UNCLOS III].”137 The 
Chairman of the Fish Stocks Conference adopted a prominent role in the negotiating 
process, preparing compromise texts and facilitating informal negotiations between 
the principal protagonists.   
Ultimately, the Fish Stocks Agreement was adopted by consensus at the final 
session of the Conference in August 1995.  The conclusion of the Agreement was 
welcomed by General Assembly Resolution 50/24 which called on all states and other 
                                                 
132 Agenda 21, at paras 17.44 and 17.45 
133 Agenda 21, at para. 17.49(e). 
134 General Assembly Resolution 47/192, 1992, at para. 3. 
135 General Assembly Resolution 47/192, 1992, at para. 4.   
136 Doulman, "Structure and Process of the 1993-1995 United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks", (1995)  FAO Fisheries Circular No. 898 FID/C898 in part 
6. 
137 Anderson, "The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995 - an Initial Assessment", (1996) 45 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly at p. 467. 
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entities eligible to do so to ratify or accede to the Agreement and to consider applying 
it provisionally.138   
There are several fundamental differences between the Fish Stocks Agreement 
and the Part XI Agreement.  Unlike the previous implementing agreement, the Fish 
Stocks Agreement does not “disapply” any provisions of the Convention.  In many 
ways, this was not necessary, as most of the fisheries provisions in the Convention are 
themselves highly ambiguous.  The Fish Stocks Agreement complements the fisheries 
provisions in the Convention by providing further detail on the way in which they 
should be implemented.  Considering the relationship of the Fish Stocks Agreement 
with the Convention, Freestone argues that “although not always explicit, many of the 
underlying values developed in the 1995 regime can be found to be rooted in the LOS 
Convention.”
139   
The Agreement promotes the conservation of fish stocks by drawing on the 
principles of sustainable development expressed in the instruments adopted at 
UNCED, such as the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 
21140, and the Convention on Biodiversity.141    A few examples will demonstrate this 
approach.  The Fish Stocks Agreement confirms the obligation in the LOS 
Convention to take conservation and management measures based on the best 
scientific evidence available.142  It adds that states, including coastal states acting in 
areas under their jurisdiction, should apply the precautionary approach which is 
described in detail in Article 6 and Annex II of the Agreement.143  The precautionary 
approach was developed from Principle 15 of the 1992 Declaration on Environment 
and Development.  The Agreement also promotes the ecosystem approach, obliging 
                                                 
138 General Assembly Resolution 50/24, 1995, at para. 4. 
139 Freestone, "International Fisheries Law Since Rio: The Continued Rise of the Precautionary 
Principle", in International Law and Sustainable Development, ed. A. Boyle and D. Freestone (Oxford 
University Press, 1999) at p. 146.  In particular, he points to the fact that the objectives of the fisheries 
provisions must be balanced with the obligations to protect and preserve the marine environment; at pp. 
146-149. 
140 The preambular language of the Agreement affirms its origins not only in the LOS Convention, but 
also in Chapter 17 of Agenda 21.  See Ibid.,   at p. 155.   
141 In regard to the latter, the objective of the Agreement to promote the “long-term conservation and 
sustainable use” of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks is clearly influence by the Convention 
on Biological Diversity which has the objective of “the conservation of biological diversity [and] the 
sustainable use of its components.”  See Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 1. 
142 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 5(b); LOS Convention, Article 119(1)(a). 
143 Article 6(2) says that “States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or 
inadequate.  The absence of adequate information shall not be used as a reason for postponing or 
failing to take conservation measures.”   
 
 107 
states to consider the impact of other factors, human and natural, on the status of 
target fish stocks and other species and to generally protect the biodiversity of the 
marine ecosystem.144   
Whilst all of these principles and concepts post-date the LOS Convention, they 
are compatible with it.  The synergy between the Agreement and the Convention is 
reflected in Article 4 of the Agreement which says that “nothing in this Agreement 
shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the Convention.  This 
Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner 
consistent with the Convention”.  This provision confirms that the Agreement is not 
intended to override or replace any of the provisions in the Convention, but to further 
develop the original obligations contained therein.   
The Fish Stocks Agreement also differs from the Part XI Agreement because it 
is open to participation by all states or other entities regardless of whether they are a 
party to the LOS Convention.145  It is in this sense a free-standing treaty.  States and 
other entities can become a party to the Agreement either through ratification146 or 
accession.147   
Actual participation in the Agreement is, however, low at sixty-six parties.148  
Moreover, a number of major fishing states stand out as non-parties.149  Given low 
participation in the Agreement, it is appropriate to ask whether the Fish Stocks 
Agreement has succeeded in influencing the general framework of international 
fisheries law in a similar manner to the LOS Convention?   
One argument is that the Agreement can be invoked as an interpretation of 
those provisions already found in the LOS Convention.  Anderson suggests that “in 
                                                 
144 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 5(d), (e)(f) and (g).  Birnie and Boyle say that the duty to monitor 
the impact of fishing on the ecosystem as a whole “is very much in keeping with Article 194(5) of the 
1982 [LOS Convention] and with the general obligation to protect the marine environment codified in 
Part XII, but it is the very first time it has been spelt out explicitly in a major fisheries agreement”; 
Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 2002) at p. 675. 
145 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, Articles 37 and 39.  Thus it was possible for Denmark, Iran and the 
United States of America to agree to be bound by the Agreement without, at the time, being a State 
Party to the LOS Convention.  Since its ratification of the Fish Stocks Agreement on the 19 December 
2003, Denmark subsequently ratified the LOS Convention (and by operation of Article 4 of the Part XI 
Agreement, that Agreement as well) on the 16 November 2004. 
146 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 38. 
147 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 39. 
148 See http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm 
<checked 15 May 2007>. 




construing the relevant provisions of the Convention, for example, it would probably 
now be considered appropriate in many if not all instances to take into account the 
terms of the Agreement, as a “subsequent agreement … regarding the interpretation 
of [a] treaty or the application of its provisions”, within the meaning of Article 
31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, if only because the 
interpretation and application of a treaty are inextricably bound up with its 
implementation.”
150  Indeed many provisions in the Fish Stocks Agreement simply 
lay down general principles which could arguably be taken into account for 
interpretative purposes under Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.   
Interpretation may not explain all the ways in which the Agreement influences 
third states.  Interpretation cannot be used to read new and novel obligations into the 
Convention which does little more than promote co-operation.  Edeson comments that 
“the [Fish Stocks Agreement] presents a paradox, for while it is very carefully 
worded to appear to do no more than implement the [LOS Convention], it does, 
nonetheless, introduce significant changes in the international legal regime governing 
the stocks to which the Agreement applies.”
151     
Interpretation aside, some of the provisions of the Agreement could influence 
the development of the customary international law of the sea.  The fact that it was 
negotiated by the international community using a consensus procedure is significant 
for its impact on custom.  Moreover, much of the Agreement is directed at states in 
general rather than specifically at the states parties.  One commentator has said, “like 
                                                 
150 Anderson, "The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995 - an Initial Assessment",  at p. 468. Freestone 
and Elferink concur: “the Agreement and the LOS Convention are fundamentally inter-related in the 
sense that one can be used to inform the interpretation of the other”; "Strengthening the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea's regime through the adoption of implementing agreements, the 
practice of international organisations and other means", at p. 20.  See also Birnie and Boyle, 
International Law and the Environment  at p. 673.   
151 W. Edeson, "Towards Long-Term Sustainable Use: Some Recent Developments in the Legal 
Regime of Fisheries", in International Law and Sustainable Development, ed. A. Boyle and D. 
Freestone (Oxford University Press, 1999) at p. 173.  See also Hayashi, "The 1995 Agreement on the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks: Significance for the 
Law of the Sea Convention", (1995)  Ocean and Coastal Management at p. 53.  He says “the most 
significant of them are those relating to the precautionary approach, compatibility of management 
measures, regional organisations and the freedom of high seas fisheries, duties of the flag state, 
regional cooperation in enforcement, port state jurisdiction, provisional measures and practical 
arrangements.”; at p. 56.  See also Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment  at p. 673; 
E. Franckx, "Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Provisions of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea", (2000) 8 
Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law at p. 61. 
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much of the language in the LOS Convention, the goal is universal application 
through direct state usage thus requiring a dissenting state to explain its 
objections.”
152  It is only Article 21 of the Agreement dealing with enforcement and 
the dispute settlement provisions which are drafted specifically in terms of “States 
Parties”.  Indeed, it is no coincidence that it is the enforcements provision that has 
caused the most controversy.153 
Support for the Agreement as reflecting general rules and principles of 
international law can be found in several General Assembly resolutions on fisheries.  
The General Assembly has called on “all states” to comply with certain provisions of 
the Agreement, not differentiating between parties and non-parties.  For instance, 
General Assembly Resolution 57/143 calls on “all states to ensure that their vessels 
comply with the convention and management standards that have been adopted by 
sub-regional and regional fisheries management organisations and arrangements in 
accordance with relevant provisions of the Convention and of the Agreement”
154
, 
echoing Article 18(1) of the Agreement.  Similarly, General Assembly Resolution 
59/25 urges “all states to apply the precautionary approach and the ecosystem 
approach widely to the conservation, management and exploitation of fish stocks.”
155  
These resolutions can be invoked as evidence of state practice and opinio juris 
communis supporting the creation of new norms of customary international law. 
This conclusion is confirmed by additional state practice which shows that 
some states have started to implement the provisions of the new fisheries regime, 
whether or not they are actually bound by the Agreement. Jackson notes that the Fish 
Stocks Agreement formed an essential backdrop to the negotiation of the 2001 
Windhoek Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in 
the South-East Atlantic Ocean, even though the Agreement had not entered into force 
                                                 
152 Orebech, Sigurjonsson, and McDorman, "The 1995 United Nations Straddling and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement", (1998) 13 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law at p. 123.  They continue “such language is designed 
to create obligation to non-parties to the 1995 Agreement but mere semantics cannot overcome the 
principle that treaties are only binding upon ratifying states”, at p. 124.  Indeed, Jackson notes that one 
of the strengths of the Agreement is its “ready-made language which could be applied in almost any 
regional fisheries convention”; "The 2001 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery 
Resources in the South East Atlantic: an Introduction", (2002) 17 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law at p. 47. 
153 2003 Fisheries Report of the UN Secretary General, UN Document A/58/215, at para. 57. 
154 General Assembly Resolution 57/143, 2002, at para. 8; General Assembly Resolution 59/25, at para. 
9.   
155 General Assembly Resolution 59/25, 2004, at para. 4. 
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at that time.156  In a similar way, the 2000 Honolulu Convention on the Conservation 
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean157, and the 2003 Antigua Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission158 all recall the relevant provisions of the LOS 
Convention and the Fish Stocks Agreement.  Rather than re-negotiate their constituent 
instruments, other regional fisheries management organizations have adopted a step-
by-step approach to integrating the provisions of the Agreement into their practice.159  
The UN Secretary General concludes in his 2003 Report on Sustainable Fisheries that 
“practice since the adoption of the Agreement demonstrates that even before entry 
into force, provisions of the Agreement have been widely used as a benchmark for 
measuring State practice.”
160 
That is not to say that all of the Agreement is now reflected in customary 
rules.  Other paragraphs of the General Assembly resolutions are directed solely at 
states parties to the Agreement.  Thus, paragraph 10 of General Assembly Resolution 
57/143 urges “States parties to the Agreement, in accordance with [Article 21(4)] to 
inform either directly or through the relevant regional or sub-regional fisheries 
management organisation or arrangement, all States whose vessels fish on the high 
seas in the same region or sub-region of the form of identification issued by those 
States parties to officials duly authorised to carry out boarding and inspection 
functions in accordance with article 21 and 22 of the Agreement.”  It would appear 
that this resolution recognises that the enforcement provisions remain a matter of 
purely treaty law. 
 
                                                 
156 See Jackson, "The 2001 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in 
the South East Atlantic: an Introduction",  at p. 34.  See also Hedley, "Entry into Force of the United 
Nations Fish Stocks Agreement: An Initial Assessment", (2001) 24 International Fisheries Bulletin, 
available at http://www.intfish.net/ops/papers/2.htm <checked 15 May 2007>.  The Convention entered 
into force in April 2003 with three contracting parties: Nambia, Norway and the European Community. 
157 The Convention entered into force on 19 June 2004; see General Assembly Resolution 59/25, 2004, 
at para. 7. 
158 The Convention is not yet in force.  The Convention has 13 signatories but only five ratifications or 
accessions; http://www.iattc.org/IATTCdocumentationENG.htm <checked 15 May 2006>.  
159 2003 Fisheries Report of the UN Secretary General, UN Document A/58/215, at para. 46. 
160  2003 Fisheries Report of the UN Secretary General, UN Document A/58/215, at para. 7. 
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7. Review of the Fish Stocks Agreement 
As the Fish Stocks Agreement is a separate treaty, it has its own mechanisms 
for change.161 The principal means for amending the Fish Stocks Agreement is 
through an amendment conference.  According to the Agreement, the UN Secretary 
General will convene such a conference if it is supported by at least one half of the 
parties to the Agreement.162  The Agreement specifies that the conference shall be 
operated according to consensus decision-making procedures, unless otherwise 
decided.163  However, as with the LOS Convention, amendments adopted by the 
conference will only become binding on states once they have been individually 
accepted.164   
A different procedure applies to certain changes made to the annexes of the 
Agreement.  The annexes form an integral part of the Agreement165, but they tend to 
contain scientific and technical information.166  The Agreement provides that 
“revisions” to the annexes that are adopted by consensus at a meeting of the States 
Parties are to “take effect from the date of its adoption” without any further action on 
the part of the States Parties167.  It does not specify what the difference between a 
revision and an amendment is except that “revisions shall be based on scientific and 
technical considerations.”
168  This condition implies that revisions should only be 
made to keep the annexes up-to-date with scientific and technical knowledge and not 
to make changes of a more political character.  The distinction will be difficult to 
maintain in practice. 
The Agreement also makes a distinction between amendment and review.  
Article 36 provides for a review conference four years after the entry into force of the 
Agreement.169  The mandate of the conference is to review and assess the adequacy of 
the Agreement in achieving its objectives and proposing means of strengthening the 
                                                 
161 The Part XI Agreement, on the other hand, is subject to the amendment procedures applicable to 
Part XI in the LOS Convention; see chapter five, at pp. 166-167. 
162 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 45(1). 
163 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 45(2). 
164 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 45(5). 
165 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 48(1). 
166 Current annexes contain information on guidelines for the collection and sharing of data, and 
guidelines for the application of precautionary reference points. 
167 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 48(2). 
168 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 48(2). 
169 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 36(1). 
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substance and methods of implementation.170  What is interesting about the provision 
for a review conference is that participation is open, not only to States Parties to the 
Agreement, but also to “all states and entities which are entitled to become parties to 
the Agreement as well as those intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations entitled to participate as observers.”
171  The precise rights of 
participation of non-parties are not specified in the text and these details will have to 
be resolved through the preparatory process which will clarify the mandate of the 
review conference and its rules of procedure.172  Nevertheless, the Agreement 
procedure appears to recognise that it is not appropriate for the States Parties to the 
Agreement to make substantial changes to the regime without the participation of the 
wider international community.173   
Alongside the formal amendment and review processes, the Parties to the 
Agreement meet regularly to consider its implementation.  The Fish Stocks 
Agreement itself does not contain a provision for a regular Meeting of the Parties.  
However, an informal procedure for overseeing the implementation of the Agreement 
was created by the General Assembly in 2001.174  The purpose of these informal 
meeting is to consider implementation of the Agreement through national and 
regional initiatives, to make appropriate recommendations to the General Assembly 
on the scope and content of the Secretary General’s annual report on fisheries, and to 
prepare for the review conference.175  The outcome of such meetings is usually a 
series of suggestions or recommendations for the consideration of the General 
Assembly.176  Participation in this forum, it should not be surprising to learn, includes 
not only parties but also non-parties to the Agreement.177   
In pursuit of its oversight of the law of the sea and oceans policy, the General 
Assembly considers fisheries issues separately from other maritime issues.  The UN 
Secretary General reports to the General Assembly biennially on developments 
                                                 
170 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 36(2).     
171 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 36(1). 
172 The rules of procedure were not formally adopted and the Review Conference operated according to 
consensus procedures. 
173 See Report of the Second Informal Meeting of Parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement, UN Document 
ICSP2/UNFSA/REP/INF.1 at para. 56 and para. 76. 
174 General Assembly Resolution 56/13, 2001, at para. 6.   
175 General Assembly Resolution 56/13, 2001, at para. 6. 
176 Report of the First Informal Meeting of Parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement, UN Document 
ICSP/UNFSA/REP/INF.1 at para. 9. 
177 General Assembly Resolution 57/143, 2002, at para. 18.  See also the Reports of Informal Meetings 
of Parties to the Fish Stocks Agreement: First report, at para. 13; Second report, at paras. 26 to 29. 
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relating to the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks.178  In addition, the UN General Assembly adopts separate resolutions on 
sustainable fisheries, which as discussed above, may influence the development of the 
law.   
All of these mechanisms, formal and informal, interact.  In process of 
preparing for the first review conference in 2006, the informal consultations of States 
Parties to the Agreement played a central role.  The General Assembly requested the 
Secretary General to commence preparations for a review conference in 2004.179  The 
first consultations on what would be discussed at the review conference were held 
during the third round of informal consultations of parties to the Agreement, with the 
fourth and fifth meetings focussing exclusively on preparation for the review 
conference.180  Whilst the informal meetings discuss the substance of the review 
conference, the General Assembly has exercised a close oversight of the process.  It 
has requested all interested actors to submit information and views to the review 
conference, stressing that states and entities which are not parties to the Agreement 
can nevertheless “participate fully” in the preparatory process “on an equal footing 
with [the] states parties, except without voting rights” whilst affirming at the same 
time that “every effort will be made to adopt recommendations on the basis of 
consensus.”
181  In this way, the participation of all interested states is ensured in 
continuing efforts to achieve an ongoing consensus on fisheries law and policy.182 
 
8. Implementing Agreements as Modifying Agreements 
A multitude of treaties could be said to implement the LOS Convention.  
However, the concept of implementing agreement is only usually applied to the two 
instruments discussed above.183  It is true that the title of a treaty itself carries no legal 
                                                 
178 General Assembly Resolution 50/24, 2004, at para. 5. 
179 General Assembly Resolution 59/25 2004, at para. 16. 
180 General Assembly Resolution 60/31, 2005, at para. 23. 
181 General Assembly Resolution 60/31, 2005, at para. 25. 
182 The first review conference took place at the UN headquarters in May 2006.  The Conference 
adopted a set of outcomes, promoting measures to strengthen the Fish Stocks Agreement.  It was 
decided to resume the Review Conference at a date to be agreed, not later than 2011.  It also agreed to 
continue to informal consultations of the States Parties.  See Report of the Review Conference, UN 
Document A/CONF/210/2006/15, Annex.   
183 Some authors do suggest other candidates.  For instance, Treves suggests that the Convention on the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage is similar in characteristics, even though it does not 
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value per se.184  Nevertheless, the two implementing agreements do share a number of 
important features that sets them apart from other treaties.   
Perhaps the most important characteristic of the implementing agreements 
stems from the status afforded to them by the General Assembly as guardian of the 
law of the sea.  In common with the LOS Convention, the General Assembly has set a 
target of “universal participation” for the two implementing agreements.185  This 
indicates a clear aspiration to create universal law.  Indeed, the two agreements are 
similar in content to the LOS Convention because they seek to create general rules 
and regimes. 
The way in which the two instruments were adopted is also important.  
Although taking place in very different institutional settings, the two implementing 
agreements were both negotiated according to consensus decision-making techniques 
modelled on those developed at UNCLOS III.  It was intended that these instruments 
were to balance all interests so that they would be acceptable to as many states as 
possible.  
These characteristics also have consequences for the subsequent 
implementation and progressive development of the implementing agreements.  The 
two instruments do have their own institutional mechanisms.  However, as with the 
Convention itself, the designation of these two instruments as implementing 
agreements by the General Assembly also means that they are subject to regular 
scrutiny and debate by that organ.  The General Assembly is perhaps the only 
international institution which can ensures a comprehensive and coherent approach to 
oceans policy and the law of the sea.  Moreover, the General Assembly includes all 
states so that it can guarantee that the law of the sea develops in the interests of the 
international community as a whole. 
It follows that other issues which impact on the general law of the sea may 
also be subject to development under the guidance of the General Assembly.  One 
                                                                                                                                            
present itself as an implementing agreement.  He goes on “the main difference being perhaps that its 
substantive rules are more controversial”; "The General Assembly and the Meeting of States Parties in 
the Implementation of the LOS Convention",  at p. 56.  The Convention does not foster the same 
support as the other implementing agreements.  Whilst the General Assembly notes the importance of 
cooperation to protect and preserve objects of an archaeological and historical nature found at sea in 
accordance with the Convention, it merely “notes” the rules annexed to the 2001 Convention; General 
Assembly Resolution 61/30, 2006, at paras. 7 and 8.   
184 McNair, Law of Treaties (Oxford University Press, 1961) at p. 22. 
185 See General Assembly Resolution 60/30, 2005, at paras. 2 and 3. 
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issue that is currently under discussion in various fora is the protection of biodiversity 
beyond national jurisdiction.  The current rules contained in the LOS Convention are 
lacking in detail and leave much to be desired.  The issue falls within the scope of 
numerous treaties and institutions including the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
the International Seabed Authority, regional fisheries management organizations, the 
International Whaling Commission, as well as other technical institutions such as the 
IMO and the FAO.186  However, sectoral approaches alone are not going to solve the 
problem.  In addition, various questions arise over jurisdiction and general obligations 
to protect biodiversity in these areas.  
It is perhaps no surprise that the General Assembly has seised itself of the 
issue.  In Resolution 58/240 adopted in December 2003, the General Assembly called 
on international institutions to consider ways to address threats to marine ecosystems 
and biodiversity beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.187  At the following 
session, it created an Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to examine inter 
alia the legal issues involved and to consider options and approaches to promote 
international co-ordination and co-operation in the protection of biodiversity in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction.188 In particular, the Working Group is called on to 
consider genetic resources beyond areas of national jurisdiction and whether there is a 
governance or regulatory gap.189  Discussions of the Working Group are conducted by 
consensus in order to achieve a general agreement on the applicable provisions.  It is 
unclear at this stage what will be the outcome of this initiative.  Several participants 
have argued it is appropriate to negotiate a new implementing agreement.190  From the 
preceding analysis, it is possible to speculate that an instrument negotiated by 
consensus under the auspices of the General Assembly could have a significant 
impact on the legal order of the oceans for all states, modifying the framework found 
in the LOS Convention. 
                                                 
186 See in particular Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and Technological Advice, Marine and 
Coastal Biodiversity: Review, Further Elaboration and Refinement of the Programme of Work 
(Convention on Biological Diversity, 2003); Changbo et al., "Summary of the First Meeting of the 
CBD Ad-Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Protected Areas", (2005) 9 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 
available at http://www.iisd.ca/vol09/  <checked 15 May 2007>. 
187 General Assembly Resolution 58/240, 2003, at para. 52. 
188 General Assembly Resolution 59/24, 2004, at para. 73. 
189 General Assembly Resolution 61/30, 2006, at para. 91. 
190 First Report of the Working Group, UN Document A/61/65, at paras. 25, 29, 55, 58, and 61.  See 
also paragraph 11 of the summary of trends prepared by the co-chairs annexed to the Report. 
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Furthermore, the creation of the Working Group reaffirms the role of the 
General Assembly in overseeing the development of the law of the sea.   Participants 
at the first meeting of the Working Group were in broad agreement that “the General 
Assembly was generally considered to be the appropriate forum for addressing 
marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdiction, owing to its role as 
the global forum with competence to deal comprehensively with complex, 
multidisciplinary issues.”
191  It is the universal nature of its membership and its 
overarching mandate that places the General Assembly at the forefront of the 
continuing development of the universal law of the sea. 
   
9. Conclusion  
This chapter has considered a variety of mechanisms for change in the legal 
order of the oceans.  It started with the formal amendment procedures found in the 
LOS Convention itself.  The disadvantage of these procedures is that they confer 
decision-making powers on the States Parties to the Convention alone.  As long as 
some states remain outside the formal treaty regime, it is unlikely that these treaty-
based mechanisms for change will be invoked.   
The majority of changes made to the law of the sea to date have been achieved 
through informal mechanisms.  Even the States Parties have preferred the use of 
consensus decision-making techniques instead of their formal decision-making 
powers.  They offer the advantage of speed and efficiency, albeit at the cost of legal 
certainty.  More importantly, these informal procedures allow the participation of all 
states and they are therefore able to promote a universal consensus on the law of the 
sea.   
The General Assembly has also continued to play a major role in developing 
the law of the sea despite the lack of any formal powers conferred by the Convention. 
Again, it is the fact that it includes all states that makes this organ an appropriate 
forum for law-making, as it is able to maintain the delicate balance of interests that 
was achieved in the LOS Convention.   
                                                 
191 First Report of the Working Group, UN Document A/61/65, at para. 7. 
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Elferink describes several characteristics of the LOS Convention which make 
it more difficult to design an institutional framework for monitoring the 
implementation of the Convention.192  Firstly, he notes that the LOS Convention, 
unlike most other treaties, is not limited to one specific issue, but deals with most uses 
of ocean space.  He also says that many of the substantive issues covered by the 
Convention already fell within the mandate of pre-existing international organizations 
or institutional frameworks.   
A major challenge is promoting the coherent development of the law of the 
sea in a system where law-making is de-centralised.  It has been seen that the 
Convention itself does little to achieve this aim.  The General Assembly has limited 
powers to promote coherence.  It is therefore necessary to look to the operation of 
other organizations as well as general principles of law to see how to meet this 





                                                 
192 Elferink, "Reviewing the implementation of the LOS Convention: the role of the UN General 




Law-Making by Technical International Organizations 
 
 
1. Technical standards and the LOS Convention 
For many years, states have co-operated on technical aspects of the law of the 
sea through ad hoc conferences and international organizations.1 Since the Second 
World War, the number of organizations operating in this field and the types of 
standards which they adopt have proliferated.2  Each of these institutions operates 
autonomously according to the powers and functions in their constituent instrument.   
Nevertheless the new legal framework created by the LOS Convention is highly 
relevant.  The Convention covers all traditional and new uses of the oceans.  Although 
international organizations of this type cannot become a party to the Convention, it is 
the legal framework within which their member states must function. Therefore these 
institutions have adapted their practices and procedures to accommodate the new legal 
order of the oceans.     
On the whole, these technical organizations create standards and guidelines 
that are applied by and between their member states.  The work of some organizations 
is, however, incorporated into the general framework for the law of the sea by the 
LOS Convention.  As a result, the outcome of the law-making process in these 
technical organizations will have wider implications for all states, whether or not they 
are a member of the organization or formally bound by a particular rule or standard.   
This chapter examines the law-making processes in two technical 
organizations whose standards are made binding by the LOS Convention.  How are 
these standards adopted and amended?  To what extent is the law-making role of these 
organizations limited by the LOS Convention? 
   
                                                 
1 See Breuer, "Maritime Safety Regulations", in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. 
Bernhardt (North-Holland, 1997). 
2 The option of creating a single technical organization for the law of the sea was briefly mooted by the 
International Law Commission in its codification of the law of the sea, but the idea was firmly rejected 
by the special rapporteur who considered that it was neither feasible nor necessary; 1956 Report of the 
International Law Commission, (1956 II) Yearbook of the International Law Commission at p. 2, paras. 
12 and 18. 
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2. The International Maritime Organization 
At the time UNCLOS III was convened, international co-operation in 
regulating shipping was already common.  Many rules and regulations in the form of 
treaties had been negotiated at the international level to deal with shipping safety and 
pollution from ships.  Most of these matters were dealt with by technical international 
organizations with considerable expertise and experience in dealing with shipping 
issues.  
In this context, the IMO stands out from other standard-setting agencies 
because of its sole focus on maritime issues. The International Maritime 
Organization3 was created in 1948 in order to provide a permanent forum for the 
discussion of shipping issues and the adoption and amendment of shipping standards.4  
Today, instruments adopted by the IMO are one of the key sources of international 
standards in this area.5  
The IMO is open to all states.6  The majority of States Parties to the LOS 
Convention are also IMO members with one or two exceptions.7  In any case, 
meetings of the Organization are open to all UN members, who may participate in 
proceedings as observers, albeit without a vote.8  In addition, non-members may 
acquire more formal participation rights if they are party to a treaty falling under the 
auspices of the IMO.9     
The purpose of the IMO, as defined in its constitution, is “to provide 
machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of governmental 
                                                 
3 The Organization started its life as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization, later 
changing its name to the International Maritime Organization in 1982 to reflect the increased role that 
it has come to play in the regulation of maritime affairs; see the 1975 amendments to the IMO 
Convention.   
4 For a historical introduction to the IMO, see M'Gonigle and Zacher, Pollution, Politics, and 
International Law: Tankers at Sea (University of California Press, 1979) chapter 3. 
5 A paper produced by the IMO Secretariat says that “the expression "competent international 
organization", when used in the singular in [the LOS Convention], applies exclusively to IMO, bearing 
in mind the global mandate of the Organization as a specialized agency within the United Nations 
system”; IMO Document LEG/MISC/4, at p. 2.   
6 IMO Convention, Article 4.  UN members and states attending the 1948 Conference have an 
automatic right to membership; Articles 5 and 6.  Other states may apply subject to approval of two 
thirds of the Members; Article 7. 
7 For a list of all IMO members, see www.imo.org <checked 26 May 2006>. There are seven States 
Parties who are not IMO members, five of which are land-locked countries. 
8 Rule 4 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly provide that the Secretary General may invite, inter 
alia, UN members as observers.  Similar rules apply to the proceedings of the IMO Council and the 
IMO Committees. 
9 See below, at p. 121. 
 
 120 
regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds affecting shipping 
engaged in international trade; [and] to encourage and facilitate the general 
adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning the maritime 
safety (sic.), efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution 
from ships.”
10  Although the Organization was created primarily as a forum to discuss 
maritime affairs and to recommend action to its members11, it may also prepare draft 
treaties and convene diplomatic conferences for their adoption.12  Most technical 
standards adopted under the auspices of the Organization take the form of an 
international treaty.  As treaties, these standards are formally binding only on those 
states which have accepted them.  However, most IMO treaties are open to 
participation by all states, whether or not they are a member of the Organization.     
Today the IMO is responsible for more than forty international conventions 
and agreements on a variety of maritime matters13 and it continues to be the forum 
where new regulatory treaties in this field are negotiated and adopted. Moreover, the 
role of the IMO in standard setting does not finish when a regulatory treaty is adopted.  
These treaties, by their very nature, need to adapt to present day problems and to keep 
up with technological and scientific developments.14  The majority of the regulatory 
treaties recognise the IMO as a forum for the drafting and adoption of technical 
amendments.15 De La Fayette describes how “the IMO has been re-examining all the 
instruments it has adopted on a regular basis since its inception.”
16  Modifications to 
the major regulatory treaties are frequently considered by IMO committees.     
                                                 
10 IMO Convention, Article 1(a).  The original text of Article 1 only referred to the adoption of 
standards in the field of maritime safety and efficiency of navigation.  When the 1954 OILPOL entered 
into force, the IMO acted as depositary and later acted as a forum for the adoption of amendments to 
this treaty and its successor, the 1973/78 MARPOL Convention.  The text of the IMO Constitution was 
subsequently amended in 1975 to reflect this aspect of its work in adopting standards to prevent and 
control pollution from ships. At the same time, it created a Marine Environment Protection Committee 
with the same status as the Maritime Safety Committee.   
11 IMO Convention, Articles 2(a) and (c). 
12 IMO Convention, Article 2(b). 
13 For instance, the 1966 Convention on Load Lines, the 1972 Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, the 1974 Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, the 
1973/78 Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the 1979 Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue, the 1995 Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for 
Seafarers, the 2001 Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems on Ships, the 2004 
Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments.   
14 Indeed, see LOS Convention, Article 211(1). 
15 Usually as an alternative to an ad hoc diplomatic conference. 
16 De La Fayette, "The Marine Environment Protection Committee: The Conjunction of the Law of the 
Sea and International Environmental Law", (2001) 16 International Journal of Marine and Coastal 
Law at p. 200. SOLAS Convention, Article 8. MARPOL Convention, Article 16. 
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The Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection 
Committee are the two organs which are responsible for the adoption of amendments 
to most regulatory treaties.17  The mandates of these committees recognise that they 
may perform any additional functions attributed to them by international conventions, 
in addition to the purely advisory functions bestowed on them by the IMO 
Constitution.18  Both committees include representatives from all IMO member states. 
In addition, when amendments to the regulatory treaties are being discussed, 
contracting parties that are not IMO members are granted rights of participation.  
Thus, the SOLAS Convention provides that “Parties to the Convention, whether or 
not Members of the Organization, shall be entitled to participate in the proceedings of 
the Maritime Safety Committee”
19
 and similar provisions can be found in most other 
regulatory treaties.20  It follows that most states are involved in the drafting and 
adoption of amendments, not only the parties to the treaty.   
In addition to states, many industry representatives and other interest groups 
actively participate in the proceedings and discussions of the IMO committees21, in 
particular organizations representing shipping interests and the marine insurance 
industry.22 Environmental groups have also started to play a prominent role in 
discussions of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee.  Consultation and co-
operation with non-governmental international organizations is provided for in Article 
62 of the IMO Convention.  According to the IMO rules of procedure, NGO 
representatives may submit written statement on items on the agenda and with 
permission, they may make oral contributions.23  It is only states and other 
international organizations, however, that may submit agenda items in the first place 
                                                 
17 The two lead committees are also assisted by a plethora of specialized sub-committees whose role it 
is to consider the technical aspects of proposed amendments.  These include the Sub-Committee on 
Dangerous Goods, Solid Cargoes and Containers, the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and Equipment, 
and the Sub-Committee on Fire Protection.  See Guidelines on the Organization and Method of Work 
of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee and their 
Subsidiary Bodies, as amended, in MSC/Circ.1099/MEPC/Circ.405, at Annex, para. 2.1.  
18 MEPC: IMO Convention, Article 38.  MSC: IMO Convention, Article 28(b). See also Article 3(d). 
19 SOLAS Convention, Article 8(b)(iii).   
20 For instance, MARPOL Convention, Article 16(2)(c); Anti-Fouling Convention, Article 16(2)(b); 
Ballast Water Convention, Article 19(2)(b). 
21 De La Fayette concludes that “NGOs are generally well respected by member governments and some 
have a great deal of influence”; De La Fayette, "The Marine Environment Protection Committee",  at p. 
166. 
22 Prominent organizations are the International Chamber of Shipping, INTERTANKO, 
INTERCARGO, and the International Council of Classification Societies.   




or propose amendments to the treaties.24  Guidelines adopted by the IMO to promote 
effective and efficient working procedures within the organization provide that new 
amendments should not be included as part of the work programme until a 
“compelling need” for the amendment has been demonstrated by the proponents.25  
An amendment must pass through several stages before it is finally adopted.  
Proposals are usually considered initially by a technical sub-committee, before the 
broader policy implications are discussed by the main committee.  The main 
committee will provisionally approve an amendment before it is circulated to states 
for final adoption at a subsequent meeting.26  The time in which an amendment is 
adopted depends largely on the complexity of the issue and the political will of IMO 
members.   
Many amendments are proposed on an ad hoc basis, often as a reaction to a 
specific shipping incident.   In the wake of the Prestige incident in November 2002, 
the Member States of the European Communities submitted a proposal to amend 
MARPOL Annex I which would serve to accelerate the phasing in of double-hull 
tankers and ban the transport of heavy grade oil in single-hull tankers.27  The 
proposals were immediately circulated by the IMO Secretary General in April 2003 
prior to the forty-ninth session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee.  It 
was not possible to resolve differences at this meeting and the Committee agreed to 
hold an extra session in December 200328 where a revised regulation 13G and a new 
regulation 13H were subsequently adopted.29  The amended regulations entered into 
force on 5 April 2005, less than two and a half years after the sinking of the Prestige.   
Other amendments are introduced as part of a rolling programme of review of 
IMO technical regulations.  For instance, revisions of Annexes I and II of the 
                                                 
24 In practice, NGOs may seek a sponsor state for a particular amendment. 
25 See Guidelines on the Organization and Method of Work of the Maritime Safety Committee and the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee and their Subsidiary Bodies, as amended, in 
MSC/Circ.1099/MEPC/Circ.405, at Annex, para. 2.10.2.   
26 The requirement for circulation of amendments is laid down by the Conventions themselves.  See 
SOLAS Convention, Article 8.  MARPOL Convention, Article 16. 
27 See IMO Document MEPC 49/16/1. 
28 See IMO Document MEPC 49/22, at para. 16.35. 
29 IMO Resolution MEPC.111(50).  The amendments were adopted despite the concerns of some 
delegations that it was inappropriate to alter rules which had only recently been changed after the Erika 
incident in 1999.  For a summary of the debate, see Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) at pp. 139-155.  A similarly speedy reaction can be observed in the wake of the 
Erika incident; for a discussion, see De La Fayette, "The Marine Environment Protection Committee",  
at pp. 194-200. 
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MARPOL Convention were finally adopted in 2004 following a comprehensive and 
time-consuming review that lasted nine years.30  The revised annexes incorporate all 
amendments adopted since the Convention entered into force, as well as additional 
changes adopted as a result of the review process.  Similar reviews have also been 
undertaken in relation to Annexes III31 and IV.32  Most recently, the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee commenced a review of Annex V, following a 
request from the General Assembly in its 2005 resolution on the law of the sea to “to 
assess its effectiveness in addressing sea-based sources of marine debris.”
33 
Formal procedures for the adoption of amendments are specified in the 
regulatory treaties.  They usually require amendments to be adopted by a two-thirds 
majority of the parties, present and voting.34  However, the practice of the two main 
IMO committees tends to aim towards the adoption of amendments by consensus.35  
Votes are rarely taken in the committees and the participants try to reach a 
compromise on the proposed changes.   
Once adopted, amendments are then communicated to the parties for 
acceptance.36  Tacit acceptance procedures were included in most IMO regulatory 
treaties concluded after 1972 in light of concerns that many amendments were not 
entering into force.37  Amendments to the technical annexes will enter into force for 
all states who have not objected at least six months after the date on which it was 
deemed to have been accepted.38  The amendment procedures therefore facilitate the 
entry into force of technical amendments that have been adopted by the IMO.   
                                                 
30 See IMO Document MEPC 52/24, at para. 5.1. 
31 Adopted at the fifty-fifth session of the MEPC. 
32 Adopted at the fifty-first session of the MEPC. 
33 General Assembly Resolution 60/22, at para. 67.  The Committee established a correspondence 
group at its fifty-fifth session in order to develop the framework, method of work and timetable for the 
review. 
34 SOLAS Convention, Article VIII(b)(iv); MARPOL Convention, Article 16(2)(d); Ballast Water 
Convention, Article 19(2)(c); Anti-Fouling Convention, Article 16(2)(c). 
35 IMO Document LEG/MISC/4, at p. 7. 
36 SOLAS Convention, Article 8(b)(v) and (c)(ii). 
37 See “IMO 1948-1998: A Process of Change”, Focus on the IMO Paper, 1998, at pp. 9-11.  See also 
M'Gonigle and Zacher, Pollution, Politics, and International Law: Tankers at Sea at p. 107. 
38 The period for entry into force changes from treaty to treaty and it can be specified by the committee 
at the time of adoption.  However, the treaties usually set a minimum period of time during which 
objections can be made.  The MARPOL Convention prescribes a minimum period of ten months.  In 
May 1994, the Contracting Governments to the SOLAS Convention approved an accelerated 
amendment procedure which reduces the minimum period from one year to six months where 
exceptional circumstances prevail.  It is very rare that states actually rely on their right to object to 
amendments adopted under the tacit acceptance procedures. Of all the amendments to the SOLAS 
Convention and the MARPOL Convention that have been adopted to date, less than fifteen objections 
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The tacit acceptance procedures under the SOLAS Convention apply to any 
amendments to the Annexes apart from changes to chapter I.39 Amendments to this 
chapter require the consent of individual states before changes can come into force.  
However, new chapters can be added to the Convention with relative ease using the 
tacit acceptance procedures.  For instance, when a diplomatic conference agreed in 
December 2002 to add a new chapter on measures to enhance maritime security to the 
Annex of the SOLAS Convention, the amendment was able to enter into force for all 
parties within two years.40  In contrast, the MARPOL Convention has several 
annexes, each dealing with a different source of marine pollution.  The Convention 
specifies that the adoption of a new annex to the MARPOL Convention is to be 
treated in the same way as an amendment to the main text of the Convention and 
requires the express consent of a state before it becomes bound.41  It is not possible to 
add new annexes using the tacit acceptance procedure.  Therefore, the new annex on 
the prevention of air pollution from ships adopted by the MARPOL Contracting 
Parties in 1997 needed to be accepted by two-thirds of the parties, the combined 
merchant fleets of which constitute not less than fifty per cent of gross tonnage of the 
world’s merchant fleet, before it could enter into force.  As a result, the Annex did not 
enter into force until 19 May 2005 and it is moreover only formally binding on those 
states which have given their express consent.42  De La Fayette suggests that one of 
the reasons for choosing to frame the regulations on anti-fouling systems as a new 
convention rather than an additional annex to MARPOL is that “the entry into force 
provisions for amendments to MARPOL constitute an almost insurmountable barrier 
to early entry into force.”
43  Where amendments are perceived as urgent, the 
                                                                                                                                            
have been made and the majority of these have been subsequently withdrawn; See International 
Maritime Organization, Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in respect of which the 
International Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General performs depositary or other functions, 
as at 31 December 2003, (2004). 
39 SOLAS Convention, Article 8(b)(iv). 
40 Chapter XI-2 entered into force on 1 July 2004.  One objection was made by the Government of 
Finland; see Status of Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in respect of which the International 
Maritime Organization or its Secretary General performs depositary functions, as at 31 December 
2003, Document J/86/87, 2004, at p. 36. 
41 MARPOL Convention, Article 16(5). 
42 XXX IMO figures, as at 30 April 2006; see www.imo.org <checked 22 May 2006>. 
43 De La Fayette, "The Marine Environment Protection Committee",  at p. 172. 
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Committees may also adopt resolutions encouraging states to give early and effective 
application to amendments.44  Such resolutions are, however, only hortatory.   
One significant advantage of the amendment procedures in these regulatory 
treaties is that it is possible to predict the date on which the amendment will enter into 
force.  When adopting amendments, the committees will indicate the date on which 
the amendment will be deemed to be accepted and the date on which it will enter into 
force, subject to the minimum periods provided in the Conventions.  This procedure 
allows the shipping industry to prepare for changes to the regulations.  To further 
protect the interests of ship-owners, the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions specify 
that amendments which relate to the structure of a ship shall only apply to ships the 
keels of which have been laid on or after the date on which the amendment enters into 
force.45   
In addition to legally binding standards, IMO committees also adopt non-
binding instruments which can serve a variety of purposes.  Sometimes, non-binding 
instruments are adopted as a prelude to the negotiation of a treaty.  For instance, the 
IMO adopted guidelines on ballast water46 and anti-fouling systems47 before treaties 
on these topics were successfully negotiated.  A similar process can be seen in the 
case of regulations on ship recycling.  At the twenty-third session of the IMO 
Assembly, Guidelines on Ship Recycling were adopted along with an instruction to 
the Marine Environment Protection Committee to keep the matter under review.48  At 
its twenty-fourth session, the Assembly requested the Committee to start work on 
developing a legally binding instrument.49  This process could take several years, 
during which time the Guidelines will indicate to industry what types of measures 
they should be taking.     
Other IMO resolutions, whilst not formally binding, are directly related to the 
technical standards found in regulatory treaties.  Sometimes, the treaty itself may 
                                                 
44 For example, IMO Resolution MEPC.114(50) calling for the early and effective application of 
regulations 13 G and H of Annex I to the MARPOL Convention.   
45 SOLAS Convention, Article 8(e). 
46 IMO Resolution A.774(18) on Guidelines for Preventing the Introduction of Unwanted Pathogens 
from Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediment Discharges.  See Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution, at pp. 
162-174. 
47 MEPC 46(30) on Measures to Control Potential Adverse Impacts Associated with Use of Tributyl 
Tin Compounds in Anti-Fouling Paints. 
48 IMO Resolution A.962(23) subsequently revised by Resolution A.980(24). 
49 IMO Resolution A.981(24) on a New Legally Binding Instrument on Ship Recycling.  Work on a 
legally binding instrument commenced at MEPC 54 in March 2006. 
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make reference to guidelines or recommendations.  For instance, the Ballast Water 
Convention includes several references to guidelines that the parties must take into 
account in implementing the Convention.  Since the adoption of that treaty, the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee has been working hard to develop the 
necessary guidelines.50  In addition, IMO committees may adopt resolutions which 
seek to promote a uniform interpretation of a technical regulation.51  As the parties to 
a treaty are competent to adopt authoritative interpretations, such interpretative 
resolutions cannot be completely dismissed simply because of their non-binding 
status.   
The IMO plays a more significant role in setting technical standards than was 
perhaps anticipated when the Organization was first created in 1948.  The decision-
making procedures within the IMO seek to ensure that initiatives are supported by a 
consensus of interested actors.  This is not a formal requirement of the IMO 
Convention or the regulatory treaties.  Rather, it is a reflection of the desire for a 
consensual and inclusive approach to law-making in all aspects of the law of the sea.  
It is submitted that the use of consensus in the IMO recognises the fact that the 
resulting standards will have an impact on the general legal framework as a 
consequence of the rules of reference found in the LOS Convention. 
 
3. The Regulation of Shipping and Rules of Reference 
Regulatory treaties adopted by technical organizations tend not to deal with 
jurisdictional issues.52  Most regulatory treaties were directed at flag states whose 
jurisdiction over ships flying their flag is long-standing and chiefly uncontested.53  As 
the IMO itself says, “in principle IMO treaties do not regulate the nature and extent 
                                                 
50 See the reports of MEPC 54 and 55. 
51 Such uniform interpretations are common in relation to the technical annexes to the SOLAS 
Convention and the MARPOL Convention. 
52 IMO Document LEG/MISC/4, at p. 8. 
53 See e.g. SOLAS Convention, Chapter 1, Regulation 6.  Coastal state jurisdiction is not addressed by 
the SOLAS Convention.  Port states were also intended to play a role in regulating standards.  
However, port state control does not raise substantive issues of maritime jurisdiction as the ship is at 
that stage voluntarily in the territorial jurisdiction of the port state. See e.g. SOLAS Convention, 
Chapter 1, Regulation 19.  Port state jurisdiction is a different concept that has been developed in 
Article 218 of the LOS Convention.   
 
 127 
of coastal state jurisdiction in connection with their implementation.”
54  Where 
regulations were intended to be applied by coastal states, the question of jurisdiction 
was largely avoided.  Thus, the 1973/78 MARPOL Convention provides that “any 
violations … within the jurisdiction of any Party to the Convention shall be 
prohibited…”
55 whilst defining jurisdiction in light of international law at the time of 
application or interpretation.56  This formulation was designed to ensure consistency 
with general international law and the outcome of negotiations that were taking place 
at that time through UNCLOS III.57 
Negotiating a new jurisdictional framework was the focus of UNCLOS III.  
Whilst not specifying the content of technical standards, the Convention often 
qualifies the powers of states to legislate on maritime matters by reference to 
international standards.58  The effect of so-called “rules of reference” varies 
depending on the precise phrasing of a particular provision.   
The jurisdiction of a state over ships flying its flag is a long held principle of 
international law.  In the words of one study, “creating the conditions that enable the 
safe and efficient navigation of ships through the world’s oceans is primarily the 
responsibility of flag states.”
59  Yet, the powers of a flag state are not completely 
unfettered.  The LOS Convention builds on the provisions on the 1958 Convention on 
the High Seas, setting out the obligations and duties of flag states in securing safety of 
navigation.  Article 94 of the LOS Convention requires the flag state to adopt rules 
and regulations for ships flying its flag regarding “administrative, technical and 
social matters” and in particular: 
(a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; 
(b) the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews…; 
(c) the use of signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions. 
                                                 
54 Report of the Secretary General, Impact of the Entry into Force of the LOS Convention on Related 
Existing and Proposed Instruments and Programmes, 1997, UN Document A/52/491, at p. 22. 
55 MARPOL Convention, Article 4(2). 
56 MARPOL Convention, Article 9(3).  See also the 1972 Dumping Convention, Article 13. 
57 See IMO Document LEG/MISC/4, at p. 6; see also Blanco-Bazan, "IMO Interface with the Law of 
the Sea Convention", in Current Maritime Issues and the International Maritime Organization, ed. 
Moore and Nordquist (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 199) at p. 273; Wolfrum, "IMO Interface with the 
Law of the Sea Convention ", in Current Maritime Issues and the International Maritime Organization, 
ed. Moore and Nordquist (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999) at p.  231.  These sources note that the 
IMO Secretariat was actively involved in the negotiations at UNCLOS III in order to ensure 
consistency in its own work. 
58 On the diversity of language, see e.g. Vukas, "Generally Accepted International Rules and 
Standards", in Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention through International Institutions, ed. 
Soons (Law of the Sea Institute, 1990) at pp. 406-408.  




Having listed the types of issues that a flag state’s regulations should address, 
Article 94(5) of the Convention continues: 
In taking the measures called for [above] each State is required to conform to generally 
accepted international standards, procedures and practices and to take any steps which may be 
necessary to ensure their observance. 
 
Therefore, the flag state does not have complete discretion over the standards 
which it prescribes.  Such measures must “conform to” international standards, 
procedures and practices.  This provision is based on the text of Article 10 of the 1958 
High Seas Convention and guidance on its interpretation can therefore be found in the 
drafting history of that instrument.60  
The original draft article prepared by the International Law Commission only 
included a reference to navigational safety and collision avoidance.61  For such 
measures, the Commission makes clear that the rule of reference seeks to ensure that 
states do not prescribe rules at variance with international standards and thus cause 
confusion amongst seafarers.62  As Hudson stressed to other members of the 
International Law Commission during its debate on the subject, “any ship sailing on 
the high seas was in danger if each ship was free to navigate as it pleased.”
63  It is 
practical necessity that dictates that uniform international standards are developed to 
promote safety of shipping.64  Thus, the rule of reference promotes the 
universalisation of so-called “maritime rules of the road”65 so that there is a single 
standard that is binding on all ships wherever they are in the world, and whatever flag 
                                                 
60 In M/V Saiga (No. 2), the ITLOS referred to the commentaries of the International Law Commission 
in interpreting Article 91 of the LOS Convention; see chapter seven, at p. 227.  For a historical account 
of these provisions, see Oxman, "The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted International Standards", 
(1991) 24 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 109.  
61 See International Law Commission, "Commentary to the Articles concerning the law of the sea", 
(1956) 2 Yearbook of the International Law Commission at p. 280. 
62 Ibid.,    at p. 281. 
63 Report of the sixty-fourth meeting of the International Law Commission, 10 July 1950, (1956) 1 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, at p. 194, at para. 86b. 
64 Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 1999) at p. 265. 
65 Oxman attributes this phrase to Manley Hudson; "The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted 
International Standards",  at p. 123.  See also International Law Association, Report of the Committee 
on Coastal State Jurisdiction relating to Marine Pollution, (2000) at p. 479.   
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they fly.66  This provision reflected the position under customary international law 
where states had already accepted some uniform standards on navigational safety.67   
Subsequently, the Commission added a reference to other types of regulations 
concerned with safety of at sea.  It noted that “regulations concerning the 
construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships, and the labour conditions of 
crews, can contribute much to the safety of navigation.”
68  Yet these topics raise 
different issues of policy and practice.  In these instances, there is no practical 
necessity that all ships navigating on the high seas must apply the same standards. 
The rules of reference in this regard would therefore seem to serve a different 
objective.  The drafting history of Article 10 suggests that the object and purpose of 
the rules of reference relating to these issues is to prevent the proliferation of sub-
standard shipping.69  Thus, in this context, the term “conform to” would appear to 
require a different interpretation; it would appear to prescribe an international 
minimum standard that states may exceed if they wish.   
The jurisdiction of flag states over pollution and environmental protection is 
similarly linked to international standards.  These obligations were introduced for the 
first time at UNCLOS III.70  Article 211(2) of the LOS Convention created a new 
obligation for flag states to adopt regulations which “shall at least have the same 
effect as that of generally accepted international rules and standards.”  The meaning 
of this provision leaves no doubt that it is intended to create an international minimum 
                                                 
66 See Shearer, "Collisions at Sea", in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. Bernhardt (North-
Holland, 1989) at p. 64.  The Chair of the International Law Commission summarised the discussion on 
the issue at the sixty-fourth meeting by saying that “it appeared to be the desire of the Commission for 
international unification to be achieved in that field”, in (1950 I) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, at p. 194, para. 94.  At the time when the 1958 Convention was formulated, the rules on 
collision avoidance were contained in a non-binding instrument, so the article not only achieved 
uniformity, but also created a legal obligation.  The rules are now codified in the 1972 Convention on 
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.  It should also be recognized that the 
rules themselves are inherently flexible as the master of a ship is at all times required to act in such as 
way as to secure the safety of a ship. In extreme circumstances, this may involve ignoring a particular 
rule.  
67 See chapter two, at p. 19. 
68 See International Law Commission, "Commentary to the Articles concerning the law of the sea",  at 
p. 280. 
69 Oxman, "The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted International Standards",   at p. 127, footnote 47.  
On flags of convenience, see Ignarski, "Flags of Convenience", in Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, ed. Bernhardt (North-Holland, 1989) at pp. 125-127. 
70 The environment had appeared on the international agenda following the 1972 Stockholm 
Conference on the Human Environment.  Recommendation 92 of that Conference covered the marine 
environment.  The 1958 Conventions had little to say on the environment.  Article 24 of the High Seas 
Convention simply provides that states shall draw up regulations to prevent pollution by discharge of 
oil from ships “taking into account existing treaty provisions on the subject.” 
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standard whilst continuing to permit flag states to adopt stricter pollution measures if 
they wish.71  The purpose, as with the provisions on safety and labour standards, is to 
prevent sub-standard shipping.  As Tan explains, “the lack of any flag state incentives 
to prescribe and enforce pollution control measures is the very reason why a 
minimum standard has had to be imposed on the flag states.”
72   
Rules of reference play a different role when it comes to prescribing the 
powers of coastal states.  It is again necessary to analyse each article individually 
according to its wording, its context, and its object and purpose in order to determine 
its effect. 
Article 21 confers a power on coastal states to adopt laws on “the safety of 
navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic” in its territorial sea.  There is no 
express limit on this power in relation to international rules or standards.  However, a 
limit may be implied from Article 21(4) which provides that “foreign ships exercising 
the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea shall comply with all such 
laws and regulations [adopted by the coastal state] and all generally accepted 
international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.”  This 
provision suggests that the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal state should be 
compatible with generally accepted international regulations.  Any other interpretation 
would require a ship in innocent passage to comply with two sets of incompatible 
norms. 
More express limits are placed on the power of coastal states in the case of 
other types of shipping standards.  For instance, Article 21(2) provides that “[coastal 
state] laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or 
equipment of foreign ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted 
international rules and standards.”  This provision serves to limit the jurisdiction of 
                                                 
71 See for example Boyle, "Marine Pollution under the Law of the Sea Convention", (1985) 79 
American Journal of International Law at p. 353; Oxman, "The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted 
International Standards",  at p. 131.  Articles 208(3) and 210(6) adopt a comparable approach, 
requiring coastal states to adopt rules on seabed pollution and dumping which are no less effective than 
minimum international standards.  Note that these two provisions do not refer to generally accepted 
international rules or standards but “international rules, standards and recommended practices and 
procedures” and “global rules and standards” respectively.  Oxman suggests that the absence of the 
qualifying words “generally accepted” suggests in strictly textual terms that the underlying idea may 
not be precisely the same, although he argues that careful interpretation could lead to that outcome; 
"The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted International Standards",  at pp. 132-133.  He reaches a 
similar conclusion in the case of the term “global” rules and standards, at p. 135. 
72 Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution  at p. 179. 
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coastal states in prescribing standards on these matters.73  The purpose of this 
provision is to facilitate international trade by preventing the proliferation of technical 
standards which would stop a ship from freely transiting the world’s coastal zones.74    
In doing so, it requires the coastal state to prescribe the international standard.   
One of the most significant innovations at UNCLOS III was to extend the 
jurisdiction of coastal states over environmental issues.  Yet, from very early in the 
negotiations at UNCLOS III, any extension in the exercise of coastal state jurisdiction 
was linked to the idea of internationally accepted rules and regulations.75  In the 
words of one study, the way in which the Convention referred to international 
standards “reflected the crux of a delicately weighed balance of power arrived at 
between coastal states and shipping nations.”
76  For instance, the power of coastal 
states to adopt regulations on pollution from ships within their EEZ is limited by 
reference to international rules and regulations.  In this zone of maritime jurisdiction, 
coastal state may only adopt regulations “conforming to and giving effect to generally 
accepted international rules and standards established through the competent 
international organization or general diplomatic conference.”
77  This provision again 
acts to limit the competence of a coastal state by setting an upper limit on their 
prescriptive powers78, deterring coastal states from using environmental regulations as 
a means to restrict the navigational rights of foreign ships.79  Under this provision, 
                                                 
73 Ships themselves may be subject to higher standards prescribed by the flag state in accordance with 
Article 94. 
74 See Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea, at p. 94; Tan, Vessel-Source Marine Pollution, at p. 
180. 
75 See Rosenne and Yankov, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 - A 
Commentary, 5 vols., vol. 4 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991) at p. 183 ff.. 
76 International Law Association, Report of the Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction relating to 
Marine Pollution, at p. 487; see also Vignes, "La valeur juridique de certaines regles, normes ou 
pratiques mentionnees au T.N.C.O. comme "generalement acceptees"", (1979) 25 Annuaire Francais 
de Droit International at p. 712; Boyle, "Marine Pollution under the Law of the Sea Convention",  at p. 
353. 
77 LOS Convention, Article 211(5).   
78 See, however, Article 211(6) which will be discussed below. 
79 See Attard, The Exclusive Economic Zone in International Law (Oxford Univ. Press, 1987) at p. 95; 
Orrego Vicuña, The Exclusive Economic Zone (Cambridge University Press, 1989) at p. 85.  There 
would appear to be no limits on the competence of coastal states to regulate pollution in their territorial 
sea; LOS Convention, Article 211(2).  It is questionable whether setting higher standards would have 
the effect of hampering innocent passage.  On this issue, in a slightly different context, see Oxman, 
"Environmental Protection in Archipelagic Waters and International Straits - the role of the 




coastal states must prescribe the international standards if they wish to adopt pollution 
legislation in their EEZ.80 
Whether the rule of reference seeks to set a uniform or minimum standard, 
international rules and regulations will thereby be binding on all states.  In the words 
of Oxman, “the effect of the [rules of reference] is to impose a legal obligation on a 
state to respect a standard which it would not otherwise be legally bound to 
respect.”
81  Thus, the Convention serves to incorporate certain international standards 
into the general framework for the law of the sea.   
This effect depends on the wording of the rule of reference.  Other rules of 
reference confer a greater discretion on coastal states in standard setting.  Provisions 
that simply require states to “take into account” international rules and standards do 
not make compliance with the standards compulsory.82  
    
4. The Incorporation of “Generally Accepted” Standards 
There are two primary questions related to which technical standards are 
incorporated by rules of reference.  Which organizations set these standards?  Which 
particular standards are incorporated? 
There are many international organizations which have the power to adopt 
technical standards relevant to the law of the sea.  Rarely do rules of reference specify 
the source of the standards to be applied.  The only organization to be named in the 
Convention is the International Civil Aviation Organization.83  Otherwise the 
Convention simply makes references to the “competent international organization” or 
“organizations” or says nothing at all about which organizations are to adopt 
standards.84   
                                                 
80 They differ from the uniform standards found in Article 94 because coastal states are not under an 
obligation to prescribe the international standards.  Indeed, a coastal state must choose to create an 
EEZ.  See also LOS Convention, Article 60(5) for rules of reference in relation to the regulation of off-
shore platforms and structures. 
81 Oxman, "The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted International Standards",  at p. 144. 
82 LOS Convention, Articles 207 and 212. 
83 LOS Convention, Article 39(3); see the comments of Rosenne, "IMO Interface with the Law of the 
Sea Convention", in Current Maritime Issues and the International Maritime Organization, ed. Moore 
and Nordquist (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1999) at p. 253. 
84 See the list of organizations prepared by DOALOS in Law of the Sea Bulletin, vol. 31.  See also 
Kingham and McRae, "Competent international organizations and the law of the sea", (1979)  Marine 
Policy 106.   
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The primary institution involved in the regulation of shipping is the IMO, 
although the work of several other institutions is also relevant, including the FAO, the 
ILO and the IAEA.  It would appear that standards adopted by any of these 
organizations may be incorporated by rules of reference.   
None of these organizations have exclusive competence and their mandates 
often overlap.  However, it is common for technical organizations to co-operate with 
one another and co-operation is often called for in their constituent instrument.85  
Forms of co-operation vary from the simple sharing of information to the conferral of 
reciprocal participation rights.  Sometimes, organizations will draft standards, 
guidelines or policies together.  For instance, the IMO and the ILO often form joint 
working groups to address shared concerns.86 
More important than the source of the standards is that fact that they are 
“generally accepted”.  It is this qualification which most rules of reference use to 
incorporate standards into the LOS Convention87  Determining a precise interpretation 
of “generally accepted” is difficult.  The ILA Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction 
relating to Marine Pollution says that “the drafting history of this provision suggests 
that it was intentionally kept vague in order not to upset the delicate balance which 
the notion incorporates.”
88  The use of this term creates a degree of dynamism, as the 
standards may change over time, without amending the LOS Convention.89  On the 
other hand, it also creates uncertainty, as it is not clear at any one time which 
                                                 
85 E.g. IMO Convention, Articles 60-62. 
86 E.g. Joint ILO/IMO Committee of Training, Joint ILO/IMO/BC Working Group on Ship Scrapping.   
87 Other qualifications are used in different contexts.  Article 210 calls for states to adopt laws that are 
“no less effective in preventing, reducing, and controlling [pollution from dumping] than the global 
rules and standards”.  It is suggested that global rules and standards are equivalent to generally 
accepted international rules and standards.  See Vukas, "Generally Accepted International Rules and 
Standards",  at pp. 406-408; Boyle, "Marine Pollution under the Law of the Sea Convention",  at p. 
355.  Articles 208 and 209 require seabed activities to be no less effective than “international rules, 
regulations and standards and recommended practices and procedures”.  The adoption of seabed 
standards will be dealt with below, at p. 157 ff.  Finally, the rule of reference in Article 42(1)(b) in 
relation to the legislative competence of strait states is formulated in terms of “applicable international 
regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes, and other noxious substances in the strait.”  
Article 54 applies this in turn to archipelagic sea-lanes.  The term “applicable rules and standards” 
suggests those standards that are formally binding on the state and includes generally accepted 
international standards.  See Van Reenen, "Rules of Reference in the New Convention on the Law of 
the Sea in Particular Connection with the Pollution of the Sea by Oil from Tankers", (1981)  
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law at pp. 12-13; International Law Association, Report of the 
Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction relating to Marine Pollution, at pp. 481-482.   
88 International Law Association, Report of the Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction relating to 
Marine Pollution, at p. 480. 
89 Sohn, "Implications of the Law of the Sea Convention regarding the Protection of the Marine 
Environment", in Developing Order of the Oceans, ed. Krueger and Riesenfeld (Law of the Sea 
Institute, 1985) at p. 109. 
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standards fall within the ambit of a rule of reference.  Yet the utility of the rules of 
reference is severely diminished if it is unclear which standards are incorporated.  
Boyle critically concludes that “to say that states have a duty to regulate pollution is 
to beg the question what regulations they must adopt, a question that the Convention 
does not satisfactorily answer.”
90   
Clarifying the interpretation of which standards are “generally accepted” is 
therefore vital.  The question was raised by the IMO in a letter to the chair of the 
drafting committee at UNCLOS III: “it would be useful if it would be clearly 
indicated whether the term “generally accepted rules and standards” is intended to 
refer to international standards which have received sufficient international 
endorsement in an appropriate international forum, for example, by their adoption by 
the competent international body or by a diplomatic conference for general 
application or, alternatively, whether rules and standards would be considered as 
being “generally accepted” only if they are contained in formal treaty instruments 
which are in force.”
91  
The focus of this analysis is on which IMO standards qualify as “generally 
accepted”.  It is true that many of the major maritime states are in practice already a 
party to the most of the important IMO regulatory treaties.  In commenting on the 
implications of the entry into force of the LOS Convention, the IMO Secretariat 
reported that acceptance of relevant IMO treaties has increased since 1982.  The 
Secretariat suggested that the obligation in the LOS Convention to apply generally 
accepted rules and standards had acted a “paramount incentive” for states to become 
a party to the regulatory treaties.92  The SOLAS Convention, for instance, is binding 
on 98.52% of the world merchant fleet in terms of tonnage.93  Similar figures apply to 
the 1966 Convention on Load Lines94 and the 1972 Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.95  The two compulsory annexes of the 
                                                 
90 Boyle, "Marine Pollution under the Law of the Sea Convention",  at p. 357. See also Churchill and 
Lowe, The Law of the Sea  at p. 347; Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment 
(Oxford University Press, 2002) at p. 353. 
91 Letter dated 23 May 1980, cited by Vukas, "Generally Accepted International Rules and Standards",  
at pp. 416-417. 
92 United Nations Secretary General, Impact of the Entry into Force of the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea on related existing and proposed instruments and programmes, 






MARPOL Convention have been accepted by a similarly high percentage of the world 
merchant fleet.96  Such high levels of participation leave little doubt that these treaties 
are indeed generally accepted.   
Nevertheless, not all regulatory treaties benefit from such high levels of 
participation.  For instance, some of the optional annexes to MARPOL have struggled 
to attract parties.97  Treaties that have been negotiated more recently, such as the 2001 
Anti-Fouling Convention and the 2004 Ballast Water Convention, may not attract 
high levels of participation for many years to come.   
It is difficult to locate a precise threshold of general acceptance.  In doing so, 
it is necessary to take into account the warning words of the ICJ in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases that it should not be lightly presumed that a state which has 
not formally accepted an instrument has become bound in another way.98   
One argument is that rules and standards are generally accepted if they have 
satisfied the conditions for entry into force.99  This approach appears to assume that 
the conditions for entry into force of regulatory treaties are set at a level that is 
equivalent to general acceptance.  Valenzuela makes the argument that “the condition 
… for the entry into force of IMO conventions – that is the requirement of a 
substantial number of states parties having amongst them more than half the tonnage 
of the world’s merchant fleet – seems to have precisely this purpose.”
100  Yet, the 
level of acceptance needed for entry into force varies from treaty to treaty: twenty-
five states representing fifty per cent of world tonnage in the SOLAS Convention101, 
fifteen states representing fifty per cent of world tonnage in the MARPOL 
Convention102, thirty states representing thirty-five per cent of world tonnage in the 
Ballast Water Convention103, and twenty-five states representing twenty-five per cent 
of world tonnage in the Anti-Fouling Convention.104  The risk of this approach is that, 
                                                 
96 97%.  IMO figures, as at 31 January 2005.  56 states are not parties to MARPOL. 
97 Annex III has 92.99%; Annex IV has 54.35%; Annex V has 95.23%; and Annex VI has 60.04%.   
98 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (1969) ICJ Reports 3 at para. 28.   
99 For instance, Valenzuela, "IMO: Public International Law and Regulation", in The Law of the Sea 
and Ocean Industry: New Opportunities and Restraints, ed. Johnston and Letalik (Law of the Sea 
Institute, 1984) at p. 145.  For a similar approach, see Boyle, "Marine Pollution under the Law of the 
Sea Convention",  at p. 356. 
100 Valenzuela, "IMO: Public International Law and Regulation",  at p. 145. 
101 SOLAS Convention, Article 10(1). 
102 MARPOL Convention, Article 15(1). 
103 Ballast Water Convention, Article 18(1). 
104 Anti-Fouling Convention, Article 18(1). 
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as Timanegis puts it, “small minorities could impose their wishes on other states.”105 
Furthermore, this interpretation seems to suggest that all international standards that 
have entered into force are generally accepted.  Yet, the LOS Convention makes a 
distinction between generally accepted international standards and “applicable 
international standards”.106 The latter concept implies a lower level of acceptance.  
This distinction would be lost if all treaties in force were considered to be generally 
accepted. 
An alternative interpretation of “generally accepted” concentrates not on 
formal acceptance of a standard but on whether or not a standard has been accepted in 
state practice.  Thus, Van Reenan argues that “the meaning of “generally accepted 
international rules” can be found in the criteria for determining whether certain 
treaty rules have become world-wide rules of customary law.”
107  Others have argued 
that the strict threshold for the creation of customary law is too high and that a lower 
level of acceptance is appropriate.108  Vukas thus argues that “such extensive 
interpretations are plausible in this case, taking into account the intentions of the 
drafters and the texts of the corresponding provisions of the LOS Convention dealing 
with other sources of pollution, where no extensive application was envisaged and the 
habitual terminology was used.”
109  
Hakapäa argues that this interpretation removes the distinction between 
customary international law and generally accepted international standards.110 
According to this criticism, the rules of reference are redundant if they simply create 
an obligation to comply with international standards which are already binding as part 
of customary international law.  It could be also argued that the rules of reference act 
as clarification that generally accepted international standards have become part of 
                                                 
105 Timagenis, International Control of Marine Pollution (Oceana Publications, 1980) at p. 606. 
106 The term applicable international regulations is found in Articles 42, 60, 94, 213, 214, 216, 217, 
218, 219, 220, 220, 226, 228, and 230. 
107 Van Reenen, "Rules of Reference in the New Convention on the Law of the Sea in Particular 
Connection with the Pollution of the Sea by Oil from Tankers",   at p. 11.  He continues that “it is 
identical to what the Court [in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases] calls a “general rule of 
international law”, at p. 12. 
108 Timagenis, International Control of Marine Pollution at p. 605.  See also Hakapäa, Marine 
Pollution in International Law (Suomlainen Tiedeakatemia, 1981) at p. 121; International Law 
Association, Report of the Committee on Coastal State Jurisdiction relating to Marine Pollution, at p. 
478.   
109 Vukas, "Generally Accepted International Rules and Standards",  at p. 420. 
110 Hakapäa, Marine Pollution in International Law, at p. 121. 
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customary international law, whilst acknowledging that these standards may change 
over time.   
Some comment is also needed on how customary international is determined 
in this context.  Some commentators suggest that a standard must be reflected in the 
actual practice of states and the shipping industry.  Asserting the importance of action 
rather than rhetoric, Oxman places the emphasis firmly on the enforcement of 
international standards.111  In his opinion, statements made at diplomatic conferences 
and through international organizations should not be accorded significant weight.  To 
do so, he argues, would attribute to them a legislative competence that was not 
intended.112   
Clearly actual state practice can be an important indicator that certain 
standards are generally accepted.  However, the practice of states in adopting 
standards should not be ignored.  In the negotiation of international standards, states 
have ample opportunity to express their views on the desirability of such standards 
and whether or not they are accepted.  The mere adoption of a standard is not 
sufficient to create customary international law.  The practice of states in adopting a 
standard must also be accompanied by evidence of opinio juris communis.113  Sohn 
concludes that “once a rule is generally accepted, usually by consensus at a meeting 
of an international organization or a diplomatic conference, each state has under the 
new customary international law developed by the Law of the Sea Conference the 
duty to act in accordance with it.  The necessary safeguard is in the words “generally 
accepted” which imply that a preponderant majority of states, including almost all 
states with any special interest in that rule, have accepted the rule as one fairly 
balancing the interests of all states.”
114
 
In the case of the IMO, it is significant that the drafting of standards involves 
not only parties to regulatory treaties, but includes other states and industry actors.  
Therefore, all interests are taken into account and universal agreement can be 
achieved.  Furthermore, formal procedures are generally set aside in favour of 
adopting international standards by consensus.  Majority views are not normally 
                                                 
111 Oxman, "The Duty to Respect Generally Accepted International Standards",  at p. 152. 
112 Ibid., at pp. 149-150. 
113 See chapter three, at pp. 50-59. 
114 Sohn, "Implications of the Law of the Sea Convention regarding the Protection of the Marine 
Environment",  at p. 109.   
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forced upon dissenters, rather participants aims towards achieving a compromise, 
balancing the interests of all states.   
It is not only through the IMO that states can express an opinion on which 
standards are “generally accepted”.  Further evidence of what amounts to generally 
accepted international standards can also be found in General Assembly resolutions 
on the law of the sea.  These resolutions regularly deal with maritime safety and the 
protection of the marine environment, reviewing developments in regulatory activity.  
A careful reading of these resolutions reveals that the General Assembly calls upon 
states to comply with certain instruments adopted by the IMO, whether or not they are 
a party thereto.  For instance, in its 2005 resolution, the General Assembly “calls 
upon states to effectively implement the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code and related amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at 
Sea.”
115  This plea was repeated in its 2006 resolution.116  Another paragraph of the 
2005 resolution “urges states to take all necessary measures to ensure the effective 
implementation of the amendments to the International Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue and to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
relating to the delivery of persons rescued from sea to a place of safety upon their 
entry into force as well as the associated Guidelines on the Treatment of Rescued 
Persons at Sea”
117.  In 2006, states were similarly required to “ensure that masters on 
ships flying their flag take the steps required by relevant instruments to provide 
assistance to persons in distress at sea”
118.  A footnote refers to the SOLAS 
Convention and the Search and Rescue Convention as the relevant instruments.  
These resolutions go beyond simple bringing instruments to the attention of states or 
encouraging states to ratify of accede to international standards.119  They are 
addressed to all states, urging and encouraging them to ensure effective 
                                                 
115 General Assembly Resolution 60/22, 2005, at para. 53. 
116 General Assembly Resolution 61/30, 2006, at para. 60. 
117 General Assembly Resolution 60/22, 2005, at para. 59. 
118 General Assembly Resolution 61/30, 2006, at para. 70. 
119 C.f. General Assembly Resolution 61/30, 2006, which “encourages states that have not done so to 
become parties to the Protocol of 1997 (Annex VI – Regulations for the Prevention of Air Pollution 
from Ships) to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as 
amended by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto, and furthermore to ratify or accede to the 
International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems of Ships 2001, as well as the 
International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments 
2004, thereby facilitating their early entry into force”; at para. 81.  See a similar call in relation to the 
1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972 in 
General Assembly Resolution 60/22, 2005, at para. 63. 
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implementation of these instruments, whether or not they are a party.  It is submitted 
that these resolutions are further evidence that these instruments are generally 
accepted for the purposes of the LOS Convention. 
This interpretation of “generally accepted” potentially incorporates non-
binding instruments which are accepted as customary international law.  The inclusion 
of non-binding instruments in the rules of reference is supported by the ILC 
commentary on Article 10 of the High Seas Convention which says “this expression 
covers regulations which are a product of international cooperation, without 
necessarily having been confirmed by formal treaties.”
120  In order to be captured by 
the rules of reference, however, there must be an indication that the instrument was 
intended to have some normative impact or is generally complied with by states.  This 
may be seen from the wording of an instrument, from statements made during its 
negotiation, or from subsequent practice of states.   
   
5. Enforcement of Generally Accepted Standards 
The LOS Convention not only addressed the incorporation of technical 
standards but also ways in which they should be enforced.  It is notable that 
enforcement is not linked to institutional mechanisms but to action taken by states.   
Article 94(4)(a) of the LOS Convention obliges a state to undertake surveys of 
each ship flying its flag both “before registration and thereafter at appropriate 
intervals.”  Almost all of the IMO regulatory treaties require ships to be regularly 
surveyed and these regulations can be used to interpret the term “appropriate 
intervals” in Article 94(4)(a) of the Convention.  In addition, Article 217(3) of the 
Convention requires that ships carry on board certificates required by and issued 
pursuant to general international rules and standards.  These certificates may be 
inspected by port states and the Convention specifies that “these certificates shall be 
accepted by other States as evidence of the condition of the vessels and shall be 
regarded as having the same force as certificates issued by them, unless there are 
clear grounds for believing that the condition of the vessel does not correspond 
                                                 
120 International Law Commission, "Commentary to the Articles concerning the law of the sea",  at p. 
281.  It continues, “this applies particularly in the case of signals.”  Until 1972, the International 
Regulations on Signals were contained in a non-binding instrument. 
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substantially with the particulars of the certificate.”
121  This language is also 
borrowed from IMO regulatory treaties, such as the SOLAS Convention122 and the 
MARPOL Convention.123  This provision also underlines the requirement in such 
regulatory treaties that parties shall ensure that no more favourable treatment is given 
to ships of non-parties.124 
The obligations created by the rules of reference also fall under the dispute 
settlement provisions in Part XV of the LOS Convention.  Indeed, adjudication may 
be one way in which the content of generally accepted international standards can be 
clarified.125  To date, no such dispute has arisen and the likelihood of inter-state 
litigation is relatively low.  As one UN report summarises:126 
…despite a fairly high level of dissatisfaction among some States at the deficiencies in the 
performance of some other States, there has been no rush to litigation to rectify the problems 
adumbrated in the various contributions to the present report. … [T]he most likely reason for 
the lack of litigation is an extreme reluctance of States to challenge each other in adversarial 
cases in court, coupled with the high cost of doing so. Thus it appears that the rather remote 
prospect of litigation is not sufficient to induce recalcitrant flag States to honour their 
international legal obligations. 
 
In practice, it is much more likely that states will pursue issues of compliance 
with generally accepted international standards through diplomatic institutions, such 
as the IMO127, other technical organizations, and in some cases the General 
Assembly.  Indeed, in the absence of judicial interpretation of the Convention, taking 
into account what states say during the discussions and deliberations in international 
organizations is perhaps the best way in which to determine which international 
standards are in fact generally accepted. 
   
                                                 
121 LOS Convention, Article 217(43. 
122 SOLAS Convention, Annex, Chapter 1, Regulations 17 and 19. 
123 MARPOL Convention, Article 5. 
124 Eg MARPOL Convention, Article 5(4). 
125 Vukas, "Generally Accepted International Rules and Standards",  at p. 421. 
126 United Nations Secretary General, Consultative Group on Flag State Implementation - Report of the 
Secretary General, (2004) UN Document A/59/63, at para. 219. 
127 The Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation was created in 1992 to assess the implementation 
of mandatory IMO conventions and to identify the difficulties which flag states face in fully 
implementing IMO instruments.  See also Resolution on the Self-Assessment of Flag State 
Performance, Resolution A.881(21); Voluntary audit scheme adopted at IMO’s 24th Assembly, IMO 
Briefing 51/2005, 7 December 2005. 
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6. Traffic Measures & the International Maritime Organization 
The role of the IMO is not confined to adopting technical shipping standards 
of the type considered in the previous section.  In areas beyond national jurisdiction, 
the IMO has for a long time been involved in adopting and approving certain types of 
navigational measures.  The General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing provide that the 
“IMO is recognized as the only international body responsible for establishing and 
recommending measures on an international level concerning ships’ routeing.”
128  
The types of measures which the Organization can approve under this instrument 
include routeing systems, traffic separation schemes, separation zones, traffic lanes, 
roundabouts, inshore traffic zones, two-way routes, recommended routes, deep water 
routes, and areas to be avoided.129  Yet, such measures have generally been seen as 
recommendatory given that ships sailing in international waters have the right to 
freedom of navigation.130   
The LOS Convention creates a much more complex regime of maritime 
jurisdiction where the ability of coastal states to adopt legislative and regulatory 
measures are delicately balanced against the interests of other members of the 
international community.  In order to maintain this balance, states are obliged to seek 
the approval of the IMO, as the “competent international organization”, before they 
impose compulsory navigational measures in these maritime zones; what Oxman 
terms the “approval role” of the IMO.131   
The role played by the IMO in this context differs from the drafting of general 
rules and regulations described above.  The power to initiate the process of adopting 
navigational measures resides solely with the coastal state concerned.  The IMO is 
called on to review the proposals in order to uphold the balance of interests found in 
the LOS Convention.  In doing so, the IMO is also involved in interpreting and 
applying the Convention in order to decide where the balance should be struck.   
                                                 
128 General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing, IMO Resolution A.572(14), as amended, at para. 3.1. 
129 General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing, Resolution A.572(14), as amended, at para. 2.1. 
130 Plant, "International Traffic Separation Schemes in the new Law of the Sea", (1985)  Marine Policy 
at p. 145. 
131 Oxman, "Environmental Protection in Archipelagic Waters and International Straits - the role of the 
International Maritime Organization",   at p. 468.  It is the Maritime Safety Committee which fulfils 
this role; see Resolution A.858(20) on the procedure for the adoption and amendment of traffic 
separation schemes, routeing measures other than traffic separation schemes including the designation 
and substitution of archipelagic sea-lanes and ship reporting systems. 
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One area where the IMO has an approval role is in relation to measures to 
promote safety of navigation in international straits.  The purpose of the regime on 
international straits found in Part III of the Convention is to limit the interference of 
coastal states within major maritime traffic routes that would otherwise fall within the 
territorial sea of the coastal state and thus within their “sovereign” jurisdiction.132   
Strait states are under a general duty to co-operate with user states in “the 
establishment and maintenance … of necessary navigational and safety aides and 
other improvements in aid of international navigation.”
133  The Convention does not 
specify the framework in which such co-operation should take place and it may be 
conducted on an ad hoc or institutional basis.134   
The power of strait states to adopt legislative measures is provided in Article 
42 subject to specific limitations, as well as a general prohibition that states bordering 
straits shall not hamper transit passage and that transit passage shall not be 
suspended.135  Article 42(1)(a) provides that “states bordering straits may adopt laws 
and regulations relating to transit passage through straits in respect of … the safety 
of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic, as provided in article 41.”  
Whilst seeming to be general in scope, the reference to Article 41 would appear to 
limit the types of safety measures that a strait state can adopt.  Sea-lanes and traffic 
separation schemes are the only two types of measures mentioned in that article.  
Navigational measures adopted under Article 41 are also subject to a special 
adoption procedure.   Central to this process is the approval role of the IMO.  Article 
41(4) requires strait states to submit proposals to designate, prescribe or substitute 
sea-lanes and traffic separation schemes to the IMO “with a view to adoption”.  The 
IMO is prevented from adopting any measures without the agreement of the strait 
state. At the same time, that state may only designate, prescribe or substitute the 
applicable measures once it has been “adopted” at the international level.  Thus, it 
                                                 
132 See Moore, "The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea", (1980) 74 American Journal of International Law 77. 
133 LOS Convention, Article 43. 
134 See 2006 Law of the Sea Report of the UN Secretary General, UN Document A/61/63, at paras. 69-
71. 
135 LOS Convention, Articles 41(2) and 44.  In addition, the competence of the strait state to regulate 
pollution from ships is limited to “giving effect to applicable international rules and regulations 
regarding the discharge of oil, oily waste and other noxious substances in the strait”; Article 42(1)(b); 
see Rosenne and Nandan, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 - A 
Commentary, 5 vols., vol. 2 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) at pp. 375-376. 
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appears that IMO Members and the strait state must negotiate a mutually acceptable 
solution.136  Adoption by the IMO would appear to be a prerequisite to the validity of 
traffic measures applied to international straits.  Article 41(7) provides that “ships in 
transit passage shall respect applicable sea lanes and traffic separation schemes 
established in accordance with this article”. The Virginia Commentary concludes 
that “by implication, there is no obligation under this Convention to respect sea lanes 
or traffic separation schemes unless they have been established in accordance with 
the conditions [in Article 41].”
137 
In light of these consideration, the IMO acts as an important forum in which 
the interests of all states, the strait state and user states, can be taken into account and 
balanced in deciding whether to adopt proposed traffic measures.  The role of the 
IMO is to scrutinise measures formulated by the strait state in order to decide whether 
such measures are “necessary” to promote safety of navigation.  It must also ensure 
that the proposal complies with “generally accepted international regulations”.138 In 
this context, the General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing may be relevant.139  The 
General Provisions serve to clarify the role of the IMO in the decision-making process 
and what factors should be taken in account when determining whether a particular 
traffic measure is necessary.140  However, these factors are not exhaustive and the 
IMO may take into account other considerations on a case-by-case basis.  The 
Organization may often adopt a pragmatic approach, seeking to achieve a compromise 
between the strait state and other interested actors. 
The IMO also plays an approval role in relation to sea-lanes through 
archipelagic waters.  The concept of archipelagic waters and archipelagic sea-lanes 
was introduced by Part IV of the LOS Convention which seeks to reconcile the 
political and security interests of archipelagic states with the interests of maritime and 
shipping states.141  The Convention provides that archipelagic states can exercise 
                                                 
136 See Rosenne and Nandan, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 - A 
Commentary, at p. 363.  Where the strait passes through the territorial sea of two or more states, those 
states must cooperate in formulating proposals before submitting them to the IMO for consideration; 
LOS Convention, Article 41(5). 
137 Ibid.,  at p. 365. 
138 LOS Convention, Article 41(3). 
139 General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing as amended, Resolution A.572(14). 
140 See General Provisions on Ships’ Routeing as amended, Resolution A.572(14), paras. 3.2 and 3.3. 
141 In general, see Munavvar, Ocean States - Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995); Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Archipelagic States - 
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sovereignty over waters enclosed by archipelagic baselines142 but that this sovereignty 
is subject to the right of vessels to continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit 
passage through archipelagic sea-lanes between one part of the high seas or EEZ and 
another part of the high seas or EEZ.143 In order to ensure that this balance of interests 
is maintained, the Convention provides for international scrutiny and the approval of 
archipelagic sea-lane proposals by the IMO.  Under Article 53 of the LOS 
Convention, the archipelagic state is under an obligation to refer any proposals for an 
archipelagic sea-lane to the IMO “with a view to their adoption.”144  Again, the IMO 
is acting as a forum in which competing interests can be reconciled.  Thus, the 
procedure foresees a dialogue between the archipelagic state and other IMO members; 
neither side has the power to impose a measure without the consent of the other and 
mutual accommodation is necessary.145   
The conditions in the Convention for prescribing archipelagic sea-lanes are set 
out in some detail.  Article 53(4) provides that “sea lanes and air routes shall 
traverse the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea and shall include all 
normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight.”  
Indeed, failure to prescribe sea-lanes or air routes will not affect the rights of shipping 
to pass through archipelagic waters.  Article 53 provides that “if an archipelagic state 
does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage 
may be exercised through the routes normally used for international navigation.”   
The application of these provisions may be problematic as there is no 
indication in the Convention of what is considered to be “routes normally used for 
international navigation.” This issue is one that is left for determination in the 
process of deciding individual proposals for archipelagic sea-lanes in the IMO.   
Any proposals for archipelagic sea-lanes must comply with generally accepted 
international regulations.146  As the concept of archipelagic sea-lanes was an 
innovation, the IMO has developed a new set of regulations on this topic.  The 
General Provisions on the Adoption, Designation and Substitution of Archipelagic 
                                                                                                                                            
Legislative History of Part IV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (United Nations, 
1990).   
142 LOS Convention, Article 49. 
143 LOS Convention, Article 53(3). 
144 LOS Convention, Article 53(9).  
145 See Munavvar, Ocean States - Archipelagic Regimes in the Law of the Sea  at p. 169. 
146 LOS Convention, Article 53(8). 
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Sea-lanes were first adopted by the Maritime Safety Committee in May 1998.147  
These provisions purport to clarify how proposals for archipelagic sea-lanes shall be 
dealt with by the Organization.  In this sense, they complement the provisions found 
in the Convention itself.  They specify the procedure for the adoption of proposals and 
the criteria to be taken into account in the designation process.  As the LOS 
Convention only devotes twelve short paragraphs to the subject of archipelagic sea-
lanes, it was to be anticipated that the IMO would be faced with filling in certain gaps.  
Therefore, the General Provisions on Archipelagic Sea-lanes can be considered as an 
interpretation of the LOS Convention.   
Yet, some commentators have argued that the General Provisions on 
Archipelagic Sea-lanes go further and modify the balance of rights and interests in the 
archipelagic waters regime.  In particular, Johnson suggests that the requirement for 
archipelagic states to consult and to take into account the opinions of other states 
"seem to lessen the practical effect of any pre-existing power of veto held by the 
archipelagic states” and “in this way, the General Provisions reinforce the 
ascendancy of user interests in the archipelagic sea-lanes passage regime.”
148  It is 
true that the General Provisions on Archipelagic Sea-lanes add a number of 
procedural obligations that do not appear in Article 53 of the LOS Convention.  As 
well as requiring a state proposing a particular archipelagic sea-lane to consult at an 
early stage with other user governments and the IMO149, the proposing government 
must also explain the suitability of its proposed sea-lane for the continuous and 
expeditious of foreign ships and aircraft150, including reference charts and other 
supporting data.151  Furthermore, if it is submitting a partial archipelagic sea-lanes 
proposal, the state must also provide periodic reports to the IMO of its plans for 
conducting further surveys and studies towards the proposal of additional archipelagic 
sea-lanes.152  Yet, there is no direct conflict between the General Provisions on 
Archipelagic Sea-lanes and the LOS Convention and it is clear that they were 
                                                 
147 IMO Resolution MSC.71(69) as amended by Resolution MSC.165(78). 
148 Johnson, "A Rite of Passage: The I.M.O. Consideration of the Indonesian Archipelagic Sea-Lanes 
Submission", (2000) 15 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law at p. 324. 
149 General Provisions, at para. 3.6.  For similar arguments on the concept of partial designation, see J. 
L. Batongbacol, "Barely Skimming the Surface: Archipelagic Sea Lanes Navigation and the IMO", in 
Oceans Management in the 21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and Responses, ed. Oude Elferink 
and Rothwell (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004) at p. 56. 
150 General Provisions, at para. 3.8. 
151 General Provisions, at para. 3.10. 
152 General Provisions, at para. 3.12. 
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intended to be complementary, as the General Provisions specify that “archipelagic 
sea-lane proposals shall conform with the relevant provisions of the [LOS 
Convention] including Article 53, and the requirements of this Part.”
153  As the 
General Provisions on Archipelagic Sea-lanes do no more than promote maximum 
possible co-operation between the archipelagic state and other states at all stages of 
the process, it is difficult to accept the argument that they are contrary to the LOS 
Convention.   
Another objection to the General Provisions on Archipelagic Sea-lanes is how 
they deal with the concept of a “partial archipelagic sea-lanes proposal”.   This term 
derives from the General Provisions which define a partial archipelagic sea lanes 
proposal as one “which does not meet the requirement to include all normal passage 
routes and navigational channels as required by [the LOS Convention].”
154  It further 
provides that the IMO will retain “continuing jurisdiction” over the process of 
adopting archipelagic sea-lanes until the requirements of the LOS Convention are 
met.155  Batongbacal argues that “the concept of a partial proposal or designation 
was not envisaged in the LOS Convention” and it has the effect of undermining the 
provisions on archipelagic sea-lanes.156  He concludes that the concept converts much 
of Article 53 into “excessive verbiage” as “if a complete [archipelagic sea-lanes] 
designation must at all times include “all routes”, then there is no situation in which 
substitution can be called for, nor is there any opportunity to eliminate redundant 
routes.”
157  Yet, the view that the concept has no foundation in the Convention is 
difficult to accept.  Arguably, it is no more than a procedural device which aims to 
satisfy the condition in Article 53(4) that archipelagic sea-lanes must include all 
normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight.   
The definition of normal passage routes is vital to the process of designation.  
However, the General Provisions simply reproduce the text of the LOS Convention 
without further clarification. In practice, the Organization has opted to deal with this 
question on a case-by-case basis through negotiations at the Maritime Safety 
                                                 
153 General Provisions, at para. 4.1.. 
154 General Provisions, at para. 2.2.2. 
155 IMO Resolution MSC.71(69), at para. 3.5. 
156 Batongbacol, "Barely Skimming the Surface: Archipelagic Sea Lanes Navigation and the IMO",  at 
pp. 55-56. 
157 Ibid.,    at p. 56. 
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Committee.158  Through discussing specific proposals for archipelagic sea-lanes, 
states may be able to reach compromises on an acceptable solution.   
Article 53 also permits archipelagic states to promulgate traffic separation 
schemes “for the safe passage of ships through narrow channels in such sea 
lanes.”
159    Again, such measures must be submitted to the IMO for approval and its 
role in this regard resembles the approval of traffic measures in international straits.160 
A final area where the IMO has powers of approval under the LOS 
Convention is for certain areas of the EEZ.161  It has been suggested that in terms of 
navigation, the EEZ is analogous to the high seas and therefore it is not normally 
appropriate to apply mandatory navigational measures.162  Indeed, there is no general 
provision in the LOS Convention which allows coastal states to adopt mandatory 
navigational measures in the EEZ.  An exception is found in Article 211(6) of the 
LOS Convention which says that a state may propose special mandatory measures to 
protect a particular, clearly defined area of its EEZ from pollution from ships if 
generally accepted international standards are inadequate to meet special 
circumstances of a technical nature.  It would appear that two categories of measures 
are anticipated under Article 211(6).   
Paragraph (a) allows coastal states to adopt “laws and regulations for the 
prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from vessels implementing such 
international rules and standards or navigational practices as are made applicable, 
through the organization, for special areas.”  The reference to special areas brings to 
mind the concept of special areas in Annexes I, II and V of the MARPOL 
Convention.  A special area in that context is defined as “a sea area where for 
recognized technical reasons in relation to its oceanographical and ecological 
condition and to the particular character of its traffic the adoption of special 
mandatory measures … is required.”
163  In his analysis of Article 211(6), Timagenis 
                                                 
158 Batongbol also brings attention to the important role played by informal negotiations between 
interested actors outside of the formal IMO framework; Ibid.,   at p. 54.  Indeed, he argues that the IMO 
is not the appropriate forum to resolve conflicts over the designation of archipelagic sea-lanes as its 
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159 LOS Convention, Article 53(6). 
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162 Plant, "International Traffic Separation Schemes in the new Law of the Sea",  at pp. 145-146.   
163 MARPOL Convention, Annex I, Regulation 1(10).  Provisions on special areas are also found in 
Annexes II and V. 
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says that “special area was mainly understood during the negotiations to refer to the 
special areas established by the [MARPOL] Convention.  The language used, 
however, (through the Organization) clearly suggests that other special areas may be 
included.”
164  In support of this conclusion, a leading commentary on the Convention 
suggests that, whilst they share similar characteristics, the two concepts “must not be 
confused.”
165  However, the similarities are striking and further supported by the fact 
that the coastal state must provide information on the “necessary reception facilities”, 
a requirement of the special areas under the MARPOL Convention. 
Whether or not paragraph (a) is linked to special areas under the MARPOL 
Convention, it is clear that coastal state may adopt “additional laws and regulations 
for the same area for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels” 
under paragraph (c) of Article 211(6).  These additional laws and regulations are not 
required to implement international rules and standards and they can be unilaterally 
proposed by the coastal state.  The provision is not very precise as to what types of 
measures the coastal state may adopt, simply saying that they may include “laws 
relating to discharges or navigational practices.”
166  The types of measures that 
could be proposed under this provision are therefore potentially quite wide.  The one 
restriction is that any measures adopted may not “require foreign vessels to observe 
design, construction, manning or equipment standards other than generally accepted 
international rules and standards.”
167  Nevertheless, the implications for freedom of 
navigation in the EEZ are potentially significant.  
In order to prevent the imposition of unilateral impediments to freedom of 
navigation, Article 211(6) requires the coastal state to consult other interested states 
through the competent international organization and to submit scientific and 
technical evidence and other materials in support of its proposals.  The proposal 
should specify a clearly defined area which has extraordinary oceanographical and 
ecological conditions.  The exceptional nature of the provision is stressed by the fact 
that technical and scientific evidence must be submitted by the coastal state in support 
of the proposal.  Under the procedure, the competent organization has twelve months 
                                                 
164 He calls for the concept of special areas to be further clarified; Timagenis, International Control of 
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to consider the proposal and if it agrees that the conditions are met, the coastal state 
may adopt the proposed laws and regulations.168  Again, the role of the IMO is to 
ensure that the interests of coastal states and shipping states are balanced so that 
protective measures do not unduly infringe on freedom of navigation in this zone. 
Article 211(6) has been linked to the concept of Particularly Sensitive Sea 
Areas169  as developed by the IMO, although it is clear that these two concepts are 
distinct.170    
None of these procedures where the IMO is given a role in approving 
additional coastal state measures specify exactly what is meant by approval.  Is a 
simple majority or a higher level of approval required?  If a state has voted against a 
measure, is it bound to comply?  It is submitted that an interpretation that assumes 
that measures can be approved by a majority does not reflect the underlying 
motivations of states involved in the process.  It is only through consensus decision-
making that all interests can be satisfactorily balanced.  It is this type of decision-
making which is reflected in the practice of the Organization. 
   
7. The International Maritime Organization as a forum for 
change? 
The regime of maritime zones created by the LOS Convention seeks to 
balance the interests of coastal states and maritime states.  The Convention calls for 
ongoing co-operation and compromise through established organizations in the 
implementation of its jurisdictional regime.  It has been seen how international 
organizations, and in particular the IMO, play a crucial role in helping to maintain this 
delicate balance.     
Whilst the LOS Convention provides some flexibility, is the regime as set out 
in this instrument fixed?  Are the circumstances in which the IMO can authorise the 
                                                 
168 For further comment, see Rosenne and Yankov, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
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application of mandatory measures limited to those that are authorized in the LOS 
Convention?   
Claims for stronger regulation often go hand-in-hand with calls for increased 
jurisdiction over prescribing and enforcing standards.  As a consequence, the IMO can 
become a forum where the boundaries of the jurisdictional regime are discussed, 
clarified and developed. 
The PSSA is one concept that raises the extent of coastal state prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction.  A PSSA is defined as “an area that needs special 
protection through action by IMO because of its significance for recognized 
ecological, socio-economic, or scientific attributes where such attributes may be 
vulnerable to damage by international shipping activities.”
171  Although sharing the 
goals of Special Areas under MARPOL and provisions adopted in accordance with 
Article 211(6) of the LOS Convention, the concept of the PSSA is inspired by a wider 
conception of marine protected areas and it is distinct from these two types of 
measures.172   
In fact, the creation of a PSSA involves two distinct but related processes.  
Designation of an area as a PSSA does not in itself involve any restrictions on 
shipping in the area.  An application for PSSA must satisfy at least one of the criteria 
identified in the Guidelines173 as well showing that the area is at risk from 
international shipping.174  The purpose of designation is more rhetorical, raising the 
profile of the environmental sensitivity of the area, heightening the awareness of 
mariners, and informing and educating policy-makers.175   
                                                 
171 Revised Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, IMO 
Resolution A.982(24) at Annex, para 1.2.  Hereinafter, “the Revised Guidelines”. 
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particular Article 194(5) of the LOS Convention; at p. 186. 
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4.5.   
174 Revised Guidelines, at para. 5.1. 
175 See Report of the Third International Meeting of Legal Experts on Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas; 
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In addition, all applications for a PSSA must be accompanied by proposals for 
so-called “associated protective measures”.  The Guidelines on the Identification and 
Designation of PSSAs indicate that associated protective measures may include ships’ 
routeing measures, reporting requirements, discharge restrictions, operational criteria, 
and prohibited activities.176  This list is purely indicative and other measures may be 
proposed.  The PSSA procedure specifies a number of factors which should be taken 
into account including the appropriateness of a measure to address the vulnerability of 
the area and the characteristics and the size of the proposed area.177  According to the 
Guidelines, the “IMO should provide a forum for the review and re-evaluation of any 
associated protective measures adopted, as necessary, taking into account any 
pertinent comments, reports, and observations … Member Governments which have 
ships operating in the area of the designated PSSA are encouraged to bring any 
concerns with the associated protective measures to the IMO so that any necessary 
adjustments may be made.”
178  This provision implies that consent for a measure may 
be withdrawn or amended in the future if concerns are raised by affected states.  In all 
cases, associated protective measures must have an identified legal basis.179  The 
Guidelines specify that a measure may find its legal basis in an IMO regulatory treaty 
or under Article 211(6) of the LOS Convention.180  Thus, it would appear that the 
concept of the PSSA does not provide any additional legal authority for the adoption 
of measures that are not already available under other instruments.  This conclusion 
would appear to be confirmed by the preamble to the Guidelines which say that the 
Guidelines should be “implemented in accordance with international law.”181   
The procedures for the designation of PSSAs are important means for ensuring 
that all interests are taken into account in deciding whether or not such action should 
be taken.  The Guidelines themselves specify that their aim is to “ensure that … all 
interests – those of the coastal state, flag state, and the environmental and shipping 
communities – are thoroughly considered…”
182  
                                                                                                                                            
the fact that designation can be sought for an area which already has protective measures applied to it; 
see para. 7.2. 
176 Revised Guidelines, at para. 7.5.4.  See also paras. 6.1-6.2. 
177 Revised Guidelines, at para. 8.2. 
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180 Revised Guidelines, at para. 7.5.3. 
181 Revised Guidelines, at preamble.  See also para. 9.2. 
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The two distinct processes involved in designating a PPSA and associated 
protective measures are highlighted by paragraph 7.10 which require the proposing 
state to “submit a separate proposal to the appropriate sub-committee to obtain 
approval of any new associated protective measure.”
183  However, the two processes 
are inter-connected as a PSSA will only be designated “in principle” until the 
associated protective measures have been approved.184  On this view, the PSSA 
provides “a managerial framework from which to develop appropriate protective 
measures related to both shipping and non-shipping activities that can be taken at 
either the national or the international level.”
185   
The first two areas which were designated as PSSAs did not challenge this 
view of the concept.  Since the Guidelines were revised in 2001, many more 
applications have been submitted.  Calls for increased powers for coastal states in 
areas of environmental sensitivity have led to allegations that the concept of the PSSA 
is being used to undermine the jurisdictional framework in the LOS Convention.  
Subsequent discussions over which areas should be designated as PSSAs and what 
measures should be applied therein have raised heated discussions over the legality of 
extending compulsory navigational measures beyond the territorial sea.  Two case 
studies will be considered in order to assess these arguments. 
The first case study is the proposal for compulsory pilotage in the Torres Strait 
by Australia and Papua New Guinea.  These states made this proposal as part of their 
application to extend the pre-existing Great Barrier Reef PSSA to include the Torres 
Strait.186  In order to protect the vulnerable marine ecosystem in the strait, these two 
countries proposed a recommended two-way shipping route through the strait and the 
extension of the compulsory pilotage system that operated in the existing PSSA, 
replacing the system of recommended pilotage that already had previously been 
adopted for the strait.187 As the area proposed for designation fell within an 
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international strait, the associated protective measures were to be addressed in the 
context of Part III of the Convention.188 
The first proposed measure was uncontroversial as it fell squarely within the 
ambit of Article 41 which allows strait states to apply sea-lanes and traffic separation 
schemes in international straits with the approval of the IMO.  However, compulsory 
pilotage does not feature in Article 41 and the legal basis for such a measure was 
questioned by several states.189  Australia and Papua New Guinea argued that the LOS 
Convention did not prohibit the establishment of compulsory pilotage schemes in 
such areas.190  Opponents, on the other hand, said that the right of unimpeded transit 
passage was one of the most critical freedoms in the LOS Convention and they feared 
that failure to comply with the scheme may lead to the strait states imposing sanctions 
on transiting vessels.191  Others thought that the introduction of compulsory pilotage 
per se was an impediment of the right to transit passage and therefore incompatible 
with the LOS Convention.192   
Given the polarisation of views, the IMO Legal Committee was unable to 
reach a conclusion on the legality of compulsory pilotage in straits used for 
international navigation.193  Yet, when the Marine Environment Protection Committee 
and the Maritime Safety Committee came to consider the application, they were able 
to agree on language that left the precise legal implications of the measures 
ambiguous.  The Marine Environment Protection Committee agreed to extend the 
existing system of pilotage within the Great Barrier Reef to the Torres Strait without 
specifying that it is compulsory.194  At the same time, the United States and others 
stressed that they only supported the measure if it was interpreted as a 
recommendation.195  The correct interpretation of this resolution is controversial.196  
What is clear is that the current resolution does not provide a satisfactory solution for 
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shipping interests who need a degree of certainty over whether or not the measures are 
mandatory.   
Although Article 41 makes no mention of compulsory pilotage, it is not 
completely clear that such measures are not authorised thereunder.  It may be argued 
that pilotage is sufficiently similar to the measures which are anticipated in Article 41 
that they are impliedly allowed under the Convention.  Even if this interpretative 
approach is not accepted, it would be difficult to object to a compulsory pilotage 
scheme if it had been adopted by consensus at the IMO.  The IMO includes all 
interested states and its competence over navigational measures is recognised by the 
LOS Convention itself.  It is submitted that a consensus decision could possible 
modify the jurisdictional framework in the Convention.  Precedents for such an 
approach have been discussed in the context of the Meetings of the States Parties.197  
It follows that the only safe way for a strait state to enforce such measures is with the 
consensus backing of the international community. In the current scenario, consensus 
is lacking and the precise status of those measures applied in the Torres Strait is left in 
limbo.  As Roberts concludes, “any attempt by Australia to take enforcement action 
against, or refuse entry to, any ships that fails (sic.) to carry a pilot may well result in 
a legal challenge by the flag state of that vessel.”
198   
Similar tensions can be seen in the proposal for a ship reporting system in the 
Western European Waters PSSA.  “Ship reporting” refers to a system which requires 
a ship to report its name, position and related information to the coastal state when it 
enters a certain jurisdictional zone.  Again, ship reporting is not expressly envisaged 
by the LOS Convention.  The concept was first developed by Chapter V of the 
SOLAS Convention.199  Under these provisions, states wishing to develop ship 
reporting systems, whether mandatory or not, are required to take into account the 
guidelines of and criteria developed by the Organization.200  However, it is not clear 
from the regulation to which maritime zone states can apply mandatory ship reporting 
systems, nor whether states are required to submit such proposals to the IMO for 
approval or not. In the opinion of one study, ship reporting systems and vessel traffic 
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services are “at present both tied in principle to the territorial sea concept, even 
though nothing seems to prevent [SRS] from sometimes extending beyond.”
201  Yet, as 
Plant notes, “it is … difficult to envisage any IMO authorization of … [ships’ 
reporting systems] extending beyond territorial waters that would not involve some 
effect upon the navigation/environmental protection balance in those waters affected 
in the Convention.”
202  Such measures could possibly fall under Article 211(6)(c) if 
they are authorized by the IMO if the conditions therein are satisfied. 
In the case of the Western European Waters PSSA, the applicant states 
proposed inter alia an obligation for certain tankers to report to the coastal state 
authorities at least 48 hours before entering the PSSA.203 Whether or not the 
application was based on Regulation V/11 or on Article 211(6) of the LOS 
Convention is unclear.  In any case, it was opposed by several states as the size of the 
proposed PSSA covered a large proportion of the territorial seas and the EEZs of the 
proposing states, including several major shipping routes.  In presenting their 
objections, Russia, Panama and Liberia, supported by private shipping interests, 
stressed that “if such a large and diverse area of the ocean is designated a PSSA and 
associated measures restricting navigation are applicable to foreign vessels in the 
region, there is a danger of the exception becoming the norm and the fundamental 
principles of [the LOS Convention] being undermined.”
204  In the opinion of these 
states, the designation of the Western European Waters PSSA and its associated 
protective measures did not adequately balance ecological interests with the interests 
of commercial navigation.205  Another concern of these states was that the measure 
would be used to detain vessels which had not complied with the reporting obligation.  
They argued in the IMO Legal Committee that “if the intention of the proposed 
reporting obligation is to refuse certain ships that are in compliance with 
international rules and standards from entering or navigating in the PSSA, then that 
would be in contravention of the fundamental provisions of [the LOS 
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206  The fundamental provision that is indicated is probably the right of 
freedom of navigation found, inter alia, in Article 58 of the LOS Convention.  In its 
submission, DOALOS agreed that any attempt to arrest a vessel for failing to comply 
with a ships’ reporting system in the EEZ would be incompatible with the LOS 
Convention, but that it did not agree that this was the intention of the proposal.207  In 
the course of the discussion, the applicant states made an undertaking that the 
reporting requirement would not be used to prohibit entry into the PSSA.208  The final 
resolution approving the ships’ reporting system is ambiguous as to precisely what 
enforcement action a coastal state may take, providing that “all means will be used to 
obtain the full participation of ships required to submit reports [and] if reports are 
not submitted … information will be passed on to the relevant flag state authorities 
for investigation and possible prosecution.
”209     
From the perspective of legislative jurisdiction, the DOALAS paper suggested 
that by adopting Regulation V/11 of the SOLAS Convention, states had implicitly 
agreed that a reporting obligation simpliciter does not offend the principle of freedom 
of navigation.210  This interpretation assumes that Regulation V/11 allows mandatory 
ship reporting systems to be applied to the EEZ which, as it was suggested above, is 
unclear from the text alone.  Yet, it seems that by adopting the ship reporting scheme 
for Western European Waters, IMO members have indeed implicitly accepted that 
Regulation V/11 can be applied to the EEZ and that such an extension of coastal state 
prescriptive jurisdiction is acceptable in these circumstances.   
The debate over these proposals illustrates that although the IMO is a technical 
forum, legal perplexities that go to the heart of the jurisdictional regime can be raised.  
It should be remembered that the IMO Legal Committee was first created to deal with 
difficult legal issues that arose following the sinking of the Torrey Canyon off the 
coast of the United Kingdom in March 1967.211  The adoption of the 1969 
                                                 
206 IMO Document LEG 87/16/1, at para. 12. 
207 For support of this view, see Comments made by the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the 
Sea of the United Nations (DOALOS) in connection with issues raised in document LEG 87/16/1, IMO 
Document LEG 87/WP.3, at p. 2. 
208 See IMO Document LEG 87/17, at para. 200. 
209 IMO Resolution MSC.190(79), at para. 9. 
210 IMO Document LEG 87/WP.3, at p. 2. 
211 See Balkin, "The Establishment and Work of the IMO Legal Committee", in Current Maritime 
Issues and the International Maritime Organization, ed. Nordquist and Moore (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 199) at pp. 291 – 308. 
 
 157 
Intervention Convention provides an early precedent of the IMO tackling questions of 
maritime jurisdiction.212 
It has been seen how the IMO is used as a forum in which to clarify the 
balance between the interests of coastal states and maritime states on a case-by-case 
basis.  Many of the legal issues raised by applications for PSSA status concern the 
authority to adopt associated protective measures rather than the actual legal basis for 
the PSSA itself.  The revised Guidelines adopted in December 2005 clarify that 
proposed associated protective measures should have a secure legal basis.213  This 
change places the burden firmly on the proposing state to demonstrate that such 
measures are available, at the same time as confirming that compulsory measures 
cannot be taken by the coastal state without the explicit approval of the IMO.  In this 
context, the ability of the IMO to forge consensus will be of continuing importance in 
defining the precise scope of the jurisdictional framework for the law of the sea.  
Ultimately, where there is truly a desire for change to the jurisdictional framework, it 
is through such discussions in the IMO and similar technical institutions that a 
consensus will be forthcoming. 
This approach has advantages over invoking the formal amendment 
procedures in the LOS Convention.  Firstly, the IMO possesses an expertise and 
experience in maritime and navigational issues that the Meeting of the States Parties 
does not have.  Secondly, the formal amendment procedures risk fragmentation of the 
legal framework, whereas the use of consensus decisions in the IMO promotes unity 
and certainty in the law of the sea.  Finally, the use of consensus decision allows 
changes to be made quickly, without the need to wait for an instrument to come into 
force.  Therefore, the IMO has the ability to play a significant role in clarifying and 
developing the legal order of the oceans. 
 
8. Regulation of the International Seabed Area 
Although the presence of minerals on the deep seabed was first discovered in 
1873, it was not until the second-half of the twentieth century that their exploitation 
                                                 
212 See Blanco-Bazan, "IMO Interface with the Law of the Sea Convention",  at p. 270. 
213 See the Revised Guidelines, in particular, paras. 6.1.3 and 7.5.2.3. 
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became technologically feasible.214  The regulation of deep seabed mining was a topic 
that was addressed for the first time by delegates gathering at UNCLOS III.  The aim 
of the Conference was to agree “an equitable international regime – including an 
international machinery – for the area and the resources of the seabed and the ocean 
floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”215  It was 
also to take into account the Declaration of Principles governing the Seabed and the 
Ocean Floor adopted by the General Assembly in 1970.  The 1970 Declaration 
established that the International Seabed Area was the common heritage of mankind 
and “shall not the subject to appropriation by any means by States or persons, 
natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign 
rights over any part thereof.”
216  Moreover, any activity in the Area “shall be carried 
out for the benefit of mankind as a whole.”
217  Putting these revolutionary principles 
into practice required the creation of innovative forms of international co-operation 
and governance.  It was generally accepted that a new international organization was 
necessary for this purpose, although the precise form and powers of any institutional 
mechanisms were the subject of intense debate and disagreement.   
As with other areas, it was not intended that the LOS Convention should 
include a comprehensive legal code covering all aspects of regulation.  The proposed 
regime would permit the progressive adoption and amendment of standards for seabed 
mining, allowing a flexible approach.  However, there was disagreement over the 
extent of the discretion to be wielded by any institutions created for this purpose.  
Industrialised countries were adamant that the decision-making procedure of the 
proposed institution “fairly reflects and effectively protects the political and economic 
interests and financial contributions of participating states.”
218  This was one of the 
issues that caused the failure to achieve consensus at UNCLOS III.219  A compromise 
was eventually reached through extended negotiations leading to the adoption of the 
Part XI Agreement in 1994.220  
                                                 
214 For an introduction, see Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea  at pp. 223-224. 
215 General Assembly Resolution 2750C (XXV), 1970, at para. 2. 
216 General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV), 1970, at para. 2. 
217 General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV), 1970, at para. 7. 
218 United States, Department of State, “Law of the Sea”, Current Policy No. 371, January-February 
1982, cited by Larson, "The Reagan Rejection of the U.N. Convention", (1985) 14 Ocean Development 
and International Law at footnote 13. 
219 See chapter two, at p. 35. 
220 See chapter four, at p. 97 ff. 
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The constituent instrument of the so-called International Seabed Authority221 
is found in Part XI of the LOS Convention, as modified by the Part XI Agreement.  
The Authority came into existence on 16 November 1994, the same day that the LOS 
Convention entered into force.  It is this organization which is responsible for 
standard setting in relation to deep seabed mining and to ensure that such activities are 
carried out in accordance with the principle of the common heritage of mankind.  The 
Authority is an autonomous international organization with its own secretariat and 
separate legal personality.222  It has its headquarters in Jamaica where its organs meet 
to conduct the business of regulating deep seabed mining.  States Parties to the LOS 
Convention are ipso facto Members of the Authority.223 
According to the LOS Convention, the primary function of the Authority is 
organising, carrying out and controlling activities in the Area.224  This role includes 
both setting the detailed standards that should be complied with by deep seabed 
mining companies, as well as supervising the implementation of these standards and 
the general provisions of Part XI.225   
The Authority has a power to adopt a variety of rules, regulations and 
procedures related to the administration of the Area in order to fill in any gaps in the 
legal framework.  The range of rules that the Authority can develop is relatively wide, 
covering the financial management and internal administration of the organization, as 
well as the technical conditions for prospecting, exploration, and exploitation of 
polymetallic nodules and other deep sea mineral resources.226  Specific mention is 
made of regulations relating to the prevention and control of pollution, the protection 
and conservation of natural resources in the Area227, the protection of human life228, 
                                                 
221 Hereinafter, referred to as “the Authority”. 
222 LOS Convention, Articles 156 and 176, 
223 Initial membership of the Authority was wider given that states which had signed the Part XI 
Agreement or who had consented to its adoption in the General Assembly were eligible for provisional 
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first Legal and Technical Commission.  All provisional membership expired on 16 November 1998. 
224 LOS Convention, Article 153.  The Area is defined as “the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”; LOS Convention, Article 1(1)(1). 
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Part XI Agreement, Annex, Section 2. 
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at least as effective as the rules adopted by the Authority.  See also Article 214. 
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and the erection, emplacement or removal of installations for the purpose of pursuing 
mining activities in the Area.229   
Article 153 of the Convention stipulates that all activities in the Area shall be 
carried out in accordance with inter alia the rules, regulations and procedures adopted 
by the Authority.230  Thus, decisions of the Authority are legally binding on Member 
States without any need for further acceptance or approval and whether or not an 
individual Member State has consented.   
In addition to binding Member States, the rules and regulations adopted by the 
Authority are also directly binding on investors by way of exploration or exploitation 
contracts concluded with the Authority.231  The standard clauses for contracts to 
explore the Area for polymetallic nodules are contained in an annex232 to the 
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area. 
They clearly stipulate that “the Contractor shall carry out exploration within the 
terms and conditions of the contract, the Regulations, Part XI of the Convention, the 
Agreement and other rules of international law not incompatible with the 
Convention.”
233  Article 209(2) of the Convention also requires states to adopt laws 
and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution in the Area by any vessels 
flying their flag or other installations operating under their authority which are “no 
less effective than” the standards adopted by the Authority.  This rule of reference 
also makes standards directly binding on States Parties without their specific consent.  
It would appear from this short analysis that the Authority has a quasi-
legislative function as it can adopt measures that are automatically binding on states 
and investors.  There is no need for subsequent acceptance of standards.  Rather than 
formal provisions on entry into force, it is the process of adopting rules, regulations 
and standards that seeks to safeguard the interests of all states and other actors. 
   
9. Standard Setting by the International Seabed Authority 
In order to safeguard the interests of all states, the power of the Authority to 
adopt rules, regulations and procedures are subjected to a specific and sometimes 
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complex decision-making procedure.  This power is divided between three organs of 
the Authority: the Legal and Technical Commission, the Council and the Assembly.   
It is only Members of the Authority who possess voting rights and the ability 
to propose candidates to serve on its organs.  Yet, provision is also made for the 
participation of non-parties in the deliberations of the Authority. The internal rules of 
procedure of the Authority clarify rights of participation in the organization.  Rule 82 
of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly permits all states which are not Members 
to take part in the deliberations of the Assembly as observers.  They have speaking 
rights but they may not vote.  To date, forty-three states have registered as observers 
and many of them actively participate in meetings of the Assembly.  Other 
international organizations and NGOs have more limited rights of participation.234  
Similar participation rights apply to meeting of the Council.235  These participation 
rights allow all interests to be represented in the decision-making process.     
The standard setting process starts with the Legal and Technical Commission, 
a group of independent experts, elected by the Council.236  It is the role of the 
Commission to consider the technical aspects of the regulations and to draft proposals 
for further consideration by the Council.237 
The Council is the “executive” organ of the Authority238 and it consists of 
thirty-six representatives of the Member States, elected every four years by the 
Assembly.239  Which states would have a seat on the Council and how it would make 
decisions was the subject of intense discussion during the consultations leading to the 
Part XI Agreement.240  The composition of the Council is finely balanced to guarantee 
that all the major interest groups, such as consumers of minerals, land-based 
                                                 
234 Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, Rule 83(3)-(6). 
235 Rules of Procedure of the Council, Rule 75.  According to Rule 74, any member of the Authority 
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producers of minerals, and developing countries, are represented.241  The composition 
is significant, not only for participation in debates, but also for the voting 
procedures.242 
In practice, the composition of the Council is also subject to a detailed 
political compromise; the agreed allocation of seats in the Council is ten seats to the 
African Group, nine seats to the Asian Group, eight seats to the Western European 
Group, seven seats to the Latin American and Caribbean Group, and three seats to the 
Eastern European Group.243  As this adds up to thirty-seven and the official total of 
seats on the Council is thirty-six, it is agreed that each regional group other than the 
Eastern European Group will relinquish a seat in rotation.244   
The Part XI Agreement promotes consensus decision-making for all organs.245  
It provides that the Council may defer the taking of a decision in order to facilitate 
further negotiation whenever it appears that all efforts at achieving consensus have 
not been exhausted.246  In the absence of consensus, the adoption of decisions by the 
Council is subject to a qualified majority vote.  For voting purposes, the Council is 
divided into four chambers247 and it is necessary that a majority of all the chambers 
support a proposal in order for it to be approved.248  In addition, the Council must 
“seek to promote the interests of all members of the Authority”
249, although whether 
this creates a legal obligation is open to question.   
A stricter decision-making procedure applies to the adoption of binding rules 
and regulations.  Under Article 161(8)(d) of the LOS Convention, the Council must 
adopt any rules or regulations by “consensus”.  The use of the terms consensus, in 
this context, is confusing, as it has a different meaning to consensus as understood in 
the context of UNCLOS III or other organs of the Authority.  In these cases, the task 
of facilitating consensus was given to the chair of the committees and there was 
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always the threat of a majority vote if consensus could not be achieved.250  However, 
in the context of adopting rules and regulations through the Council, Article 161(8)(e) 
defines consensus as “the absence of any formal objection.”251  This would appear to 
be closer to unanimity than consensus, as no alternative decision-making process 
exists.  The Convention does set out a conciliation procedure that can be invoked by 
the President of the Council in order to reconcile the differing views of members.  
According to this procedure, a committee of nine members, with the President as 
chair, is mandated to produce a proposal that will be acceptable to all members.  If it 
cannot reach agreement, the committee shall report the grounds on which a proposal 
is being opposed.  Whilst this procedure aims to facilitate consensus, it does not avoid 
the need for all members of the Council to agree, or at least to fail to object.  Thus, it 
appears that the Council, when adopting rules, regulations and procedures, must reach 
agreement by unanimity and each member of the Council effectively holds a veto.    
Once the proposed regulations are agreed by the Council, they are sent to the 
Assembly for final approval.  A two-thirds majority of the Assembly is necessary in 
order to approve the proposal from the Council, although it will first attempt to 
achieve consensus on the issue.252   
Any rules, regulations or procedures adopted by the Council are provisionally 
valid, pending the approval of the Assembly.  If the Assembly does not approve the 
regulations adopted by the Council, they will remain provisionally valid until 
amended by the Council in light of the views of the Assembly.253  There is no time-
limit by which the Council must re-evaluate the regulations rejected by the Assembly. 
If the Council fails to reconsider its decision, for whatever reason, the rules, 
regulations and procedures adopted by it continue to be binding.  Thus, the role of the 
Assembly, the most democratic of the organs, is very limited.  In practice, however, it 
is unlikely that investors will want to sign contracts incorporating rules and 
regulations which have not been agreed by the Assembly.  Legal certainty demands 
that rules are in fact approved by the Assembly before they are applied to investors. 
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The adoption of the first set of regulations on prospecting and exploration for 
polymetallic nodules254 further illustrates the centrality of the Council in the decision-
making process.  The regulations were drafted by the Legal and Technical 
Commission between 1997 and 1998 and then sent to the Council for discussion.  The 
draft regulations were scrutinised by the Council over several successive sessions, 
where amendments and drafting changes were made before the regulations were 
provisionally adopted by the Council on 13 July 2000.255  The regulations were 
authoritatively adopted by the Assembly on the same day following a short debate.256  
As can be seen, the Assembly had very little input into the decision-making process, 
merely confirming what had been previously agreed by the thirty-six members of the 
Council.  However, when discussing the draft regulations, the Council met in informal 
sessions which were open to all interested members of the Authority.  Therefore, the 
interests of other states not directly represented on the Council could be taken into 
account at an earlier stage in the law-making process.   
The composition of the Council is designed to ensure that all interests are 
taken into account in the decision-making process.  Moreover, the requirement of 
“consensus” means that none of these interests can be overridden.  These mechanisms 
therefore guarantee that the rules and regulations adopted by the Authority are in fact 
generally accepted.   
Non-binding instruments are also used by the Authority to develop the 
regulatory framework of deep seabed mining.  Regulation 38 of the Polymetallic 
Regulations confers on the Legal and Technical Commission the power to adopt 
“recommendations of a technical or administrative nature for the guidance of 
contractors to assist them in the implementation of the rules, regulations and 
procedures of the Authority.”  Indeed, several of the regulations, especially those 
dealing with environmental issues, mention that such guidelines will be developed in 
the future.257  The Commission issued its first set of recommendations relating to 
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environmental baseline studies in 2001258, based on the outcomes of a workshop 
convened by the Authority in June 1998.  These recommendations aim to define the 
biological, chemical, geological and physical components to be measured by the 
contractors in order to ensure the effective protection of the marine environment.  
They define the type of data that a contractor should gather in performance of its 
duties under the regulations. They also specify which activities require prior 
environmental impact assessment and monitoring programmes and it specifies some 
of the measurements and observations that the contractor should make both during 
and after performing a specific activity.  Whilst recommendations are, by their very 
nature, non-binding, they represent an important indication of what is expected of 
contractors.  Indeed, the fact that recommendations are drafted and adopted by the 
same body that determines whether contractors are complying with their obligations 
under the Convention could have a significant influence on the decision of a 
contractor to abide by them.  Yet, the procedure for adopting recommendations does 
not involve any input from the political organs of the Authority.  Paragraph 2 of 
Regulation 38 provides that the Council may request that the recommendations be 
withdrawn or modified if it finds that they are inconsistent with the intent and purpose 
of the Regulations.  It is surprising that this is worded as a request and it does not 
make clear whether or not such recommendations will continue to be valid.  
Regardless of their formal status, recommendations that have been rejected by the 
Council will lose much of their persuasive authority. 
   
10. The International Seabed Authority as a Forum for 
Change? 
The ability of the Authority to adopt rules and regulations confers on it a 
powerful tool to develop the legal regime for deep seabed mining.  It provides a 
flexibility in the deep seabed mining regime that allows the international community 
to react to pressing issues and concerns that may not have been foreseen at the time 
that the Convention was drafted.   
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Many of the Regulations adopted to date reproduce what was already 
contained in the Convention or the Part XI Agreement.  Yet, there are also some 
significant innovations, adding further details to the duties of contractors, as well as 
granting powers to certain organs of the Authority which were not foreseen by the 
treaties.  For example, if a contractor, through its activities in the Area, causes or is 
likely to cause serious harm to the marine environment, the Regulations allow the 
Secretary-General of the Authority to take immediate measures to prevent, contain or 
minimise the harm.259  Such measures are provisional and will be effective for no 
longer than ninety days or until the Council has decided what measures it wishes to 
impose.  The measures adopted by the Council may include orders for the suspension 
or adjustment of operations, taking into account the recommendations of the Legal 
and Technical Commission.260  These provisions on protecting the deep seabed 
environment are important developments.  At the time when the Convention was 
drafted, the rich diversity of the deep seabed environment was not fully appreciated 
and it may be that the Authority comes to play a significant role in regulating this 
aspect of deep seabed activities in the future.261 
In order to ensure the effective regulation of deep seabed activities, it may be 
necessary for modifications to be made to the regulatory framework. The Authority 
also plays a central role in making such changes.   
Modifying the rules and regulations is relatively straightforward.  There is no 
special procedure for adopting amendments to the regulations and ordinary procedure 
for the adoption of regulations will apply.  The Legal and Technical Commission is 
mandated to keep regulations under review and propose changes to the Council.262  It 
is important to note that the rights of existing contractors are safeguarded because any 
modifications to the regulations will not be applicable to existing contracts of work.  
It is necessary to negotiate changes to existing contracts on a case-by-case basis 
Section 24.2 of the current standard terms of contract provides that a contract “may 
also be revised by agreement between the Contractor and the Authority to facilitate 
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the application of any rules, regulations and procedures adopted by the Authority 
subsequent to the entry into force of this contract.”  The contractor therefore retains a 
strong position in negotiations and it cannot be forced to accept an amendment against 
its will. 
Making changes to the provisions of Part XI itself is more problematic.  Like 
all forms of international organizations, the Authority is subject to constraints 
imposed by its constituent instrument in accordance with the concept of ultra vires.  
This concept was described by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in the Tadic Case in relation to the Security Council: “the Security 
Council is an organ of an international organization established by treaty which 
serves as a constitutional framework for that organization.  The Security Council is 
thus subjected to certain constitutional limitations, however broad its powers under 
the constitution may be.”
263   
As noted above, Part XI provides the constituent instrument of the Authority.  
The Part XI Agreement specifies that the Authority must act “in accordance with 
Part XI and with this Agreement.”
264  The Authority has those powers conferred on it 
by the Convention and the Agreement, as well as any “incidental powers … as are 
implicit in, and necessary for, the exercise of those powers and functions with respect 
to activities in the Area.”
265  At all times, the Authority must act consistently with the 
Convention and the Agreement.   
It is to these instruments that we must first look in order to determine the 
process of making changes to the legal regime.  The amendment procedure for Part XI 
is set out in Article 314 of the Convention.  According to this procedure, the 
Authority is the forum for the adoption of amendments.  Any Member of the 
Authority can propose amendments by submitting a written communication to the 
Secretary-General of the Authority who shall in turn circulate the proposal to all other 
Member States.  The proposed amendment is then subject to the approval of the 
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Assembly and the Council, the latter acting by “consensus”.266  There appears to be no 
formal role for the Legal and Technical Commission under this procedure, although in 
practice it is likely that the Commission would be asked to proffer advice to the other 
organs.   
Following adoption of the proposal by these two organs, there is a second 
stage that must be completed before the amendments enter into force.  According to 
Article 316(5) of the Convention, an amendment to Part XI shall enter into force for 
all States Parties one year after the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession 
by three-fourths of the States Parties.  This provision is notable in that amendments 
that have been accepted by three-fourths of the membership become binding on all the 
Parties.  There is no opportunity for an objecting state to prevent the application of the 
amendment to itself, short of denouncing the Convention.267  However, acceptance by 
over three-fourths of Member States is a higher threshold than that required for 
amendments to other parts of the Convention.  It is likely to make the amendment 
procedure a slow process.  
The question arises whether modifications to Part XI of the Convention can be 
made through other mechanisms other than the formal amendment procedures?  In 
academic writing and state practice, there is some support for the proposition that the 
practice of international organizations can modify the constituent instrument itself.268 
As Klabbers notes, there is but a fine line between a formal amendment and a 
collective decision to engage in a certain practice unforeseen in the constituent 
document.269  In the Certain Expenses Advisory Opinion, the ICJ took into account 
institutional practice when deciding whether the funding for peace-keeping activities 
of the United Nations fell with the “expenses of the Organization” for the purposes of 
Article 17(2) of the UN Charter.270  The Court stressed that there is no procedure in 
the structure of the United Nations to determine the validity of a given act and “each 
organ must, in the first place at least, determine its own jurisdiction.”
271  It continued, 
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“when the Organization takes action which warrants the assertion that it was 
appropriate for the fulfilment of one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the 
presumption is that such action is not ultra vires the Organization.”
272   
The proceedings of the Preparatory Commission for the LOS Convention also 
illustrate that in spite of formal limitations on the powers of an institution, states are 
willing to adopt a flexible attitude to the question of modifications.  The Commission 
was created by Resolution I adopted at UNCLOS III.  Its constituent instrument made 
it clear that any action taken by the Commission must be in conformity with the 
provisions of the Convention.273  Nevertheless, states participating in the Preparatory 
Commission were pragmatic and they used it as the forum in which to seek further 
compromises on an acceptable multilateral regime for deep seabed mining.  One can 
only conclude that some of the decisions of the Preparatory Commission had the 
effect of modifying the terms of Resolution II, which is an integral part of the 
Convention.  For instance, the so-called New York Understanding, adopted 
unanimously by the Commission in September 1986, extended the time-limit within 
which a minimum investment must be made by pioneer investors from developing 
countries.  The date was postponed from 1 January 1985 to the date on which the LOS 
Convention entered into force.  Whilst this is a purely technical change which was 
made for practical purposes, the Understanding also made more substantive 
alterations, allowing pioneer investors to specify the part of the seabed that they shall 
be allocated.274  Another decision of the Preparatory Commission, known as the 
Understanding on the Fulfilment of Obligations by the Registered Pioneer Investors 
and their Certifying States made adjustments to the regime foreseen by Resolution II, 
including the waiver of the $1 million annual fee for investors. 
Such questions are not only of theoretical value.  Although deep seabed 
mining is not yet a reality, the Authority is nevertheless faced with a change in the 
circumstances prevailing at the time that Part XI was negotiated.  The text of Part XI 
as it stands is premised upon the mining of polymetallic nodules which, when 
UNCLOS III opened, were the only type of mineral resource known to exist in the 
                                                 
272 Ibid., at p. 168. 
273 See Resolution I, contained in the Final Act of UNCLOS III. 
274 See Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea  at pp. 236-238. 
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deep seas.  However, our understanding of the oceans is continuously expanding275 
and with it, the regulatory challenges that the Authority must meet. One example is 
the treatment of polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich crusts, two types of deep sea 
minerals that were only discovered during the closing stages of UNCLOS III.  This 
type of resource differs enormously from polymetallic nodules as they are found on 
the side of underwater mountains, rather than on flat abysmal plains.   
It is the exploration of polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich crusts that is the 
focus of the Authority’s current standard setting activities.  Yet, drafting regulations 
for these types of deposits raises very different issues to polymetallic nodules.  The 
drafting process has prompted difficult questions over the extent to which the 
regulations must conform to the provisions of the LOS Convention and the Part XI 
Agreement.  The issue has been summarized by the Secretary-General of the 
Authority as follows:276 
The basic formal elements of the regulations would be the same as that for polymetallic 
nodules.  However, because of the localised nature of the deposits there will be differences 
relating inter alia to the size of the area allocated for exploration under the contract, the size 
of the eventual exploitation area and the system for participation by the Authority either 
through the application of the parallel system which may not always be practical in this case, 
or other form of participation, such as equity participation, as well as environmental 
regulations appropriate to the unique environment in which these deposits are found. 
 
In a paper outlining the considerations to be taken into account when drafting 
regulations for these minerals, the Secretariat noted that the size of areas to be 
allocated under the LOS Convention is not appropriate for polymetallic sulphides and 
cobalt-rich crusts and that the anti-monopoly provisions contained in Annex III of the 
Convention also cannot be applied without difficulty.277  The draft regulations 
prepared by the Secretariat foresee a system of equity participation by the Authority 
in lieu of the site-banking system.278  
There are admitted difficulties in agreeing a regulatory regime in this field 
because of the lack of available scientific knowledge and, as the Secretary General 
                                                 
275 The Census of Marine Life is an ongoing research project which aims to map ocean life throughout 
the world.  In May 2006, a research cruise taking part in the project reported finding several new 
species, including forms of plankton and fish.  See Richard Black, Deep Ocean Trawl Nets New 
“Bugs”, BBC News, 04 May 2006, available at news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/sci/tech/4973249.stm 
<checked 25 May 2006>. 
276 Nandan, Administering the Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed, (2005) SLS/BIICL Symposium 
on the Law of the Sea at pp. 18-19. 
277 Document ISBA/7/C/2, at paras. 19 and 22. 
278 Document  ISBA/7/C/2, at para. 24. 
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noted in his report to the ninth session of the Authority, “the objective should be to 
progressively develop a regulatory regime as prospecting and exploration activities 
take place and better knowledge of the resources and the environment in which they 
occur is gained.”
279  On the face of it, such changes would require an amendment of 
the Convention and the Part XI Agreement which lay down in detail certain 
conditions that any regulations must meet.  For instance, Article 8 of Annex III of the 
LOS Convention places an obligation on contractors to specify an area sufficiently 
large to accommodate two mining operations, one by the contractor and one reserved 
for the Authority itself.  This parallel system of mining was central to the compromise 
reached at the UNCLOS III and it was maintained, albeit with minor changes, in the 
Part XI Agreement.280     
To what extent could modifications to these provisions be made without 
formal amendments?  The discussions within the Authority to date have not 
contemplated the adoption of amendments.  Key to the successful adoption of a 
decision at variance with the constituent instrument of an organization is the amount 
of support that it has amongst the membership. If a decision is adopted by consensus, 
it is difficult to see whether objections could later be raised.  Where the decision of 
the organ conflicts with the text of the treaty, it may be that nothing short of 
consensus will suffice.281 
It has already been seen that the procedure for adopting rules, regulations and 
procedures under the Part XI Agreement promotes consensus within the Authority.  
The adoption of regulations by the Council requires consensus and the Assembly 
should also attempt to reach a consensus where possible.  There remains the 
possibility, nevertheless, that a decision may be adopted by a majority vote of the 
Assembly.  In such a situation, can a dissenting state claim that the decision was ultra 
vires?  There are several options open to such a state.    
Having a forum to challenge an allegedly ultra vires decision is often an 
obstacle for states who are objecting to a decision. As Klabbers says “in the absence 
                                                 
279 2003 Report of the Secretary-General of the Authority, Document ISBA/9/A/3, at para. 59. 
280 See Part XI Agreement, section 2, para. 5. 
281 See Churchill, "The impact of State Practice on the jurisdictional framework contained in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea", in Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea, ed. Oude 
Elferink (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at p. 97; Boyle, "Further Development of the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention: Mechanisms for Change", (2005)  International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
at p. 567. 
 
 172 
of a well-developed system of judicial review, the ultra-vires doctrine has little chance 
of successful application.”
282  Yet, the LOS Convention does provide a quasi-
comprehensive dispute settlement procedure.  Article 187 provides that the Sea-Bed 
Disputes Chamber of the ITLOS has jurisdiction, inter alia, over disputes between a 
State Party and the Authority concerning acts of the Authority alleged to be in 
violation of Part XI or alleged to be in excess of jurisdiction or a misuse of power.  
Whilst the adoption of ultra vires rules or regulations would prima facie appear to fall 
within this category, a closer examination of the section on the settlement of disputes 
under Part XI casts doubt on whether a state can seek judicial review of rules, 
regulations and procedures adopted by the Authority in abstracto.  Article 189 limits 
the jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber.  It provides that in exercising its 
jurisdiction under Article 187, the Chamber is prevented from deciding whether any 
rules, regulations or procedures adopted by the Authority are in conformity with the 
Convention and from declaring any such instruments invalid.283  It would thus appear 
that the opportunity for judicial review does not exist in relation to the law-making 
powers of the Authority.   
Article 189 is without prejudice to Article 191 which provides the ability for 
the Council or the Authority to request advisory opinions from the Chamber “on legal 
questions arising within the scope of their activities.”  Advisory opinions by their 
nature are not binding.  The Chamber would not be able to strike down any ultra vires 
regulations.  Ultimately, any remedy ultimately lies with the political organs of the 
Authority.   
As with the IMO, there will be no certainty in the legal situation until a 
consensus prevails.  Companies will be unlikely to want to invest in the absence of a 
clear legal regime.  It is therefore important that the Authority provides a standing 
forum in which states can debate and discuss the legal framework applicable to deep 
seabed activities, with the aim of maintaining the consensus that was achieved 
through the Part XI Agreement. 
                                                 
282 Klabbers, An Introduction to International Institutional Law  at p. 242.  Klabbers continues, “the 
only possible remaining defence then is to try to stop an illegal decision from being taken by trying to 
persuade the organization’s other members of its undesirability, but that, typically, is an exercise in 
politics.”  See also Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms  at p. 290; Schermers and Blokker, International 
Institutional Law  at pp. 279-280. 
283 It is limited to deciding whether the application of any rules and regulations in individual cases 
would be in conflict with the contractual obligations of the parties to the dispute or their obligations 





The mandate of technical organizations is primarily to negotiate and adopt 
international standards in their particular field of competence.  Although their 
mandates are technical, most organizations have been faced with difficult legal and 
political questions over the interpretation and development of the LOS Convention.  
Given the lack of any central mechanisms for solving such legal issues, these 
organizations have often assumed the role of a forum in which these general issues on 
the law of the sea can be debated.   
It is interesting to note that such organizations have tended to work towards 
consensus, regardless of their formal decision-making processes.  In this sense, 
participation and decision-making processes of these institutions have come to 
resemble UNCLOS III.  Indeed, given the relative informality of their role under the 
Convention, consensus would seem to be the only way in which decisions of technical 
organizations can legitimately influence the LOS Convention regime.   
A further question that arises is whether the technical organizations can go 
beyond filling in gaps in the Convention to making changes or modifications.  Again, 
it would seem that states have been willing to use whatever fora are available to work 
towards a consensus of the international community as a whole, utilizing technical as 
well as political organizations.  Where consensus decisions have been achieved, there 
is no reason to doubt that they can be seen as modifying the legal framework.   
The decisions, resolutions and standards adopted by technical organizations 
have therefore contributed towards filling in gaps, resolving ambiguities and 
developing the legal framework of the LOS Convention, on a step-by-step basis. 
These negotiations contribute to a continuing crystallisation of the law of the sea.  
Instruments adopted by international organizations are a valuable source of state 
practice, which, as Rothwell says, “provides an additional and most important 
mechanism for the Convention to gradually evolve over time and thereby remain of 
ongoing contemporary relevance.”
284   
                                                 
284 Rothwell, "The impact of state practice of the jurisdictional framework contained in the LOS 
Convention: a commentary", in Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea, ed. Oude Elferink 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), at p. 149. 
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The advantage of developing practice through international organizations is 
that it is possible to reach a collective view over developments in the law. There is 
less risk of fragmentation than through unilateral state practice.  Indeed, international 
organizations are also used in order to scrutinise unilateral practice.  It follows that 
unilateral practice plays a less significant role in the development of the law of the sea 
in the twenty-first century than in previous periods.285   
This analysis raises the possibility of several institutions acting as agents of 
interpretation and modification of the law of the sea framework.  These organizations 
sometimes co-operate in their law-making endeavours and the General Assembly 
plays a central role in encouraging co-ordination.286  However, this is an area of 
weakness in international law.  The General Assembly has stressed the importance of 
improved co-operation and co-ordination between international organizations, funds 
and programmes in the development of the law of the sea.287  Ultimately, however, 
there is no hierarchical framework which dictates a single competent organization for 
a particular issue.  States may exploit these overlaps in the mandate of international 
organizations through a strategy of “regime-shifting”.288  Therefore it is necessary to 





                                                 
285 Boyle, "EU Unilateralism and the Law of the Sea", (2006) 21 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law, at p. 20. 
286 See chapter four, at pp. 94-96. 
287 General Assembly Resolution 60/30, 2005, at para. 104. 
288 See Helfer, "Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of International 




Conflicts of Treaties and the Law of the Sea 
 
 
1. Fragmentation in the Law-Making Process 
Much modern law-making is conducted through the conclusion of treaties.  It 
is the nature of treaties that they have a particular focus, concentrating on a specific 
aspect of international affairs.  As one commentator warns, “chaque traité aurait une 
tendence à se presenter comme constituent à lui seul un univers juridique presque 
complet, une sorte de monde.”
1  This trait is consolidated if one considers that most 
treaties are negotiated within an institution committed to a single issue of 
international law and with few incentives to look beyond its own limited sphere of 
activity. 
Despite their inherent specificity, all treaties belong to a single system of 
international law.2  The definition of treaty in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties acknowledges this connection between treaties and the wider framework of 
international law.3  It follows that “no treaty, however special its subject-matter or 
limited the number of parties, applies in a normative vacuum but refers back to a 
number of general, often unwritten principles of customary international law 
concerning its entry into force, and its interpretation and application.”
4   
The normative environment of a treaty includes not only general international 
law, but also other treaties and other rules of customary international law.  This is 
                                                 
1 Reuter, Introduction au Droit des Traites (Librairie Armand Colin, 1972) at p. 127. 
2 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at p. 
37; International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International 
Law, (2006) UN Document A/CN.4/L.682, at para. 33.  Hereinafter, International Law Commission, 
Fragmentation of International Law.  C.f. Hafner, Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International 
Law (2000) in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-fifth session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/55/10), annex. 
3 “An international agreement concluded by states in written form governed by international law”; 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 2(1)(a). 
4 See Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of International Law: The Function and Scope of the Lex Specialis 
Rule and the Question of Self-Contained Regimes, (2004) at p. 7; paper available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentation_outline.pdf <checked 11 November 2007>. 
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particularly true for the LOS Convention.  There are a multitude of other legal 
instruments which deal with aspects of maritime affairs and the law of the sea.   
The Convention has been described in some quarters as a “framework 
convention”.5  Unlike other framework conventions6, it does not create an 
institutional structure for the conclusion of additional protocols or implementing 
agreements.  Other treaties are concluded in a variety of international institutions or 
ad hoc conferences.  Often these other instruments have no formal relationship with 
the LOS Convention.  They are not strictu sensu “implementing agreements” which 
are adopted to give further detail to a framework treaty.7   Nevertheless, they 
interface with the basic principles of the law of the sea found in the LOS Convention.   
Another label for the LOS Convention is an “umbrella convention”.8  This 
designation merely reflects its overarching character as the instrument which 
provides the background for all other law-making activity in the law of the sea.      
The potential overlap of the LOS Convention with other instruments is 
greater still given that the law of the sea is not a “self-contained” sphere of law that 
can be strictly delimited from other disciplines.9  In the words of one study, 
“denominations such as “trade law” or “environmental law” have no clear 
boundaries.”
10    Whilst being concerned directly with the law of the sea, the LOS 
Convention also touches on inter alia trade, the environment, and human rights.  The 
Swordfish dispute between Chile and the European Communities aptly illustrates the 
interface of the LOS Convention with other international regimes.11  In that dispute, 
Chile denied European fishing vessels access to its ports because it argued that the 
EC had failed in its duty to conserve high seas stocks of swordfish as outlined inter 
alia in Articles 116-119 of the LOS Convention.  The case was brought before the 
                                                 
5 See for instance, Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan) Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (2000) 39 ILM 1359 at para. 51. 
6 See Birnie and Boyle, International Law and the Environment (Oxford University Press, 2002) at pp. 
10-11. C.f. UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. 
7 See chapter four for a discussion of the two instruments that have been designated as implementing 
agreements by the UN, at p. 97 ff.. 
8 See for instance, Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, at para. 51; also IMO Document LEG/MISC/4, 
at p. 3. 
9 See International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, at p. 65 onwards. 
10 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, at para. 55; See also Birnie 
and Boyle, International Law and the Environment, at p. 2. 
11 See Orellana, "The Swordfish Dispute between the EU and Chile at the ITLOS and the WTO", 
(2002) 71 Nordic Journal of International Law 55. 
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ITLOS.  In turn, the EC argued that Chile was obliged under Article V of the GATT 
to grant freedom of transit to European goods.  Thus, parallel dispute settlement 
proceedings were instituted through the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the 
World Trade Organization.  The dispute was provisionally settled before a decision 
was reached on the merits in either forum.  Nevertheless, it demonstrates the dangers 
of institutional fragmentation, as well as the interrelationship between treaties 
dealing with what at first sight appear to be distinct aspects of international law.   
The lack of a single international legislative organ makes it more difficult to 
co-ordinate law-making activities at the international level.  As a result, there is a 
greater risk of states concluding incompatible instruments.  Jenks wrote in 1953 that 
conflict of treaties is one of a number of weaknesses inherent in the development of 
international law.12  The challenge, in his words, is to develop “the multiplicity of 
law-making treaties on every aspect of modern life which constitute the international 
statute book” into “a coherent body of international law.”13  This remains true 
today. 
This chapter addresses those rules and principles which promote the 
achievement of this aim.  International law has no basic hierarchy in the sources of 
law.14  Conflicts of treaties are primarily addressed through priority rules which seek 
to determine which treaty is applicable in the case of a particular conflict.  Such 
priority rules are largely concerned with which treaty provisions are enforceable in 
the context of litigation.  Out-with litigation, they play a secondary role, as there is 
no imminent question of enforceability.  In this scenario, other mechanisms for 
determining which treaty should take priority, such as rules on state responsibility, 
rules on the termination or suspension of treaties, or other institutional mechanisms 
must be considered.  It is only taking into account all of these rules that it is possible 
to appreciate how international law struggles towards coherence. 
   
                                                 
12 Jenks, "The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties", (1953) 30 British Yearbook of International Law at 
p. 416. 
13 Ibid.,   at p. 420. 
14 See Akehurst, "The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law", (1974-5)  British Yearbook of 
International Law at p. 273. 
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2. Priority Rules and Conflicts of Treaties  
Most analyses of conflicts of treaties start with Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention which provides in full: 
 
Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject-matter 
 
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of 
States Parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter shall be determined in 
accordance with the following paragraphs. 
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as 
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail. 
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier 
treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies 
only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the latter treaty. 
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:  
(i) as between States parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;  
(ii) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the 
treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations. 
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the termination or 
suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any question of responsibility 
which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the provisions of 
which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another treaty. 
 
It is clear that Article 30 does not offer one simple rule that applies to all 
conflicts of treaties.  There are several rules which may apply to a treaty conflict 
depending on its particular circumstances.   
In preparing the draft articles on the law of treaties, the special rapporteur 
stressed that conflicts of treaties did not normally raise questions of validity.15  
Rather, priority rules are invoked in order to determine which of the competing 
provisions should prevail in the legal relations between two states.   
                                                 
15 Waldock, "Second Report on the Law of Treaties", (1963 II) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission at p. 53.  In this sense, he distinguished himself from previous special rapporteurs.  See 
for instance, Lauterpacht, "First Report on the Law of Treaties", (1953 II) Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission at p. 156; Fitzmaurice, "Third Report on the Law of Treaties", (1958 II 
) Yearbook of the International Law Commission at p. 44.  Waldock did prescribe invalidity for 
conflicts with jus cogens; see Articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  
See also Article 59 on termination. 
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The central priority rule in Article 30 is the lex posterior principle.16  This 
principle is firmly based in a contractual notion of treaties.  It reflects the idea that 
states can change their minds and that the later expression of intent should prevail.17  
One problem with the lex posterior principle is determining which treaty is later in 
time.18  Most authors agree that the relevant date is the date of adoption.19  However, 
it has also been argued that the date of entry into force is more important for the 
purposes of determining the later treaty.20  Pauwelyn criticises the process of dating 
treaties altogether, arguing that “the fiction of later legislative intent overruling 
earlier legislative intent loses its attraction as soon as the same context – same 
constellation changes.”
21  The rarity of such constellations casts doubt on reliance on 
the later intention of the parties.  This view is supported by the International Law 
Commission in its recent report on the fragmentation of international law, where it 
says that “the straightforward priority of one treaty over another … cannot be 
reasonably assumed on a merely chronological basis” and it has called for “a more 
nuanced approach” to resolving treaty conflicts.22  The ILC continues that “it may 
often be more useful to refer directly to the will of the parties than to the lex 
posterior principle for which, as also noted above, it may simply give expression.”
23 
To some extent, Article 30 permits a flexible approach to resolving treaty 
conflicts.  Lex posterior is not the only priority rule in this article.24  Article 30(2) 
allows the drafters of a treaty some leeway to specify its relationship with other 
treaties.  However, states are limited under this provision to confirming the priority 
of another treaty, whether it is earlier or later.  According to one author, “an explicit 
                                                 
16 International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly", (1966 II)  Yearbook of the International Law Commission at p. 217. 
17 Ibid.,   at p. 217. 
18 See Vierdag, "The Time of the Conclusion of a Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and Related Provisions", (1988) British Yearbook of International 
Law 75. 
19 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester University Press, 1984) at p. 
98; Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2000) at p. 182. 
20 Czaplinski and Danilenko, "Conflicts of Norms in International Law", (1990)  Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law at p. 19.   
21 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, at pp. 368-369 
22 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, at para. 272, and paras. 225-
226.  See also Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms  at p. 370; Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p. 248. 
23 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, at para. 243.  See also para. 
252. 
24 The special treatment of the UN Charter will be discussed below, at pp. 185-187. 
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conflict clause claiming priority over future treaties must anyhow give way to the lex 
posterior principle.”
25   
It is apparent that Article 30 is not without controversy.  There are not many 
authors who accept Article 30 as an authoritative statement of priority rules in 
international law.  It is a common view that “the rules laid down in Article 30 are 
intended to be residuary rules – that is to say, rules which will operate in the absence 
of express treaty provisions regulating priority.”
26
   
An alternative priority rule, suggested by many commentators, is the lex 
specialis principle.  According to this maxim, the more specific treaty provision 
should apply.27  Reuter suggests that lex specialis is implied in Article 30 because 
this provision only deals with two treaties with the same degree of generality.28  
Nevertheless, the concept of speciality or generality is also highly ambiguous.  
Several indicators have been suggested, such as the subject matter and the number of 
contracting parties29, although none are completely satisfactory.   Ultimately the 
principle of lex specialis simply acts as another latin label for the intention of the 
parties, without necessarily shedding any light on how to identify such an intention. 
Sometimes lex specialis and lex posterior will lead to the same conclusion.  
This was the case in the Mavromattis Concessions Case where the PCIJ considered 
the relationship between the Mandate for Palestine conferred on the United Kingdom 
in 1922 and Protocol XII to the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty.  The Court concluded 
that, “in cases of doubt, the Protocol, being a special and more recent agreement, 
should prevail.”
30  Yet, these principles may also suggest contradictory outcomes, in 
                                                 
25 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, at p. 335. 
26 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  at p. 97.  See also Aust, Modern Treaty 
Law and Practice, at p. 174; Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, at p. 263; Boyle and Chinkin, The Making 
of International Law, at p. 252.  The residual character of the rules of priority in Article 30 has most 
recently been supported by the International Law Commission Study Group on the Fragmentation of 
International Law: “ultimately, it was left for the will of States to establish priority among successive 
treaties in accordance with their interests”; International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group 
on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law, (2004) at p. 15, para. 38.     
27 This maxim was applied by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Mavromattis 
Concessions Case as a general principle of law; Mavromattis Palestine Concessions, (1924) PCIJ 
Reports, Series A, No. 2, at p. 31.   
28 Reuter, Introduction au Droit des Traites, at p. 130.  See also International Law Commission, 
Fragmentation of International Law, at para. 64, and footnote 74. 
29 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, at p. 389. 
30 Mavromattis Palestine Concessions, at p. 31.   
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which case the fiction of intention is fully revealed.  The International Law 
Commission concludes that “the question boils down to an assessment of which 
aspect – “speciality” or “temporality” – seems more important in this connection.
”31 
What is more important would appear to depend on the particular context of a 
conflict.  Whilst providing flexibility in the priority rules, this conclusion also leads 
to a lack of certainty in the way in which normative conflict will be solved.  In this 
situation, it is perhaps best to treat the lex posterior principle in Article 30 as a 
presumption which can be rebutted if there is evidence of a contrary intention on the 
part of the contracting parties.   
 
3. Conflicts of Absolute or Reciprocal Obligations 
It is the nature of the priority rules that they determine the applicable law 
between two particular states in the case of a treaty conflict.  This role is stressed by 
Article 30 which differentiates between the situation where the parties to a treaty are 
identical and where they differ.   
Where the parties to the two treaties are identical, the special rapporteur made 
clear that the contracting parties are “fully competent to abrogate or modify the 
earlier treaty which they themselves drew up.”
32   According to Article 30(3), the 
provisions in the later treaty will prevail for all parties.  In practice, however, this 
situation is very rare.   
Most treaty conflicts will therefore be governed by Article 30(4) which 
confirms the validity of both treaties involved in the conflict.  Article 30(4) creates 
two different treaty regimes between the respective parties.33  In the words of one 
commentator, “the purpose of Article 30 is to determine, in the event of competing 
treaties, which one governs the mutual relationship between the contracting 
parties.”
34     
                                                 
31 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, at para. 233. 
32 International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly",  at p. 216. 
33 See Karl, "Conflicts Between Treaties", in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. Bernhardt 
(North-Holland, 1984) at p. 473.  
34 Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties (2003) at p. 72. 
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Two outcomes are possible.  Where two states are party to both of the 
conflicting treaties, the later treaty, as lex posterior, will apply and the earlier treaty 
will not be enforceable between the two states to the extent of the conflict. 
Otherwise, the earlier treaty will continue to apply to those states which are not party 
to the later treaty.   
It is clear that in this case the operation of the lex posterior principle is only 
really appropriate for solving conflicts between treaties of a reciprocal character.  
This type of treaty provides for “a mutual interchange of benefits between the 
parties, with rights and obligations for each involving specific treatment at the hands 
of and towards each of the other individually.”
35  In this scenario, it is possible for a 
state to apply different rules in its relations with two sets of states.   
The situation in the case of treaties containing commitments of an 
“absolute”36 nature is more complex.  It will not be possible to enforce the later 
treaty without also affecting the rights and obligations of states under earlier treaty.37  
In the words of Fitzmaurice, absolute obligations do not lend themselves to 
“differential application”.38 
In this context, the priority rules must also be seen in light of Article 41 of the 
Vienna Convention which covers the relationship between multilateral treaties and 
modifying agreements. This article provides:    
Two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty may conclude an agreement to modify the 
treaty as between themselves alone if: 
(a) the possibility of such a modification is provided for by the treaty; or  
(b) the modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty and:  
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the treaty 
or the performance of their obligations; 
(ii) does not relate to a provision, derogation from which is incompatible with the 
effective execution of the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole. 
 
                                                 
35 Fitzmaurice, "Third Report on the Law of Treaties",  at p. 27. 
36 What Fitzmaurice, as special rapporteur on the law of treaties, called “interdependent” or “integral” 
obligations. 
37 See Reservations to the Genocide Convention Advisory Opinion, (1951) ICJ Reports 15. 
38 Fitzmaurice, "Second Report on the Law of Treaties", (1957 II) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, at p. 55. 
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Article 41 implies that some sorts of modifications are not permitted where 
they may affect obligations of an absolute character.39  The commentary to Article 41 
makes it clear that such agreements that do not meet these conditions will not be 
invalid.40  The principal question is, whether an inter se agreement can be enforced 
between its parties?    
The text of Article 41 is not drafted in terms of priority41 and some 
commentators have concluded that it does not intend to deviate from the priority 
rules found in Article 30.42  According to this view, the inter se agreement, as lex 
posterior, would apply, although the parties to the later agreement may have to make 
reparations for violating the rights of the other parties to the original multilateral 
treaty.43    
On the other hand, some authors interpret Article 41 as a priority rule which 
operates so that the original multilateral treaty will prevail over inter se agreements 
which do not meet the conditions of Article 41.44   As Pauwelyn says “to allow one 
of the parties to enforce the inter se agreement as against another party to the inter 
se agreement would not only be giving effect to an illegal instrument from the point 
of view of both parties, it would constitute, moreover, confirmation of the breach vis-
à-vis third parties, given that the implementation of the inter se agreement 
necessarily breaches the rights of third parties.”
45  According to this view, a court 
should refuse to enforce the inter se agreement in order to protect the rights of 
contracting parties to the original multilateral treaty.   
In addition, Pauwelyn suggests a general application of Article 41 to all 
subsequent agreements.  He asserts that “two multilateral treaty norms stemming 
                                                 
39 Fitzmaurice and Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (2005) at pp. 328-329; 
Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, at p. 306. 
40 International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Report of the Commission 
to the General Assembly",  at p. 217.  Invalidity was reserved for conflicts with jus cogens 
obligations.  See further Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties, at pp. 66-70. 
41 This understanding is confirmed by the fact that Article 41 is found in Part IV of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties which covers the amendment and modification of treaties, rather 
than in Part III which covers the Application and Interpretation of Treaties.   
42 See e.g. Karl, "Conflicts Between Treaties",   at p. 473. 
43 See below, at p. 184. 
44 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, at pp. 310-313. See also Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of 
International Law, at p. 255. 
45 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms, at p. 313. 
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from entirely different contexts could also fall under the scope of Article 41.”
46
  Yet, 
it is submitted that this interpretation is neither supported by the text nor the drafting 
history of Article 41.  According to Article 41, it only applies to agreements 
concluded by “two or more of the parties to a multilateral treaty … as between 
themselves alone”.  As noted by the International Law Commission in its report on 
fragmentation in international law, “during the debates in the ILC on treaty conflict, 
a distinction was made between subsequent agreements between some of the parties 
to modify the application of the treaty in their relations inter se and subsequent 
treaties in which, in addition to parties to the earlier treaty, also other parties 
participated.”
47  According to this view, Article 41 only applies to those inter se 
agreements concluded between a sub-set of the parties to the original multilateral 
treaty.  It is submitted that there are also good policy grounds in support of this 
interpretation.  The difference stems from the fact that in the case of inter se 
agreements between a sub-set of the parties, all parties to the later treaty have 
voluntarily accepted the limitation on their rights and obligations by becoming a 
party to the first treaty.  By refusing to enforce the inter se agreement, a court will 
not affect the rights of any states who are not party to the original multilateral treaty.  
This is not true when there are additional states which are party to modifying treaty 
but not to the original multilateral treaty.  In this situation, not enforcing the later 
treaty will also affect the rights of third states.   
In the case of a later multilateral treaty conflicting with absolute obligations 
in an earlier multilateral treaty, the priority rules are of limited practicality. That is 
not to say that there are no other ways in which treaty conflicts may be settled.  
Where a state cannot comply with two provisions of an absolute nature, Sadat-
Akhavi explains that “the State concerned is free to comply with its obligations 
towards either State, but it has to compensate the other.”
48  An affected state may 
make a claim under the rules of state responsibility demanding reparation from states 
which have violated an obligation owed to it.  In some circumstances, the conclusion 
                                                 
46 Ibid.,  at p. 321. 
47 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, at para. 295. See the 
comments of the special rapporteur; 753rd meeting of the International Law Commission, (1964 I) 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, at p. 197, para. 84.  See also the discussions at the 
754th meeting, at p. 197, paras. 1-88. 
48 Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties, at p. 72. 
 
 185 
of the later treaty may also constitute a material breach of the original treaty, in 
which case it can be invoked by affected states as a ground for termination or 
suspension, as well as reparations.49  More often, solutions to complex treaty 
conflicts may have to be negotiated by political institutions.  In the words of the 
International Law Commission, “conflicts between specialized regimes may be 
overcome by law, even [if] the law may not go much further than require a 
willingness to listen to others, take their points of view into account and to find a 
reasoned resolution at the end.”
50 
   
4. Hierarchy in Treaty Obligations 
One exception to relative priority of treaties is found in Article 30(1) and 
relates to the position of the UN Charter.51  Article 103 of the Charter provides that 
“in the event of conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United 
Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”  
It is generally accepted that the UN Charter has priority over all other international 
agreements, whether concluded before or after the Charter.52   
The scope of Article 103 of the Charter is particularly wide.  In the words of 
one commentator, “there are no exceptions to the obligations under treaty and 
customary law over which Charter obligations prevail, other than jus cogens 
norms.”
53  Article 103 of the Charter prioritises not only the provisions in the Charter 
but also Security Council resolutions.54 Of course, any conflict with the Charter is 
unlikely, although not completely unknown.  In the Lockerbie Case, the UK 
                                                 
49 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 60. 
50 International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, at para. 487. 
51 The concept of jus cogens also reflects a hierarchy. 
52 Nothing is said in the preparatory work over the consequences of priority of the Charter; Simma, 
ed., The Charter of the United Nations : a commentary 2ed., 2 vols., vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 
2002) at p. 1293.  One commentary suggests that Article 103 was intended by its drafters to prioritise 
the Charter over past and subsequent treaties, including treaties with states which are not members of 
the UN; Cot and Pellet, eds., La Charte des Nations Unies - Commentaire article par article, 
(Economica, 1985) at p. 1373.  It is doubtful whether a conflict with the UN Charter leads to 
invalidity.  See Wood, The UN Security Council and International Law, (2006) Hersch Lauterpacht 
Memorial Lectures, Lecture 1, at para. 52. 
53 Wood, The UN Security Council and International Law, Lecture 1, at para. 56. 
54 See UN Charter, Article 25.     
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government argued that Security Council Resolutions 748 and 883 prevailed over the 
rights of Libya under the 1971 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation.  In its defence, Libya argued that the 1971 
Convention was lex posterior and therefore it was the applicable law.  In its order on 
provisional measures, the ICJ rejected this submission, finding that “prima facie 
[Article 25] extends to the decision contained in resolution 748 (1992); and …in 
accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the Parties in that 
respect prevail over their obligations under any other international agreement, 
including the Montreal Convention.”
55    
The absolute priority of the Charter under Article 103 has important 
implications.  Firstly, it is also not necessary to determine whether the Charter 
contains absolute obligations or not.  The Charter has priority regardless.  More 
importantly, Article 103 prioritises the Charter over all other incompatible 
agreements, whether or not non-members are a party to them.56   
Why is the UN Charter given special treatment?  One explanation for the 
priority accorded to the UN Charter is its constitutional status and its central position 
in the international legal system.  For instance, Simma et al. argue that the Charter 
should prevail over treaties with third states “since the Charter presumes or aspires 
to be the ‘constitution’ of the international community accepted by the great majority 
of states.”
57  Fassbender also asserts that the UN Charter is a constitution of the 
international community, citing inter alia the intention to create a new world order, 
and the universality and inclusiveness of the instrument.58   Even self-proclaimed 
sceptics of an international constitutional order accept that Article 103 is the “chief 
constitutional element” of the Charter.59   
                                                 
55 Lockerbie Case (Libya v. United Kingdom) (Provisional Measures) Order of 14 April 1992 (1992) 
ICJ Reports 2, at para. 42.  See also R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWCA 
Civ 327; Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European 
Communities (T-315/01), (2005) 2005 European Court Reports Page II-03649.  
56 See Simma, ed., The Charter of the United Nations : a commentary, at p. 1298.  As membership of 
the UN increases, this characteristic decreases in importance. 
57 Ibid.,  at p. 1295. 
58 Fassbender, "The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community", (1998) 
36 Colombia Journal of Transnational Law, at pp. 573-584. 
59 Wood, The UN Security Council and International Law, Lecture 1, at para. 17. 
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The Charter therefore challenges the contractual nature of international law, 
suggesting a limited hierarchy of treaties. Whilst many commentators vigorously 
dismiss any notion of international constitutionalism, hierarchy is not necessarily a 
new phenomenon in international law.  Some commentators have argued that Article 
103 of the UN Charter is simply a reflection of the so-called hierarchic principle 
which can be traced back to international law of the nineteenth century.60   
What are the implications of the hierarchic principle for modern international 
law?  Jenks concludes his discussion of the hierarchic principle by asking whether 
“certain other instruments may perhaps be regarded, on account of their intrinsic 
character and the degree of acceptance which they have secured, as being similar in 
legal status to the Charter?”
61  It is probably not possible nor advisable to lay down 
a strict test as to what characteristics a treaty must possess to qualify as “lex 
superior”.  Nevertheless, widespread acceptance by the international community and 
aspirations to universality are two important criteria.  Whether or not other treaties 
can meet this standard is a question that must be considered on a case-by-case basis 
taking into account the text of the treaty, the context of its conclusion and related 
state practice. 
   
5. The LOS Convention and Conflicts of Treaties 
How do these principles apply to the law of the sea?  It is permissible to 
conclude subsequent treaties that are incompatible with the LOS Convention?  Will 
such treaties be enforceable? 
The starting place for any discussion of the relationship between the 
Convention and other treaties is the text of the Convention itself.  How did the 
drafters intend to regulate this relationship?  As Sadat-Akhavi notes, conflict clauses 
                                                 
60 Jenks, "The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties",   at pp. 436-437.  See also Covenant of the League 
of Nations, Article 20.  See Lauterpacht, "The Convenant as Higher Law", (1936) British Yearbook of 
International Law 54. 
61 Jenks, "The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties",  at p. 439.  He continues “the General Treaty for the 
Renunciation of War of 27 August 1928 would appear to be in this category, and any treaty involving 
a violation of it may reasonably be regarded as invalid because of the illegality of its object”. This 
conclusion on invalidity may be doubted given the subsequent work of the International Law 
Commission on this subject.   
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appear not only as articles in a treaty, but also as preambular statements and in 
appendices to treaties.62  There are several provisions of the LOS Convention which 
are relevant to its relationship with other treaties and sources of law. 
The primary conflict clause is found in Article 311.  This is a complex 
provision which covers a variety of scenarios which shall be considered in turn.  
Article 311(1) provides:  
1. This Convention shall prevail, as between States Parties, over the Geneva Conventions on 
the Law of the Sea of 29 April 1958.   
 
This provision deals solely with the relationship between the LOS 
Convention and the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea.  Compared to 
the other paragraphs of this provision, the interpretation of Article 311(1) is 
relatively straightforward.  As UNCLOS III was convened as a direct result of 
dissatisfaction with the previous codifications of the law of the sea, it is not 
surprising that the Convention assumes priority over these treaties.  Moreover, this is 
no more than an application of the lex posterior principle.   
As a matter of strict treaty law, the 1958 Conventions will continue to apply 
to those states which are parties to those Conventions but which have not consented 
to be bound by the LOS Convention.  This simplistic conclusion does not, however, 
take into account the impact of the LOS Convention on the customary international 
law of the sea.  In the Gulf of Maine Case, the ICJ held that custom based on the 
LOS Convention rather than the 1958 Conventions provided the applicable legal 
framework for maritime boundary delimitations.63  Therefore it is possible to 
conclude that the 1958 Conventions have largely been rendered redundant through 
desuetude.64   
Article 311(2) is more general in scope.  It provides: 
2. This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from 
other agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment by 
                                                 
62 Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties, at pp. 85-86. 
63 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (US v. Canada), (1984) ICJ 
Reports 246 at para. 124; See also UK-French Continental Shelf Case, (1977) 54 International Law 
Reports at p. 47. 
64 On desuetude, see Akehurst, "The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law",  at p. 275. 
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other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this 
Convention. 
 
Some authors have attempted to argue that this provision should be 
interpreted contrario sensu and that it therefore provides for the priority of the LOS 
Convention over other treaties.65  On its ordinary meaning, however, Article 311(2) 
does not expressly deal with situations of conflict or incompatibility at all.  Thus, 
Orrego Vicuña argues that it “necessarily reflects the situation in which the 
compatibility between the two treaties has not been affected by the relationship to the 
rights and obligations concerned … to the extent that the provision of those other 
agreements might be incompatible with the new Convention, any conflict will be 
resolved according to the general rules of the Law of Treaties.”
66   
It is possible to shed light on the interpretation of Article 311(2) by reference 
to its drafting history.  According to the travaux préparatiores, this provision was 
initially intended to deal with the relationship between the Convention as the general 
law of the sea and the technical treaty law in this field.67  The Virginia Commentary 
explains that “one of the major problems which [the Conference] had to face was 
that the restructuring of the general law of the sea embodied in the new Convention 
is not and cannot easily be matched by a parallel restructuring of the detailed and 
often highly technical and politically delicate conventional law relevant to the law of 
the sea or to maritime and related matters.”
68   In this sense, Article 311(2) is seen 
as an interpretative principle to ensure that technical rules and standards that were 
promulgated under the old law of the sea regime continue to be applied in light of the 
new legal framework.69   
                                                 
65 Fitzmaurice and Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties  at p. 334.  The Virginia 
Commentary is more cautious, simply suggesting that paragraph 2 “can be taken to imply a measure 
of priority for the 1982 Convention in the sense that it provides a yardstick against which the 
compatibility of those other agreements is to be measured.”; Rosenne and Sohn, eds., United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary, 5 vols., vol. 5 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1989) at p. 243. 
66 Orrego Vicuña, "The Law of the Sea Experience and the Corpus of International Law: Effects and 
Interrelationships", in The Developing Order of the Oceans, ed. Krueger and Riesenfeld (The Law of 
the Sea Institute, 1984) at p. 8.   
67 Rosenne and Sohn, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary,  
at p. 238.  There was some discussion over whether a conflict clause was necessary.   
68 Ibid.,  at p. 238.  See also Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
The Eighth Session (1979)", (1980) 74 American Journal of International Law at p. 36. 
69 See also International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law, at para. 268. 
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From the text, it is clear that Article 311(2) is not limited to agreements 
concluded before the LOS Convention.70  Nevertheless, all it would appear to require 
is that any agreements concerning the law of the sea should be interpreted as far as 
possible in the context of the legal framework of the Convention.  It does not provide 
a direction on how to solve conflicts if they do arise. 
This interpretation would also appear to be supported by the limited case law 
that there is in this area.  The La Bretagne Arbitration between France and Canada 
concerned the interpretation of a 1972 Agreement which gave certain fishing vessels 
flying the French flag access to fish stocks in Canadian waters.  The dispute was 
whether Canada could regulate the filleting of fish by French vessels in the Gulf of St 
Lawrence.  To a degree, the answer turned on the interpretation of the term “fishery 
regulation” in the 1972 Agreement.  The Tribunal had stressed that the 1972 
Agreement was a bilateral treaty that struck a bargain between the two states 
involved.  However, the Tribunal also had to address the impact of the LOS 
Convention on the 1972 Agreement.  Both parties to the dispute agreed that an 
interpretation of the 1972 Agreement should take into account the subsequent 
development of the law by the LOS Convention, whilst differing on the outcome of 
such an approach. The Tribunal held that “even if the [LOS Convention] at present 
regulated relations between the two parties, the Tribunal notes that it would not 
impair the validity of the relations established by the 1972 Agreement, because of the 
clause in Article 311(2).”
71  The decision must be treated with some care as the LOS 
Convention was not in force at that time.  Nevertheless, the Tribunal appears to be 
suggesting no more than that the 1972 Agreement continued to govern the 
relationship between the two parties as it did not fundamentally clash with the new 
principles on the law of international fisheries set out in the LOS Convention.   
In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, the Tribunal invoked Article 
311(2) to support the view that the Convention was still applicable between the 
                                                 
70 Rosenne and Sohn, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary,  
at p. 241. 
71  La Bretagne (France v. Canada), (1986) 82 International Law Reports 590 at para. 51. 
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parties and it had not been displaced by the 1993 Convention on the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna.72   
From this analysis, it would appear that Article 311(2) does not provide a 
conflict clause at all.  Rather it seeks to promote a harmonious interpretation and 
application of the Convention with other treaties on the law of the sea.   
Articles 311(3) and (4) deal with subsequent agreements modifying or 
suspending the operation of the Convention: 
3. Two or more States Parties may conclude agreements modifying or suspending the 
operation of provisions of this Convention, applicable solely to the relations between them, 
provided that such agreements do not relate to a provision derogation from which is 
incompatible with the effective execution of the object and purpose of this Convention, and 
provided further that such agreements shall not affect the application of the basic principles 
embodied herein, and that the provisions of such agreements do not affect the enjoyment by 
other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this 
Convention. 
4. States Parties intending to conclude an agreement referred to in paragraph 3 shall notify 
the other States Parties through the depositary of this Convention of their intention to 
conclude the agreement and of the modification of suspension for which it provides. 
 
It has been suggested that these Articles were largely inspired by Article 41 
of the Vienna Convention.73  Certainly, the two sets of provisions have similarities.    
Article 311(3) repeats the two conditions for the lawful conclusion of inter se 
agreements found in Article 41 of the Vienna Convention.  In addition, it provides 
that an inter se agreement must not conflict with the basic principles of the LOS 
Convention, although Freestone and Elferink argue that this third condition adds 
little if anything to what was already covered by the other two conditions.74   
If the effect of these two sets of provisions is the same, it would follow that 
inter se agreements which do not satisfy the conditions of Article 311(3) may not be 
enforced by the parties to them.  As Boyle explains “the implication of Article 311(3) 
                                                 
72 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, at para 52. 
73 Rosenne and Sohn, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary,  
at p. 243: “paragraphs 3 and 4 deal in standard manner with inter se modifications, closely following 
the provisions of article 41 of the Vienna Convention of 1969.”  These paragraphs also deal with inter 
se suspensions, as in Article 58 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
74 Freestone and Elferink, "Strengthening the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea's 
regime through the adoption of implementing agreements, the practice of international organisations 
and other means", at p. 181. Indeed, several commentators argue that the two conditions in Article 
41(b) also overlap; e.g. Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties, at p. 58. 
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is that drafters of the [LOS Convention] sought to limit the right of parties to 
derogate from the Convention in later agreements.  The assumption is that, in the 
event of the kind of conflict envisaged in Article 311 arising, [the LOS Convention] 
will prevail over a later treaty dealing with the same subject matter, notwithstanding 
the lex posterior rule.”
75  According to this view, this Article seeks to rebut the 
presumption of lex posterior in the case of conflicts. 
Rosenne goes further, suggesting that Article 311(3) is not simply a priority 
clause but that it could invalidate an inter se agreement because of its very precise 
wording.76  Rosenne argues that acting under his/her powers under the Convention, 
the UN Secretary General could set in motion “a process by which breach of article 
311 could be established and the later treaty found to be void because of a specific 
provision to that effect in the Convention.”
77  This latter argument is difficult to 
accept.  Given the relative rarity of invalidity as a sanction in international law, it 
should not be accepted without solid textual support.  It is suggested that such 
support cannot be found in Article 311 which makes no reference to invalidity.   
It is accepted that Article 311(3) provides a limited priority to the LOS 
Convention.  Whether or not a subsequent treaty is enforceable will therefore depend 
on whether it satisfies the conditions in Article 311(3).  Yet, clarifying the scope of 
these conditions is not straightforward.78   
It is clear that states may not contract out of some provisions of the 
Convention because they constitute “basic principles of the Convention” or they 
reflect one of its objects or purposes.  In other words, some of the provisions of the 
Convention may be of an absolute character.  Obligations to protect the marine 
environment or to conserve fish stocks are possible candidates as they are owed to all 
states collectively.   
At the same time, it is clear that Article 311(3) does not confer absolute 
priority on all of the provisions in the LOS Convention.  Some provisions may be 
                                                 
75 Boyle, "Further Development of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention",  at p. 577.  See also Boyle 
and Chinkin, The Making of International Law at p. 255. 
76 Rosenne, Breach of Treaty (Grotius Publications, 1985) at p. 93. 
77 Ibid.,  at p. 92. 
78 See the comments of Oxman in a slightly different context; Oxman, "The Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979)",  at p. 35. 
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modified through subsequent inter se agreements provided that such modifications 
do not purport to affect third states.  Indeed, many treaties do contract out of general 
principles found in the Convention.  Several treaties have been concluded to further 
international co-operation in the fight against crime and terrorism.  For instance, the 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances aims to promote international co-operation to address various aspects of 
illicit traffic in drugs, including trafficking by sea.  Article 17 encourages co-
operation between states by inter alia requesting authorization from the flag state to 
interdict ships suspected of engaging in illicit traffic.79  The 2005 Protocol of the 
SUA Convention also affects the high seas freedoms of the contracting parties to that 
instrument by allowing high seas interdiction by states other than the flag state if 
certain conditions are met.80  These treaties clearly have the potential to interfere 
with freedom of navigation on the high seas81 yet they both include provisions which 
stress their inter se character.  Thus, the 2005 SUA Protocol provides that “nothing 
in this Convention shall affect in any way the rules of international law pertaining to 
the competence of States to exercise investigative or enforcement jurisdiction on 
board ships not flying their flag.”
82 A similar provision is found in the UN Drugs 
Convention.83  It is therefore made clear that these treaties do not seek to modify the 
general jurisdictional framework of the LOS Convention or undermine the principle 
of freedom of navigation for third states.   
What types of treaties are captured by Article 311(3)?  Does it apply to all 
other treaties conflicting with the LOS Convention?  If it is inspired by Article 41 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it would follow that it would not be 
applicable to other general multilateral treaties of a general law-making nature.84  
Yet, there may be arguments that support the priority of the Convention over all 
                                                 
79 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
Article 17(3). 
80 2005 SUA Protocol, Article 8bis. 
81 The principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction in Article 92 of the LOS Convention provides that 
it is subject to “exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties”, thus foreseeing 
some inter se modifications. 
82 2005 SUA Protocol, Article 9. 
83 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 
Article 17(1).  Paragraph 11 further provides that “any action taken in accordance with this article 
shall take due account of the need not to interfere with or affect the rights and obligations and the 
exercise of jurisdiction of coastal states in accordance with the international law of the sea.” 
84 See above, at pp. 182-185. 
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other treaties.  Certainly, Article 311(3) of the LOS Convention uses different 
language to Article 41 of the Vienna Convention and therefore it does not follow that 
the two provisions necessarily have an identical scope.  The fact that the Convention 
is largely accepted as customary international law by the international community 
may also permit a wider application of this priority rule to any agreement conflicting 
with object and purpose or the basic principles of the Convention.  After all, most 
states have consented to the basic principles in the LOS Convention.  Furthermore, 
the LOS Convention has several outstanding characteristics which stress its central 
importance to the modern international legal system.  It is a treaty that was 
negotiated by the international community as a whole which is intended to have 
universal application.  Much of the Convention sets out principles of a 
“constitutional” character, such as those provisions specifying the maritime 
jurisdiction of states.85  Applying other treaties over and above the Convention would 
undermine the compromise achieved by the international community and the delicate 
balance of interests inherent therein.   
Signs of the importance attached to the LOS Convention are also found in 
successive General Assembly resolutions on the law of the sea.  Although not legally 
binding, these resolutions provide pertinent evidence of the attitude of the 
international community and arguably qualify as practice in the implementation of 
the Convention.  For the purposes of defining the relationship between the LOS 
Convention and other treaties, General Assembly resolutions demonstrate the 
ongoing support of the international community for the LOS Convention.  
Resolutions on the law of the sea regularly confirm that the Convention is intended 
to provide “the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas 
must be carried out.”
86  The General Assembly has also repeatedly underlined the 
universal and unified character of the Convention.  The use of such terminology 
implies that the Convention should not prima facie be set aside in favour of a 
conflicting treaty, whether or not that other treaty includes third states.  In order 
                                                 
85 See Scott, "The LOS Convention as a Constitutional Regime for the Oceans", in Stability and 
Change in the Law of the Sea: The Role of the LOS Convention, ed. Oude Elferink (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2005). 
86 General Assembly Resolution 60/30, 2005, preamble and para. 4. 
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words, it is sometimes appropriate to apply the hierarchic principle to the LOS 
Convention because of its “intrinsic character and the degree of acceptance”.87   
The Convention does not, however, benefit from a general application of the 
hierarchic principle.  Article 311(5) brings attention to the fact that other treaties may 
be afforded express priority over the LOS Convention.  It provides:    
5. This article does not affect international agreements expressly permitted or preserved by 
other articles of this Convention. 
 
The list of agreements expressly permitted or preserved throughout the 
Convention is extensive. The Virginia Commentary on the Convention counts at 
least seventy articles containing a reference to other sources of international law.88  
One special conflict clause is found in Article 301 which provides: 
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, States Parties 
shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of 
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
This provision promotes compatibility between the LOS Convention and the 
UN Charter.  It does not directly correlate with Article 103 of the Charter as it does 
not confer priority to the Charter as a whole or any measures adopted thereunder.  
Nevertheless, it is sufficiently broad to capture most such measures.  It would 
presumably include Security Council resolutions as these are required to be in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Organization.89  Thus, the fifteen members of the 
Security Council would be able to modify the law of the sea for all states, although 
this is a power that they should clearly use with care, for fear of upsetting the 
consensus of the international community reflected in the LOS Convention.   
A new applicable law clause was introduced in the negotiation of the Part XI 
Agreement which adapted the deep seabed regime to reflect a more free market 
philosophy.  The Agreement incorporates the relevant provisions of the WTO.90  At 
                                                 
87 See Jenks, cited above, at p. 187. 
88 Rosenne and Sohn, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary, 
at p. 423.   
89 UN Charter, Article 24(2). 
90 Part XI Agreement, Section 6, at para. 1(b). 
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the same time, it makes clear that “the principles contained in paragraph 1 shall not 
affect the rights and obligations under any provision of the agreements referred to in 
paragraph 1(b), as well as the relevant free trade and customs union agreements, in 
relations between States Parties which are parties to such agreements.”
91
  Thus it 
confers a limited priority on the WTO covered agreements for the purposes of Part 
XI of the Convention.   
 
6. Dispute Settlement and Treaty Conflicts 
Priority clauses are primarily invoked in the context of litigation in order to 
guide the court on the applicable law.  Therefore, it is significant that a third-party 
procedure is available in the case of a treaty conflict involving the LOS Convention.  
Most disputes under the Convention will be subject to compulsory adjudication in 
accordance with Part XV of the Convention.   
Article 293 defines the applicable law for a court or tribunal acting under Part 
XV.  It provides that courts and tribunals deciding disputes under the Convention 
may apply both the Convention and “other rules of international law not 
incompatible with this Convention.”
92  It appears from this provision that courts and 
tribunals are limited in the law that they can apply.   
Whether or not a treaty is compatible with the LOS Convention must be 
partly determined with reference to the substantive conflicts clauses described above.  
Nevertheless, this provision seems to confirm that the LOS Convention will take 
priority over conflicting treaties unless the conflicting treaty is permitted by the 
Convention.  In practice, many deviations are permitted.  Nevertheless, Article 293 
                                                 
91 Part XI Agreement, Section 6, at para. 2.  See also Boyle, "Further Development of the 1982 Law of 
the Sea Convention", at p. 582. 
92 Article 293(2) continues that ‘paragraph 1 does not prejudice the power of the court or tribunal 
having jurisdiction under this section to decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties so agree’.  
Deciding a case on the basis of equity, however, fundamentally alters the role of a court or tribunal 
which is no longer involved in developing the Convention on the basis of legal principles, but of 
settling the dispute according to concepts of fairness.  In this sense, such a role is more akin to the 
alternative dispute settlement procedures that states may choose under section 1 of Part XV. 
 
 197 
partly acts as a conflict clause, conferring priority on the LOS Convention over other 
sources of law that are incompatible with it.93     
This conclusion must, however, be treated with care.  As noted above, one 
important factor to be taken into account in solving conflicts of treaties is the 
intention of the parties.  Courts and tribunals acting under Part XV should not lose 
sight of this consideration in determining the applicable law in a law of the sea 
dispute.  Although Article 293 promotes the general priority of the Convention, there 
may be occasions when it is appropriate to set it aside if an instrument has been 
adopted by a consensus of the international community as a whole with the intention 
of modifying the general law of the sea.  This thesis has demonstrated several 
occasions in which states have deemed to modify the law of the sea framework 
through informal decisions or implementing agreements.  For instance, the Part XI 
Agreement clearly modifies the LOS Convention.  However, according to a strict 
interpretation of Article 293 of the LOS Convention, it would not be applicable law.  
Thus, Blazkiewicz concludes that “the current wording of Article 293 may prima 
facie hamper the role of the development and administration of international law of 
the sea by judicial bodies having jurisdiction under the LOS Convention.”  He 
continues, “judicial bodies must recognize these new norms, as they are binding 
between states, even if they are incompatible with the Convention.”
94   
In practice, it is inconceivable that a court or tribunal would not apply the 
Part XI Agreement, whether or not a state was actually a party to that treaty.  Other 
instruments which may be incompatible with the LOS Convention but have been 
adopted by consensus must be treated in a similar fashion.  By applying such 
instruments, a court would be doing no more than recognizing the powers of states 
under general international law to interpret and modify a treaty through subsequent 
practice.95  In this sense, the priority of the Convention should not be seen as fixed 
                                                 
93 See Rosenne and Sohn, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 - A 
Commentary,  at p. 73.  See also Bartels, International Law in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, 
(2005) BIICL Fifth Annual WTO Conference; Klein, Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2005) at p. 58; Rosenne and Sohn, eds., United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary,  at p. 73.   
94 Blazkiewicz, "Commentary", in Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: the Role of the LOS 
Convention, ed. Oude Elferink (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005) at p. 160. 
95 In the Namibia Advisory Opinion, the ICJ accepted that institutional practice could modify the UN 
Charter, in spite of Article 103. 
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and it can evolve as emerging priorities become evident through the activities of 
international institutions and state practice. 
There may not always be an opportunity to bring an issue before a court or 
tribunal. Thus the question of enforceability of treaties does not directly arise.  
Nevertheless, it is important to know which treaty prevails in order to promote 
certainty in the applicable law.  In this situation, solutions to a treaty conflict may be 
pursued through international institutions.  Institutions can be used as a forum in 
which states can co-operate on solutions to conflicting rules and standards.  
Discussions can taken place over the balance to be reached on a case-by-case basis as 
conflicts arise.  The General Assembly, as a universal forum with a wide 
competence, may be an appropriate forum in which all of the relevant issues can be 
raised. 
 
7. Conflict Clauses in other Treaties 
Conflict clauses in other treaties may provide additional guidance on how 
potential incompatibilities may be solved.  These are important guides of whether or 
not states intended to modify the universal law of the sea by concluding a conflicting 
instrument.  Thus, the Part XI Agreement is clear that it is intended to replace certain 
provisions of the deep seabed mining regime found in the LOS Convention.96   
On other occasions, treaty conflict clauses reveal a recognition of the 
importance attached to the LOS Convention and the fact that the parties did not 
intend to change the applicable law.  The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 
provides one pertinent example.  This treaty was concluded at the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development and it constitutes an important instrument in the field 
of international environmental law.  The Convention is open to all states97 and it 
currently has 190 contracting parties.98  The objective of the Convention is the 
conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the 
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic 
                                                 
96 See chapter four, at p. 97 ff.. 
97 Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 35. 
98 See http://www.biodiv.org/world/parties.asp <checked 15 May 2007>. 
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resources.99  The Convention applies to the components of biodiversity found in the 
national jurisdiction of contracting parties, including any areas of maritime 
jurisdiction.100  It also extends to processes and activities carried out under the 
jurisdiction or control of a contracting party beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction.101  It therefore covers ships operating on the high seas, as well as 
activities in the International Seabed Area carried out under the auspices of a State 
Party.   
Prima facie, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the LOS Convention 
seem to pursue complementary objectives.102  The LOS Convention itself introduced 
important obligations to protect the marine environment.  The Convention on 
Biological Diversity generally promotes this aim, as well as introducing several more 
specific concepts such as the precautionary principle and the ecosystem approach 
which are not included in the LOS Convention.  The singular focus of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity may mean that it prioritises factors that would 
otherwise be given more careful consideration as part of the balance of interests in 
the LOS Convention.  In the words of one study, “fundamental differences relate to 
the underlying philosophies of the Conventions and their respective focus and 
structure.”
103 
From the perspective of the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 
consequences of any conflicts, unlikely as they are, are governed by Article 22.  
Paragraph 2 of this provision says that “Contracting Parties shall implement this 
Convention with respect to the marine environment consistently with the rights and 
obligations of States under the law of the sea”.  This is a special conflict clause 
which governs the relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity and 
the LOS Convention.104  It does not refer to priority but it does require the 
Convention on Biological Diversity to be applied consistently with the international 
                                                 
99 Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 1. 
100 Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 4(1). 
101 Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 4(2). 
102 Subsidiary Body on Scientific Technical and Technological Advice, Marine and Coastal 
Biodiversity: Review, Further Elaboration and Refinement of the Programme of Work (Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 2003) at p. 27, para. 107. 
103 Wolfrum and Matz, cited by Fitzmaurice and Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties, at 
p. 333. 
104 See Boyle, "Further Development of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention",  at pp. 578-580. 
 
 200 
law of the sea.105  By implication, the drafters of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity did not intend to alter the balance of rights and obligations in the LOS 
Convention.  Any tension between these two treaties should be solved through 
synergetic interpretation.  At the same time, the new provisions on the protection of 
biodiversity cannot be invoked to undermine rights pertaining to states under the 
LOS Convention.   
Another instrument worthy of comment is the 2001 Convention on the 
Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage.  This agreement was negotiated 
under the auspices of UNESCO with the aim of codifying and progressively 
developing the rules relating to the protection and preservation of underwater cultural 
heritage.  The annex to the 2001 Convention contains a series of rules concerning 
activities directed at underwater cultural heritage.  The Convention also prescribes 
which states may take measures to protect underwater cultural heritage and therefore 
it has the potential to affect the jurisdictional framework in the LOS Convention.   
Article 7 covers the protection of underwater cultural heritage in internal 
waters, archipelagic waters and the territorial sea, requiring states to apply the rules 
in the annex.  Article 8 says that states may “regulate and authorize activities 
directed at underwater cultural heritage in their contiguous zone” in accordance 
with Article 303(2) of the LOS Convention.  Therefore, it does no more than confirm 
the LOS Convention provisions.  Articles 9 and 10 cover underwater cultural 
heritage on the continental shelf or in the EEZ.  It confirms that a state may “prohibit 
or authorize any activity directed at such heritage to prevent interference with its 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction as provided for by international law.”
106    The 
reference to international law arguably includes the LOS Convention.  However, it 
continues to designate the coastal state as a “co-ordinating state” which may take all 
practicable measures … and if necessary prior to consultations, to prevent any 
immediate danger to the underwater cultural heritage, whether arising from human 
activities or any other cause, including looting.”
107  It does not specify what 
measures may be deemed necessary but it is possible that such measures could 
                                                 
105 Fitzmaurice and Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties, at p. 333.   
106 Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention, Article 10(2). 
107 Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention, Article 10(4). 
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interfere with the rights of other states within the EEZ.  Any such actions could be 
deemed to be incompatible with the LOS Convention, yet the 2001 Convention 
provides that “nothing in this Convention shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and 
duties of States under international law, including the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea.  This Convention shall be interpreted and applied in the context 
of and in a manner consistent with international law, including the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.”
108  Whilst seeking to improve the protection of 
underwater cultural heritage, it is apparent that the 2001 Convention was not 
intended to modify the general law of the sea.109  Inconsistencies may arise, but the 
2001 Convention makes it clear that it cannot be invoked to justify interferences with 
rights under the LOS Convention. 
It can seen that treaties which have an obvious overlap with the law of the sea 
often include a provision to govern their relationship with the LOS Convention.  It is 
noticeable that most of these treaties do not cite the LOS Convention itself, but refer 
to the “international law of the sea.”  This phrasing indicates a recognition that the 
law of the sea is a subject of customary international law.  Thus, the conflict clauses 
also apply to states which are not party to the LOS Convention.   
Another treaty with important implications for the law of the sea is the 1959 
Antarctic Treaty.  Its interaction with the law of the sea is complex and the following 
analysis can do no more than raise some of the principal problems involved.  The 
primary purpose of the Antarctic Treaty is to advance the peaceful use of 
Antarctica110 and freedom of scientific investigation on the continent.111  It does so 
by encouraging co-operation and information exchange.112  The Treaty itself is often 
claimed to create an objective regime so that it has implications for non-parties.113 
The Treaty applies to the area lying south of the 60° south latitude114, much 
of which is ocean. The drafters of the Treaty were aware of the implications for the 
                                                 
108 Underwater Cultural Heritage Convention, Article 3.  See also Article 10(6). 
109 It may be that this was the intention of some states in negotiating the Convention which was not 
adopted by consensus and was the subject of some controversy. 
110 Antarctic Treaty, Article I. 
111 Antarctic Treaty, Article II. 
112 Obligations to cooperate or consult appear throughout the treaty; see Antarctic Treaty, Articles II, 
III, IV, VII and XI. 
113 See chapter three, at p. 48.  This claim is, needless to say, controversial.   
114 Antarctic Treaty, Article VI. 
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law of the sea.   Article 6 provides that “nothing in the present treaty shall in any 
way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any states under international 
law with regard to the high seas within that area.”  In analysing this provision, it 
should be remembered that it was drafted before the conclusion of the LOS 
Convention.115  Most states claimed a territorial sea but at that time, the majority of 
the Southern Ocean would have been high seas.  It confirms that large parts of the 
Treaty area should be subject to the general law of the sea.   
How much of the Treaty area is high seas is today controversial. The concept 
of the EEZ has come into existence and the legal character of the continental shelf 
has developed through the negotiations at UNCLOS III.  Coastal states can today 
claim sovereign rights and jurisdiction over much larger areas of sea than in 1959.  
Yet, Article 4(2) of the Antarctic Treaty prohibits the assertion of a “new claim or an 
enlargement of an existing claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.”  Whether 
or not this covers the creation of new maritime zones is much disputed.116  Several 
states do claim an EEZ or an extended continental shelf in their Antarctic territories, 
although they are contested by other states.117  The rights or wrongs of these 
arguments largely depends on an interpretation of the Antarctic Treaty itself.   
If the prohibition on new claims did include claims of maritime jurisdiction, it 
would appear that the Antarctic Treaty seeks to modify the general legal framework 
of maritime jurisdiction, creating a sui generis regime applicable to this area.118  On 
this interpretation, it would appear that the rights of coastal states in the area covered 
by the Antarctic Treaty are much more limited than under the LOS Convention as 
they cannot claim an EEZ or continental shelf.   
                                                 
115 See T. Scovazzi, "The Antarctic Treaty System and the New Law of the Sea: Selected Issues", in 
International Law for Antarctica, ed. F. Francioni and T. Scovazzi (Kluwer Law International, 1996) 
at p. 386. 
116 Kaye and Rothwell, “Southern Ocean Boundaries and Maritime Claims: Another Antarctic 
Challenge for the Law of the Sea?”, in (2002) 33 Ocean Development and International Law, at pp. 
379-380. 
117 Australia, Chile and Argentina claim an EEZ in their Antarctic territories.   
118 This position would appear to be confirmed by the practice of states in relation to submissions to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Outer Continental Shelf.  See for instance, the reaction to the 
claim by Australia in its submission to the Commission.  See the Note from the Permanent Mission of 
Australia accompanying the lodgement of Australia’s submission to the Commission.  For a discussion 
of the complexities of this relationship, see Watts, International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System 
(Cambridge University Press, 1992) at pp. 156-163. 
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This example serves to underline that the solution of treaty conflicts cannot 
be solved by the application of general principles in abstracto and that context is all 
important.   
   
8. Conclusion 
Conflicts of treaties is a complex area of international law.  It is difficult to 
determine any absolute hierarchy in the absence of universal legislative, 
administrative or judicial organs.  Recourse to pragmatism and ad hoc solutions 
reflects the reality of the international legal system.  Whilst some general principles 
do exist, it is often a matter of taking into account the particular context of a conflict 
in order to achieve a solution.   
Many conflict clauses point towards mutual accommodation of treaties.  The 
International Law Commission states, “such formulations do imply a willingness to 
acknowledge the existence of parallel and potentially conflicting treaty obligations. 
But they fall short of indicating clearly what should be done in case conflicts emerge. 
Instead, recourse is to compromise formulas that push, as it were, the resolution of 
problems to the future.”
119  In this case, it is important that political institutions are 
available in which solutions to treaty conflicts can be worked out on a case-by-case 
basis.  These institutions can take into account a variety of factors in order to 
determine the priority of treaties.   
In the case of the LOS Convention, however, courts and tribunals may play a 
valuable role in maintaining its integrity.  They are aided by the general 
acknowledgement that this instrument provides a universal and unified framework 
for the law of the sea. It follows that conflicting treaties which seek to modify the 
basic principles of the law of the sea will generally be unenforceable unless there is a 
clear indication that a modification to the settlement found in the Convention is 
intended by the international community as a whole.  This is a high threshold to 
meet.  Yet, the priority of treaties is ultimately a question of context and no absolute 
hierarchies can be assumed. 
                                                 




Judicial Development of the LOS Convention 
 
1. Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea 
Courts and tribunals have a long and distinguished history of settling disputes 
over the law of the sea.  In doing so, judicial institutions such as the Permanent Court 
of International Justice and the International Court of Justice, as well as ad hoc 
arbitral tribunals, have contributed to the formation of a comprehensive and 
organised body of rules in this field1, as well as to other general issues of 
international law.2     
In the past, the contribution of courts has largely been through determining 
the content of the customary international law of the sea.  The conclusion of the LOS 
Convention potentially changes the role that judges will play.  For the first time, 
there is a comprehensive treaty instrument on the law of the sea.  Yet, courts and 
tribunals will still play a significant role in settling ocean disputes as adjudication is 
given a prominent place amongst the dispute settlement provisions in Part XV of the 
Convention.  The inclusion of compulsory dispute settlement in a treaty of the 
complexity of the LOS Convention was a landmark achievement, differentiating it 
from the 1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea.3  Not only are courts and tribunals 
important means for the peaceful settlement of disputes, they may also contribute to 
the stability of the law of the sea by promoting the uniform interpretation and 
implementation of the Convention.  For many states, compulsory dispute settlement 
was seen as a quid pro quo to the achievement of the package deal.4  According to 
                                                 
1 Oda, "The International Court of Justice and the Settlement of Ocean Disputes", (1993) 244 Recueil 
des Cours at p. 127. 
2 For example, in deciding the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, the ICJ made a significant 
contribution to clarifying the relationship between treaties and customary international law, as well as 
the law on delimitation of the continental shelf; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, (1969) ICJ 
Reports 3.  Similarly, in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, the ICJ went a long way in clarifying the 
concept of persistent objector and the principles pertaining to the formation of customary international 
law; Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, (1951) ICJ Reports 116.   
3 An optional protocol on dispute settlement was concluded at UNCLOS I.   
4 Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987) at pp. 39, 68 and 241.  See also the comments of Oxman, 
"The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the 1975 Geneva Session", (1975) 69 
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the oft-quoted speech of the first President of the Conference, “the provision of 
effective dispute settlement procedures is essential for stabilizing and maintaining 
the compromises necessary for the attainment of agreement on a convention.  
Dispute settlement will be the pivot upon which the delicate equilibrium must be 
balanced.”
5  One commentator describes the dispute settlement system as “the 
cement which should hold the whole structure together and guarantee its continued 
acceptance and endurance for all parties.”
6 
It is the purpose of this chapter to analyse the dispute settlement mechanisms 
available under the LOS Convention and to assess the ways in which the judicial 
process can contribute to developing the legal order of the oceans.  How do courts 
interpret and apply the Convention?  Are courts limited to upholding the status quo 
or can they contribute to the progressive development of the law of the sea? 
 
2. Dispute Settlement in the LOS Convention 
The settlement of disputes in international law is largely a matter for states.  
In this sense, little has changed since the PCIJ said in 1923 that “it is well-
established in international law that no state can, without its consent, be compelled 
to submit its dispute with other states either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any 
other kind of pacific settlement.”
7  Today, few treaties provide for compulsory 
settlement of disputes without the consent of the disputing parties.  The LOS 
Convention is different as it contains extensive provisions in Part XV and several 
annexes on the settlement of disputes.  The system of dispute settlement in the LOS 
                                                                                                                                          
American Journal of International Law at pp. 795-796, and again at Oxman, "The Third United 
Nations Conference On the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Sessions", (1977) 71 American 
Journal of International Law at pp. 266-267. 
5 See also the words of the Second President of UNCLOS III; Koh, "A Constitution for the Oceans", 
in The Law of the Sea - Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea with 
Annexes and Index (United Nations, 1983). 
6 Boyle, "Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and 
Jurisdiction", (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly at p. 38.  See also Rothwell, 
"Oceans Management and the Law of the Sea in the Twenty-First Century", in Oceans Management 
in the 21st Century: Institutional Frameworks and Responses, ed. Oude Elferink and Rothwell 
(Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004) at p. 353.  C.f. Klein who argues that compulsory dispute settlement is 
not requisite for disputes concerning certain activities; Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2005) at pp. 362-363. 
7 Advisory Opinion on the Status of Eastern Carelia, (1923) PCIJ Reports, Series B, No. 5, at p. 27. 
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Convention is complex and it involves a variety of procedures, both binding and non-
binding.8  By becoming a party, a state automatically consents to the compulsory 
settlement of most disputes that may arise under the Convention. 
The Convention does not create a single dispute settlement organ competent 
to decide all ocean disputes.  Participants at UNCLOS III were unable to agree on 
which forum should decide disputes arising under the Convention. The compromise 
in Article 287 creates a list of four dispute settlement organs from which States 
Parties may make a choice: the ICJ, the ITLOS9, ad hoc arbitration or special 
arbitration.  
According to Article 287, a dispute will be submitted to an organ accepted by 
both disputing states, unless they agree otherwise.10  If the choices of disputing states 
do not coincide, a dispute will be submitted to ad hoc arbitration.  Arbitration is 
therefore the default forum for most law of the sea disputes.11  Arbitration is the most 
flexible of the four options as the parties to a dispute are able to select their own 
adjudicators and to determine certain aspects of the procedure.12 For some types of 
dispute, however, arbitration is not the default forum.     
Article 290(5) provides that requests for provisional measures are to be 
submitted to the ITLOS if the parties cannot agree on an alternative forum within 
two weeks of a request being made.13  The role of the ITLOS under this procedure is 
limited in two ways.  Firstly, the jurisdiction of the ITLOS in these proceedings is 
restricted to dealing with the request for provisional measures and the Tribunal may 
                                                 
8 For a legislative history of the dispute settlement provisions, see Adede, The System for Settlement of 
Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, particularly at pp. 24-25, 53-54, 
73-75. 
9 The ITLOS is created by the LOS Convention.   
10 LOS Convention, Article 287(4). 
11 LOS Convention, Article 287(5).  In this respect, the Convention differs from the original 
“Montreux formula” which would, where no agreement could be reached, have deferred to the choice 
of the defendant state.  See Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea  at pp. and 53 and 73. 
12 See LOS Convention, Annex VII, Articles 3 and 5.  For this purpose, a list is maintained by the UN 
Secretary General based on nominations received from States Parties; see LOS Convention, Annex 
VII, Article 2.  However, appointments may be made of persons who are not on the list.  Indeed, the 
parties can agree to vary the size and composition of the tribunal if they wish.    In the case that 
arbitrators are not appointed within a certain time, the task is conferred on the President of the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, who shall make a choice from a list of arbitrators 
proposed by States Parties.  The Annex VII Tribunal can determine its own rules of procedure unless 
the parties agree on a set of rules.   
13 LOS Convention, Article 290(5). 
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not touch upon any aspect of the merits of the dispute.  Furthermore, it only has the 
competence to order provisional measures until the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal.14      
Another special procedure applies to requests for prompt release of ships 
arrested by a coastal state in its EEZ.15  According to Article 292, requests for 
prompt release may be heard by the ITLOS unless the parties agree on another forum 
within ten days of the arrest of a vessel.16  Taking a critical view of this procedure, 
Oda asserts that “the question of prompt release is inevitably linked with the content 
of the rules and regulations of the coastal state concerning the fisheries in its 
exclusive economic zone, and the way in which these rules are enforced.”
17 
Nevertheless, the Tribunal has maintained that its jurisdiction in prompt release cases 
is strictly limited to deciding whether the coastal state has complied with the 
obligation to release an arrested vessel on payment of a reasonable bond.18   
Special procedures also apply to disputes arising under Part XI of the 
Convention.  The Seabed Disputes Chamber is created in order to deal with such 
disputes.19 It is composed of eleven judges, elected by the ITLOS judges 
themselves.20  The Chamber is a court within a court and it has its own President and 
rules of procedure.21  The jurisdiction of the Seabed Disputes Chamber is defined 
under Article 187 which lists six main categories of dispute.22   
The jurisdiction of the Chamber over seabed disputes is, however, not 
exclusive.  States may agree to submit such disputes to alternative dispute settlement 
                                                 
14 The principal Tribunal has the power to modify, revoke or affirm measures previously ordered by 
the ITLOS See The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. UK) Order of 24 June 2003, (2003) 42 ILM 1187 at 
para. 40; see also Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan) Award on 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, (2000) 39 ILM 1359 at para. 66. 
15 LOS Convention, Articles 73(2) and 216(1)(b). 
16 LOS Convention, Article 292(1). 
17 Oda, "Dispute Settlement Prospects in the Law of the Sea", (1995) 44 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly at p. 866. 
18 The ITLOS has stressed that it cannot deal with other allegations, for instance failure to notify the 
flag state of an arrest, or the illegal arrest of a vessel.  See e.g. The Camouco (Prompt Release) 
(Panama v. France) Judgment of 7 February 2000, (2000) 125 ILR 151 at paras. 59-60; The Volga 
(Prompt Release) (Russia v. Australia) Judgement of 23 December 2002, (2003) 42 ILM 159 at para. 
83.   
19 LOS Convention, Article 187. 
20 LOS Convention, Annex VI, Article 36. 
21 For the constitution of the Chamber, see LOS Convention, Annex VI, Article 35. 
22 See chapter five, at pp. 171-172. 
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organs.  A state-to-state application may be unilaterally made to an ad hoc chamber 
of the Seabed Disputes Chamber made up of three judges.23  The Convention also 
provides that contractual disputes may be submitted to binding commercial 
arbitration by way of an unilateral application.  However, such an arbitral tribunal 
may only deal with the contractual aspects of the dispute and any questions of 
interpretation of the LOS Convention must be submitted to the Seabed Disputes 
Chamber for resolution.24  Finally, the Convention provides that states may by 
mutual agreement submit a dispute to a special chamber of the ITLOS.    
Although the drafters agreed on the need for compulsory dispute settlement 
as an integral component of a successful compromise, it was also accepted that such 
a system would only be viable if some exceptions were allowed.25  Section 3 of Part 
XV lists certain types of disputes which cannot be submitted to the compulsory 
procedures outlined above.26  These exceptions fall into two categories.   
The first type of exception to compulsory adjudication is found in Article 297 
which excludes a priori certain categories of dispute from compulsory, binding 
dispute settlement.  The disputes covered by Article 297 principally concern the 
exercise by a coastal State of its sovereign rights or jurisdiction within its EEZ, in 
particular disputes concerning marine scientific research and marine living resources.  
These exceptions largely reflect the wide discretions that are conferred on coastal 
states in regulating these activities in the EEZ.  Klein comments, “it is clearly 
difficult to determine the content of a legal obligation and insist on its enforcement 
when the level of discretion incorporated into the norm permits so much flexibility of 
action and decision-making.  The dispute settlement mechanism in [the LOS 
                                                 
23 LOS Convention, Article 188(1).  The procedure for the constitution of an ad hoc chamber is found 
in LOS Convention, Annex VI, Article 36. 
24 Article 188(2)(a).  The arbitral tribunal may decide proprio motu to refer such a question; Article 
188(2)(b).  For a discussion of the drafting history of this provision, see Klein, Dispute settlement in 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea  at pp. 328-329. 
25 Rosenne and Sohn, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary, 
5 vols., vol. 5 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989) at p. 87; Churchill and Lowe, The Law of the Sea 
(Manchester University Press, 1999) at p. 455. 
26 Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea  at pp. 165-184. 
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Convention] reinforces these decisions through the near-complete insulation of the 
coastal state’s discretionary powers from review.”
27    
The absence of compulsory adjudication does not mean that there is no 
independent scrutiny available.  Such disputes may be subject to a compulsory 
conciliation procedure.28  Conciliation is compulsory in the sense that provision is 
made for the appointment of conciliators if one of the states fails to do so.29 
Nevertheless, the conclusions and recommendations reached by the commission are 
non-binding and at most they serve to assert additional political pressure on the 
coastal state.  Moreover, the role of a conciliation commission is further restricted 
because it is expressly prohibited from calling into question the exercise by the 
coastal state of any discretion conferred by the Convention.30   
The second type of exception to compulsory adjudication is found in Article 
298.  This provision sets out a list of optional exclusions which States may invoke 
through a written declaration at any time prior to the submission of a dispute to 
adjudication.  The exceptions cover maritime delimitation disputes31, disputes 
concerning military or law enforcement activities, and disputes in respect of which 
the Security Council is exercising functions under the UN Charter.  The types of 
disputes covered by Article 298 reflect a desire for states to shield sensitive topics 
related to their sovereign powers from third party scrutiny and settlement.32  
Although some of the terms used in the exceptions are vague, for example military 
activities or enforcement actions, it is submitted that they cannot be invoked to 
prevent the submission of all aspects of a dispute from third party settlement.  In 
practice, this may lead to the so-called “salami-slicing” of disputes where the role of 
a court will be limited because of various exceptions or exclusions from its 
jurisdiction.33 
                                                 
27 Klein, Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea  at p. 177.   
28 See LOS Convention, Article 297(2) and (3). 
29 See LOS Convention, Annex V, Articles 3 and 12. 
30 See LOS Convention, Article 298(2)(b) and (3)(c). 
31 Most maritime delimitation disputes occurring after the entry into force of the Convention will be 
subject to compulsory conciliation.   
32 See Klein, Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea  at p. 256. 
33 See Boyle, "Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention",  at p. 41.  See also  Klein, 
Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea  at p. 291. 
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As well as these substantive exceptions, section 1 of Part XV also sets out a 
series of, what Colson and Hoyle term, “procedural prerequisites” to the jurisdiction 
of courts or tribunals.34  These provisions recognize the right of states to settle 
disputes in ways other than adjudication through the LOS Convention, if they wish.  
These provisions must be satisfied before the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal is 
founded.35   
Article 280 provides that “nothing in this Part impairs the right of any States 
Parties to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own 
choice”.  Thus, states retain a freedom of choice in selecting a mode of dispute 
settlement.  In the words of Judge Nelson, “the whole object of section 1 of Part XV 
of the Convention is to ensure that disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Convention are settled by peaceful means and not necessarily by 
the mechanism for dispute settlement embodied in the Convention.”
36  It follows that 
states can avoid the judicial settlement of disputes if they can agree on some other 
method themselves.   
The crux of section 1 is the requirement in Article 283 to “proceed 
expeditiously to an exchange of views regarding [the settlement of a dispute] by 
negotiation or other peaceful means."
37  This provision excludes a state from 
unilaterally applying for compulsory, binding dispute settlement without first 
exploring the options of alternative and consensual dispute settlement mechanisms.38 
A state initiating the dispute settlement procedures must be able to demonstrate that 
an exchange of views has taken place.   
                                                 
34 Colson and Hoyle, "Satisfying the Procedural Prerequisites to the Compulsory Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: Did the Southern Bluefin Tuna Tribunal Get It 
Right?" (2003) 34 Ocean Development and International Law 59. 
35 In Congo v Rwanda, the ICJ has said that “when consent is expressed in a compromissory clause in 
an international agreement, any conditions to which such consent is subject must be regarded as 
constituting limits thereon.  The Court accordingly considers that the examination of such conditions 
relates to its jurisdiction and not to the admissibility of the application”; Case Concerning Armed 
Activities in the Congo (Jurisdiction) (Congo v. Rwanda), (2006) at para. 88. 
36 Separate Opinion of Vice-President Nelson, The MOX Plant Arbitration, at para. 2. 
37 LOS Convention, Article 283(1).   
38 For a drafting history of the provision, see Adede, The System for Settlement of Disputes under the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea  at pp. 47, 52-53, 93. 
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Such provisions are not uncommon in international law.  In the Mavromattis 
Concessions Case, the PCIJ noted that its jurisdiction under the Palestine mandate 
was subject to the condition that the dispute could not be settled by negotiation.  The 
Court held that “the question of the importance and chances of success of diplomatic 
negotiations is essentially a relative one.  Negotiations do not of necessity always 
presuppose a more or less lengthy series of notes and dispatches; it may suffice that 
a discussion should have been commenced, and this discussion may have been very 
short.”
39 Thus, it is appropriate to consider these issues on a case-by-case basis and 
“no general and absolute rule can be laid down.”
40   
In the case of the LOS Convention, tribunals have tended to set a very low 
threshold for states to show that an exchange of views has in fact taken place.  For 
instance, in the MOX Plant Case, the ITLOS accepted that an exchange of views 
could take place by way of written communications between two states; an actual 
meeting was not necessary.41  Moreover, it held that “a State Party is not obliged to 
continue with an exchange of views when it concludes that the possibilities of 
reaching an agreement have been exhausted.”
42 This interpretation would seem to 
adopt a subjective view of the obligation which would allow one of the states to 
unilaterally determine when the obligation had been met.43  A similar approach was 
taken by the Tribunal in the Land Reclamation Case, where Singapore had argued 
that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction because the requirements of Article 283 
had not been satisfied.  The Tribunal again noted that the Convention only requires 
an expeditious exchange of views. Although Malaysia had broken off talks between 
the two states, the Tribunal held that “in the circumstances of the case, Malaysia was 
not obliged to continue with an exchange of views when it concluded that this 
exchange could not yield a positive result.”
44     
                                                 
39 Mavromattis Palestine Concessions, (1924) PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 2, at p. 13. 
40 Ibid.. 
41 The Mox Plant Case (Provisional Measures) (Ireland v. UK) Order of 3 December 2001, (2002) 41 
ILM 405 at para. 58. 
42 Ibid., at para. 60.  A similar conclusion was reached by the Tribunal in the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Cases (Provisional Measures) (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan) Order of 27 August 1999, 
(1999) 117 ILR 148 at para. 60.  This conclusion was premised on the statement by Australia and 
New Zealand that negotiations had terminated even though Japan disagreed.   
43 Klein, Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea  at p. 33.   
44 Case Concerning Land Reclamation in and around the Johur Straits (Provisional Measures) 
(Malaysia v. Singapore) Order of 8 October 2003, (2003) at para. 48. 
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The conclusions of the ITLOS should be treated with care as the Tribunal in 
these cases was not required to decide definitively whether the conditions of Article 
283 had been satisfied, rather whether the arbitral tribunal would prima facie have 
jurisdiction.  Thus, a lower threshold may have been appropriate.   
A better indication of the correct interpretation of Article 283 may perhaps be 
gained from the decisions of tribunals fully seized of a dispute.  For instance, in the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, the Tribunal held that the negotiations between 
the parties had been “prolonged, intense and serious” and therefore they satisfied the 
conditions of Article 283.45  Whilst the Tribunal in this case appears to undertake an 
objective examination of the negotiations, as Klein notes, “the Tribunal was not 
purporting to set out criteria to meet the requirement under Article 283, but rather 
that these facts were sufficient to indicate that the obligation to exchange views for 
settlement by negotiation or other peaceful means had been satisfied.”
46   
Article 283 was also considered by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Barbados – 
Trinidad Arbitration.  The case concerned the delimitation of the EEZ and 
continental shelf boundaries between these two Caribbean states, a subject on which 
they had been negotiating for a number of years.  Several rounds of negotiations had 
taken place between July 2000 and November 2003 without any agreement.  
Nevertheless, the negotiations were ongoing and the two states had agreed to 
schedule a further round of negotiations in late February 2004.  In the meantime, 
Barbados initiated legal proceedings under Part XV of the LOS Convention in 
February 2004.  
One of the preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal raised by 
Trinidad was the failure of Barbados to satisfy Article 283.  According to this 
argument, the exchange of views under Article 283 was separate to the negotiations 
anticipated by Articles 74(1) and 83(1).47  The Tribunal did not agree, finding that 
“Article 283(1) cannot reasonably be interpreted to require that once negotiations 
have failed to result in an agreement, the Parties must then meet separately to hold 
an “exchange of views” about the settlement of the dispute by “other peaceful 
                                                 
45 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, at para. 55. 
46 Klein, Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, at p. 33. 
47 Dispute Relating to the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf 
(Barbados v. Trinidad and Tobago), (2006) 45 ILM 798, at para. 76.   
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means”.  The required exchange of views is also inherent in the (failed) 
negotiations.”
48 The Tribunal made it clear that it thought that a reasonable period of 
time had elapsed since the negotiations had started and therefore Barbados was 
entitled to have recourse to Part XV.49  Moreover, it did not believe that the fact that 
another round of negotiations had been scheduled was a constraining factor.50   
The approach taken by the Tribunal conflates negotiations on the substance of 
the dispute with an exchange of views over possible procedures to settle the dispute.  
Whilst it is preferable to divide these two aspects of negotiations in theory, the 
Tribunal recognises that such formal distinctions are not always possible in practice.  
Ultimately, the Tribunal considered that “to require a further exchange of views ... is 
unrealistic.”
51     
Although the tribunals in these cases invoke an objective threshold, in the 
latter case referring to a reasonable period of time, it is difficult to think of 
circumstances in which a state would fail to comply with Article 283.  Nevertheless, 
Article 283 cannot be considered as a completely empty shell.  At a minimum, it 
obliges a state to propose the commencement of negotiations.  The decision of the 
ICJ in Congo v Rwanda may be instructive in this regard.  In that case, the ICJ 
considered a variety of compromissory clauses invoked by Congo in its claim against 
Rwanda, many of which required prior negotiations to have taken place.  In one 
instance, the Court held that protests made by Congo at the international level were 
not sufficient to satisfy the conditions in the compromissory clause in the Convention 
on Discrimination against Women.52  This reasoning suggests that a proposal for 
negotiation must be made and moreover that the proposal must identify with 
sufficient determinacy the basis for a claim.  This is particularly important where 
                                                 
48 Ibid., at para. 203. 
49 Ibid., at para. 195.   
50 Ibid., at para. 199.   
51 Ibid., at para. 205.  C.f. the Virginia Commentary which says, “this provision ensures that a party 
may transfer a dispute from one mode of settlement to another, especially one entailing a binding 
decision, only after appropriate consultations between all the parties concerned”; Rosenne and Sohn, 
eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary,  at p. 29.   
52 Congo v. Rwanda, at para. 91.  See also its discussion of the Montreal Convention, at para. 118. 
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several treaties pertain to a single issue.53  Thus, in this case, mere allegations of 
violations of international human rights laws were not sufficient.     
Of course, seizing a court of a dispute does not necessarily exhaust the duty 
of states to co-operate and consult.   Having found that it had prima facie jurisdiction 
in the MOX Plant Case, the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, and the Johur Straits 
Case, the ITLOS ordered the parties to co-operate and to report at intervals to the 
President of the Tribunal on their progress.54  Moreover, the duty to co-operate often 
exists as a substantive obligation in its own right.  Therefore, states will be under an 
ongoing obligation to talk to one another, regardless of any order made by a court.  
This is demonstrated by the ICJ in the Case Concerning Paper Mills on the River 
Uruguay where it held that “notwithstanding the fact that the Court has not been 
able to accede to the request by Argentina for the indication of provisional measures 
… the Parties are required to fulfil their obligations under international law.”
55  The 
Court continued by stressing “the necessity for Argentina and Uruguay to implement 
in good faith the consultation and co-operation procedures provided in the 1975 
Statute.”  Likewise, the LOS Convention contains numerous obligations to co-
operate which will remain binding on states regardless of a dispute arising between 
them. 
There are two further so-called “procedural prerequisites” in section 1 of 
Part XV.  Articles 281 and 282 both foresee the settlement of disputes outside the 
framework of the compulsory procedures of the LOS Convention.   
Article 282 allows States Parties to submit disputes concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention to an alternative “procedure that 
entails a binding decision” which shall apply in lieu of the procedures in Part XV.  
In particular, the drafters had in mind the settlement of disputes according to general 
                                                 
53 In the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases ITLOS took into account the fact that New Zealand and 
Australia had invoked the provisions of the LOS Convention in diplomatic notes addressed to Japan, 
as well as the Convention on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.  Failure to do so may have 
been fatal to their request as they would not have been able to demonstrate that an exchange of views 
over the settlement of a dispute arising under the LOS Convention had taken place. 
54 See The MOX Plant Case, at p. 15; Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, dispositif, at para. 2; Land 
Reclamation Case,dispositif, at para. 1.  In the latter case, the two states came to an amicable 
settlement which was submitted to the President of the Tribunal. 
55 Case Concernining Paper Mills on the River Uruguay (Provisional Measures) (Argentina v. 
Uruguay) Order of 13 July 2006, (2006) ICJ Reports at para. 82. 
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dispute settlement arrangements between states, bilateral or multilateral, or by a 
special agreement.56   
Article 281, on the other hand, contemplates situations where states may opt 
for non-binding dispute settlement procedures, such as conciliation or mediation.  It 
provides: 
3. If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation and 
application of this Convention have agreed to seek settlement of the dispute by peaceful 
means of their own choice, the procedures provided for in this Part apply only where no 
settlement has been reached by recourse to such means and the agreement between the 
parties does not exclude any further procedure. 
4. If the parties have also agreed on a time-limit, paragraph 1 applies only upon the expiration 
of that time limit. 
 
The ordinary meaning of Article 281 simply suggests that if states agree on 
an alternative form of dispute settlement, they cannot simply abandon it in favour of 
the compulsory procedure in section 2 unless the agreed procedure has been fully 
exhausted.  Whether or not a procedure has been fully exhausted will depend on the 
procedure in question.  This article should also be read in conjunction with Article 
283(2) which provides that if one means of agreed dispute settlement fails, states 
should proceed to a second exchange of views in order to try to agree on other 
methods of settlement.   
It would also appear that Article 281 allows states by agreement to exclude 
compulsory dispute settlement procedures altogether.  The Virginia Commentary 
concludes that “while this may be an undesirable result, it is consistent with the 
basic principle of Part XV, that the parties are free to decide how they want their 
dispute to be settled, and to agree that even in certain circumstances they prefer to 
have it unsettled rather than submit it to the procedures of Part XV.”
57  This 
conclusion does not raise any problems in principle, although several difficulties 
arise in practice.   
A difficult case is presented by the Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration.  The 
Annex VII Tribunal seized of the dispute held that Article 281 allowed states to 
                                                 
56 Rosenne and Sohn, eds., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 - A Commentary,  
at p. 26. 
57 in Ibid.,  , at p. 24. 
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impliedly opt out of the compulsory dispute settlement procedures in Part XV.  The 
Tribunal held that Article 16 of the Convention on the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna58 amounted to a tacit agreement to exclude compulsory adjudication 
under Part XV of the LOS Convention.59  The Tribunal was clearly influenced by the 
fact that the actual dispute touched upon a treaty which the parties had not consented 
to submit to compulsory dispute settlement: “to hold that disputes implicating 
obligations under both [the LOS Convention] and an implementing treaty such as the 
1993 Convention – as such disputes typically may – must be brought within the reach 
of section 2 of Part XV of [the LOS Convention] would be effectively to deprive of 
substantial effect the dispute settlement provisions of those implementing agreements 
which prescribe dispute resolution by means of the parties’ choice.”
60   
Klein supports the decision, suggesting that it “correctly emphasizes the 
importance of States’ freedom of choice and the continuing relevance of traditional 
consent-based methods of dispute settlement.”
61  Yet, Oxman criticises the Award 
for ignoring the central place that compulsory, binding dispute settlement in the LOS 
Convention.62  The decision was also criticized by one dissenting arbitrator who 
argued that Article 16 neither constituted an agreement to seek settlement by a 
peaceful means of their own choice63 nor excluded any further procedure.64  He 
stressed that there is nothing in Article 16 which shows that the parties have agreed 
on a method of dispute settlement.65  Rather it is an agreement to agree on a method 
in the future.  There is a strong argument that exclusions from compulsory dispute 
settlement should be expressly agreed.66  Indeed, the logic of the Tribunal can be 
reversed to suggest that its decision effectively deprives of substantial effect the 
compulsory dispute settlement provisions of the LOS Convention.  
                                                 
58 Hereinafter, “CCSBT”. 
59 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, at para. 57.   
60 Ibid., at para. 63. 
61 Klein, Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea  at p. 39, footnote 42. 
62 Oxman, "Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction", (2001) 95 American Journal 
of International Law at p. 302.  
63 See the Separate Opinion of Kenneth Keith, at para. 5.   
64 Ibid., at para. 6.   
65 Ibid., at para. 8.   
66 Ibid., at para. 22; see also the Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum in The MOX Plant Case, at p. 2. 
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The most problematic aspect in the reasoning of the Tribunal would appear to 
be its consolidation of the disputes into “a single dispute arising under both 
Conventions.”
67  By conflating disputes under the CCSBT and the LOS Convention, 
the Tribunal ignores that jurisdiction over these two treaties is distinct.  Part XV only 
confers jurisdiction on a tribunal to decide claims under the LOS Convention and it 
would not have been competent to hear claims of non-compliance with the CCSBT.68 
A better approach to this question is found in the decision of the dissenting arbitrator 
who acknowledged that the two treaty regimes remained distinct and that the powers 
of an adjudicator acting under the LOS Convention would be more confined that an 
adjudicator acting under the CCSBT.69   
This approach also appears to be sanctioned by a majority of the ITLOS in 
the MOX Plant Case where similar issues of parallel treaties arose under Article 282.  
Ireland had invoked the dispute settlement provisions of the LOS Convention, 
whereas the United Kingdom argued that the dispute actually arose under other 
regional treaties.  The Tribunal supported the Irish position, finding that “the dispute 
settlement procedures under the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom 
Treaty deal with disputes concerning the interpretation and application of those 
agreements, and not with disputes arising under the Convention.”
70  It reasoned 
further that although all these instruments may contain very similar obligations to the 
Convention, they had a separate identity and the disputes were thus distinct.71 
Whilst this latter approach is preferable, it is not without its own problems, as 
it requires making a clear distinction between jurisdiction, interpretation and 
application of treaties.  The real question in these circumstances is to what extent can 
a tribunal make reference to other legal instruments in deciding disputes under the 
                                                 
67 Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration, at para. 54.  It continues “to find that, in this case, there is a 
dispute actually arising under [the LOS Convention] which is distinct from the dispute that arose 
under the CCSBT would be artificial.” 
68 See Colson and Hoyle, "Satisfying the Procedural Prerequisites to the Compulsory Dispute 
Settlement Mechanisms of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention: Did the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Tribunal Get It Right?"  at p. 68; Boyle, "The Southern Bluefin Tuna Arbitration", (2001) 50 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly at p. 449. 
69 Separate Opinion of Kenneth Keith, at para. 16.  See also Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, at para. 51. 
70 The MOX Plant Case, at para. 49. 
71 Ibid., at para. 50.  See also Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfrum, at p. 1; Separate Opinion of Judge 
Treves, at para. 3.  For a slightly different view, see Separate Opinion of Judge Jesus, at paras. 4-7. 
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LOS Convention?  How far should the wider context of international law influence 
the interpretation and application of the LOS Convention? 
  
3. Judges as Law-Makers? 
Part XV of the LOS Convention confers jurisdiction on courts and tribunals 
over any dispute concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention.72 
The decisions of adjudicators acting under the LOS Convention are, strictu senso, 
binding only on the parties to a dispute.73  Nevertheless, the formal status of judicial 
decisions does not fully capture their significance in the development of the law.  It 
is well-established in practice and in principle that international courts are likely to 
follow their own decisions unless there a good reasons to depart from them.74  Courts 
such as the ICJ regularly cite their previous case-law in support of decisions and this 
process is strengthened by lawyers who use the language of precedent in their 
pleadings.75   
It is already possible to determine the development of a consistent 
jurisprudence in the decisions of the ITLOS which has only been in operation for ten 
years.  For instance, the factors that the Tribunal propounded in the initial cases on 
prompt release have been relied on in subsequent prompt release proceedings.76   
Nor is the availability of several dispute settlement organs likely to pose 
problems for the development of coherent jurisprudence on the law of the sea.  
Practice to date shows encouraging signs that tribunals are willing to follow each 
others’ decisions.77   ITLOS has already drawn upon previous law of the sea cases in 
its own decisions.  Thus, in the The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2), the Tribunal invoked the 
                                                 
72 LOS Convention, Article 288(1). 
73 LOS Convention, Article 296(2).  See also Annex VI, Article 33; Annex VII, Article 11. 
74 See Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Stevens, 1958) 
at p. 14; Queneudec, "The role of the International Court of Justice and Other Tribunals in the 
development of the Law of the Sea", in Implementation of the Law of the Sea Convention Through 
International Institutions, ed. Soons (Law of the Sea Institute, 1990) at pp. 584-588. 
75 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) at p. 293. 
76 The Camouco Case, at para. 66; The Monte Confurco (Prompt Release) (Seychelles v. France) 
Judgment of 18 December 2000, (2000) 125 ILR 203 at para. 76; The Volga Case, at para. 63; The 
Juno Trader Case (Prompt Release) (St Vincent/Guinea-Bissau), (2004)  44 ILM 498, at para. 82. 
77 Miller, "An International Jurisprudence? The operation of "precedent" across international 
tribunals", (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 483; Charney, "International Law and 
Multiple International Tribunals", (1998) 271 Receuil des Cours 105. 
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precedents of the “I’m Alone”78 and the “Red Crusader”79 in its decision relating to 
the use of force in the hot pursuit of vessels.80  Individual judges have made even 
more extensive use of the decisions of other courts and tribunals in their separate and 
dissenting opinons.81  Reference is made not only to other decisions on the law of the 
sea but to courts and tribunals dealing with completely different spheres of law.82  In 
The Camouco, Judges Wolfrum and Anderson noted the similarities between the 
role of the Tribunal in prompt release proceedings and the role of international 
human rights organs, arguing that the decisions of adjudicators in this field could aid 
the Tribunal.83        
Of course, the precedential value of judicial decisions cannot be taken for 
granted.  The authority of judicial decisions results not from their formal status, but 
rather on whether they are likely to be followed in the future.  It is important 
therefore to consider the degree of support for a decision, both amongst states and the 
members of the court itself.  The annals of international adjudication reveal several 
judicial decisions that have relatively rapidly faded into insignificance.84  In 
particular, decisions adopted by a slim majority may be viewed with some 
scepticism.  In The M/V “Saiga”, the majority of the Tribunal held that for the 
purpose of deciding the admissibility of the prompt release proceedings, it was 
sufficient that non-compliance had been alleged by the applicant and that the 
allegation was arguable or sufficiently plausible.85  On this basis, the Tribunal 
accepted the arguments of Saint Vincent that the arrest of the M/V “Saiga” should be 
classified as a fisheries offence, as opposed to a customs offence as was submitted by 
Guinea.   However, nine judges voted against this decision, arguing for a higher 
                                                 
78 S.S. “I’m Alone”, (1935) 3 UNRIAA 1609. 
79 The Red Crusader, (1962) 35 ILR 485. 
80 The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2) Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) Judgement of the 
Tribunal of 1 July 1999, (1999) 120 International Law Reports 143 at para. 156. 
81 For example, the Separate Opinion of Vice-President Nelson in the The Camouco Case, where he 
alludes to the jurisprudence of other international courts and tribunals on the concept of 
reasonableness; at p. 2. 
82 In M/V “Saiga” (No. 2), the ITLOS cited the decision of the ICJ in the Case Concerning the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros in relation to principles of state responsibility; at para. 133. 
83 The Camouco Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anderson, at p. 1; Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Wolfrum, at para. 14. 
84 For instance, The Case Concerning the S.S. Lotus, (1927) PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10.  See 
Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, at p. 294 
85 The M/V "SAIGA" Case (Prompt Release) (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea) Judgment 
of 4 December 1997, (1997) 110 ILR 736 at para. 59. 
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standard of appreciation.86  Given the degree of dissension on this issue and the 
strength of the dissenting arguments, it is perhaps little surprise that in its subsequent 
decisions on prompt release, the Tribunal has adopted a higher standard of 
appreciation.87 
In spite of these caveats, decisions of adjudicators acting under Part XV of 
the LOS Convention are likely to have a significant impact on the interpretation of 
the Convention for all States Parties to the Convention.  As Klein says, “a decision 
by a court or tribunal constitutes an authoritative interpretation of the provisions of 
the Convention and that meaning could then be relevant to all other States 
Parties.”
88  Indeed, as the Convention is largely representative of customary 
international law, the decisions of courts and tribunals may have significance for all 
states, whether or not they are a State Party.   
Is it going too far to describe courts as “law-makers”?  The role of a court in 
relation to developing the LOS Convention obviously differs from law-making 
undertaken by political institutions.  In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the 
ICJ stressed this distinction by saying, “it is clear that the Court cannot legislate … 
Rather its task is to engage in the normal judicial function of ascertaining the 
existence or otherwise of legal principles and rules.”
89  Courts do not create law de 
novo.  Judges are constrained in a number of ways when dealing with an 
international dispute.   
The first constraint on the role of a court is jurisdiction.  It has been seen that 
the LOS Convention provides for jurisdiction over a wide range of disputes although 
the scope of jurisdiction of a court will differ from case-to-case depending on the 
basis for a particular claim.  Strictly speaking, a court will only be able to decide 
those aspects of the dispute that fall within its jurisdiction.  Nevertheless, it is 
                                                 
86 The dissenting judges argued that a case must be “well-founded”, citing inter alia Article 113 of the 
Rules of the Tribunal.  See dissenting opinions of President Mensah, at para. 5; Judge Anderson, at 
para. 4, Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto, at para. 4, and Judges Park, Nelson, Rao, 
Vukas, and Ndiaye, at para. 8.   
87 The Camouco Case, at para. 61.  It should be noted that the facts of the later cases were less 
complex than the M/V “Saiga”.  See also Klein, Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea  at pp. 92-93. 
88 Klein, Dispute settlement in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea  at p. 365. 
89 Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, (1996) ICJ Reports 
226, at para. 18. 
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common judicial practice to address questions that are not strictly necessary for the 
disposal of a case.  Such pronouncements may be found in the main judgment of the 
court or in separate or dissenting opinions of individual judges.  Obiter dicta are not 
binding per se, but they may provide valuable guidance for the development of the 
law.90  It is on this basis that broad statements of principle were encouraged by 
Lauterpacht who concluded that “there are compelling considerations of 
international justice which favour a full measure of exhaustiveness of judicial 
pronouncements of international tribunals.”
91  However, his opinion was based on 
the fact that there were few other ways in which the law could progressively develop.  
Although there is no international legislature per se, the availability of various 
international institutions to discuss and debate issues arising over the content of the 
law may mean that today this reasoning is less persuasive. 
Jurisdiction is not the sole determining factor in what issues a court or 
tribunal can address.  The ability of a court to dispose of a dispute is also partly 
determined by the submissions of the parties to a dispute.  Litigation is largely an 
adversarial process at the international level.  The non ultra petita rule purports to 
restrict a court to deciding those questions that have been brought before it by the 
litigants.92 However, in the Arrest Warrant Case, the ICJ clarified that “while the 
Court is thus not entitled to decide upon questions not asked of it, the non ultra petita 
rule nonetheless cannot preclude the Court from addressing certain legal points in 
its reasoning.”
93  As it is the persuasiveness of the court’s reasoning rather than its 
formal power that provides the authority for its decisions, the non ultra petita rule 
does not necessarily restrict the ability of courts and tribunals to develop the law.   
Ultimately, the scope for courts and tribunals to develop the law of the sea 
depends on the rules of treaty interpretation and application which are found in 
general international law. 
                                                 
90 See Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, at p. 271. 
91 Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court, at p. 37.  C.f. 
Guillaume, "The Future of Judicial Institutions", (1995) 44 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly at p. 854. 
92 For the locus classicus of the rule, see Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru) Judgment of 20 November 
1950, (1950) ICJ Reports 395, at p. 402. 




     
4. General Rules of Treaty Interpretation 
Courts and tribunals are primarily concerned with the interpretation and 
application of the law.  Whilst their role is thus limited, it is generally accepted that 
the act of interpretation involves a degree of discretion, as there is rarely a single 
meaning to be attributed to a word or phrase. Hart has argued, “in most important 
cases, there is always a choice … all rules have a penumbra of uncertainty where the 
judge must choose between alternatives.”
94  He concludes that “at the margin of 
rules …, the courts perform a rule-producing function …this function of the courts is 
very like the exercise of delegated rule-making powers by an administrative body.”
95  
This is also true for international courts and tribunals.  In this context, Lauterpacht 
says “the very fact that the clause is so controversial that the parties are willing to 
go to the expense and the trouble of litigation … shows that the provision or term in 
question is not “clear”.”
96
     
One arbitral tribunal has described that the purpose of interpretation is to 
discover “with the maximum possible certainty what the common intention of the 
Parties was.”
97 Thus, a court should not impose its own subjective interpretation of 
an ambiguous text.  At the same time, it admits that the process is not necessarily one 
hundred per cent accurate.  Interpretation is a quest to discover how the parties to a 
treaty would have interpreted the treaty in those circumstances. In the words of 
another arbitral tribunal, it requires “une récherche objective et rationnelle qui 
permet d'établir l'intention et la volonté communes des parties.”
98   
                                                 
94 Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961) at p. 271.  For a useful review of the 
literature in this field see, Lester, "English Judges as Law Makers", (1993)  Public Law 269. 
95 Hart, The Concept of Law at p. 132 
96 Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court  at p. 54. McDougal 
et al. go further and argue that all text needs interpretation; see McDougal, Lasswell, and Miller, 
Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order (Yale University Press, 1967) at p. 82; Higgins, 
Problems and Process - International Law and How We Use It (Oxford University Press, 1994) at p. 
5. 
97 Air Transport Agreement Arbitration (US v. France), (1963) 38 International Law Reports 182, at 
p. 229.   
98 Arbitral Award on Pollution of the Rhine (The Netherlands v. France) (2004) available at 




This task is made more difficult in the case of multilateral treaties which are 
the product of prolonged negotiations between numerous states.  As said by the ICJ 
in the Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, “in a 
convention of this type, one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages 
to states, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and 
duties.”
99  Rather they are the expression of a common will to achieve a certain 
objective.  Such considerations may influence the way in which a court interprets a 
treaty.   
All of these considerations arise in the case of the LOS Convention.  The 
Convention was drafted by more than one hundred states.   It was designed to 
achieve a compromise so that the language is often highly ambiguous.  Shearer 
describes how “on certain critical points, disagreement was papered over by 
compromises or disguised by opaque texts that elude clear meaning.”
100
  Whilst it is 
common in treaty negotiations for differences of opinion to be blurred by drafting 
techniques, this trend was accentuated by the consensus decision-making procedures 
adopted at UNCLOS III.101  Identifying the common will of the parties in this 
situation is difficult, although there are a number of sources of evidence to which an 
adjudicator may look.  
The general rules on treaty interpretation are found in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which starts: “a treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” Whilst 
this provision stresses the importance of the text, it does not mandate a purely literal 
interpretation of the text.  All the aspects of this rule are interconnected and they 
cannot be separated.102  Nevertheless, this general rule allows some leeway for 
adjudicators to decide on the correct interpretation taking into account and balancing 
all of these factors, as well as considering the different types of evidence that are 
                                                 
99 Reservations to the Genocide Convention Advisory Opinion, (1951) ICJ Reports 15 at p. 23.  See 
also International Law Commission, Report of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International 
Law, (2005) at p. 250. 
100  Shearer, “Oceans Management Challenges for the Law of the Sea in the First Decade of the 21st 
Century”, in Oude Elferink and Rothwell (eds.), Oceans Management in the 21st Century: Institutional 
Frameworks and Responses, (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2004) at p. 4. 
101 See chapter two, at p. 27 ff.. 
102 See Arbitral Award on Pollution of the Rhine, at para. 62. 
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available in the case of a particular treaty.  How do these principles of interpretation 
apply in the context of the LOS Convention? 
   
5. Interpreting the LOS Convention  
Although the LOS Convention is in one sense simply a legal text, the overtly 
political nature of the negotiations which preceded its adoption should not be 
forgotten.  As noted above, the treaty was not necessarily drafted to be as accurate as 
possible, but rather to be as acceptable to as many states as possible.  Whilst a 
drafting committee was appointed by UNCLOS III, it was not possible to solve all 
problems submitted to it.103  As a consequence, one author concludes that “use of the 
same word in different provisions is, unusually, not necessarily intended to have the 
same consequence, and use of different words is not necessarily intended to have 
different consequences in every case.”
104  The Convention must be interpreted with 
these considerations in mind.  Thus, it is submitted that the context and object and 
purpose of the LOS Convention assume a still greater importance. The process may 
be helped by reference to other sources of evidence as to the intentions of the parties.  
As Judge Mensah notes, “it is neither reasonable nor possible for the Tribunal to 
confine itself in every case to the bare language of the Convention’s provisions.  It is 
permitted, indeed required, to “flesh out” the bones of the provisions to the extent 




6. Travaux Préparatoires 
One source which may offer an insight into the intentions of the parties to a 
treaty is the records of the discussions that took place during negotiations of the text. 
Yet the use of travaux préparatoires in the interpretation of a treaty is an issue that 
                                                 
103 See Nelson, "The Work of the Drafting Committee", in United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea 1982 - A Commentary, Vol. 1, ed. Nordquist et al. (1985) at p. 144. 
104 Plant, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Preparatory 
Commission: Models for United Nations Law-Making?" (1987) 36 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly at p. 548. 
105 Declaration of Judge Mensah in The Camouco Case, at para. 4. 
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has long been the subject of controversy and debate by courts and commentators.  
Indeed, Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties pointedly 
classifies the preparatory materials of a treaty as a “supplementary” source of 
interpretation.106  The argument against relying on travaux préparatoires is 
forcefully made by Fitzmaurice, who says, “[they] are often extremely confused and 
confusing.  They usually contain material supporting both the points of view in issue  
... states come to a conference with many views and intentions that are subsequently 
abandoned in the course of the conference; but it is not always clear that they were 
abandoned, and they may remain on the records as representing a view apparently 
maintained throughout.”
107    Indeed the argument against referring to preparatory 
materials may be stronger still in the case of some multilateral treaties.108  In the 
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, Judge Alvarez took 
the view that “[multilateral] conventions [of a legislative character] must not be 
interpreted with reference to the preparatory work which preceded them, they are 
distinct from that work and they have acquired a life of their own.”
109 
It may be excessive to say that courts and tribunals should never have 
recourse to the negotiations of a treaty in its interpretation. Indeed, it is common for 
the ICJ and other courts and tribunals to take into account the travaux 
préparatoires.110  Usually, such materials are invoked as support for an interpretation 
arrived at through other means, but Lauterpacht sceptically suggests that “it is not 
certain that the clarity of the meaning said to have been confirmed by the 
preparatory work was not actually due to the illumination obtained by the study of 
the latter.”
111   
In the case of the LOS Convention, reliance on preparatory materials raises 
other difficulties.  Many of the negotiations at UNCLOS III took place in informal 
sessions and the official records only provide a partial account of the negotiation.  As 
                                                 
106 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 32. 
107 Fitzmaurice, "The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation 
and Certain Other Treaty Points", (1951) British Yearbook of International Law at p. 15. 
108 McNair, "The Functions and Differing Legal Character of Treaties", (1930) British Yearbook of 
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109 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Alvarez, in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention Advisory 
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111 Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court, at p. 138. 
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a consequence, Plant argues that there is a need for “a more liberal, process-
orientated approach.”  He continues, “interpreters … should be prepared to look at 
all formal and informal statements, interventions, texts and proposals made at all 
stages and in all forums of the negotiation, including informal extra-conference 
groups, as aids to interpretation of the Convention.”
112  Furthermore, he argues that 
a special emphasis should be placed on the opinions and writings of the delegates 
who attended the Conference: “The delegates and the relevant supporting staff in 
their ministries are peculiarly placed to know the background of a provision, and 
their views, in so far as they are able and prepared to make them public – and in 
many cases they are not – should be particularly influential upon interpretations of 
the [LOS Convention].”
113  However, such sources should nevertheless be treated 
with caution.  There is a danger that the opinions of delegates may only provide a 
partial account of the negotiations; all delegates, including the officers of the 
Conference, were, after all, acting on behalf of their governments.  
In practice, decisions of the Tribunal have not extensively relied on 
preparatory materials, although individual judges of the ITLOS have been willing to 
cite official and unofficial records of UNCLOS III in order to support a particular 
interpretation.114   
It should also be noted that it is not only the negotiations at UNCLOS III that 
may provide guidance as to the meaning of the LOS Convention.  As some 
provisions of the LOS Convention are based on similar, if not identical, provisions of 
the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the drafting history of these 
treaties may also be relevant.  These materials are much more detailed than those of 
UNCLOS III, given that the articles were first prepared by the International Law 
                                                 
112 Plant, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Preparatory 
Commission",   at pp. 555-556.  See also Queneudec, "The role of the International Court of Justice 
and Other Tribunals in the development of the Law of the Sea",  at pp. 595-595. 
113 Plant, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Preparatory 
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114 See the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Ndiaye, Nelson, Park, Rao and Vukas in The M/V 
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Commission and then subjected to a conference procedure where all formal 
discussions were officially recorded.  In The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) the ITLOS relied 
on the work of the International Law Commission and the reports of UNCLOS I in 
its interpretation of provisions which had been incorporated from the 1958 High Seas 
Convention.115  Affirming the subsidiary role of travaux préparatoires, however, the 
drafting history was only invoked as confirmation of an interpretation arrived at 
through other means, including the subsequent views of states. 
   
7. Interpretative Declarations 
Under Article 310 of the LOS Convention, states are able to append unilateral 
statements on their understanding of the Convention when they sign, ratify, accede 
thereto.116  In many cases, such statements are remarkably similar to statements made 
by delegates at the closing sessions of the Conference itself, so there is an overlap 
with the travaux préparatoires themselves.  As with travaux préparatoires, such 
declarations cannot constitute an authoritative interpretation of the Convention.  
However, can they be taken into account by a court or tribunal when interpreting the 
Convention?   
Given that a court or tribunal is trying to promote a uniform interpretation of 
the Convention, it is questionable how far unilateral statements are of value to the 
interpretative process.  However, where several unilateral statements point in the 
same direction, they could indicate a common understanding of the text.  This 
possibility is anticipated by Article 31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties which allows an interpreter to take into account “any instrument which was 
made by one or more of the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty 
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to that treaty.”   
In many cases, however, the declarations submitted in furtherance of Article 
310 only reveal a disagreement over how the Convention should be interpreted.117  
For instance, whilst Algeria, Bangladesh, Czech Republic, China, Croatia, Egypt, 
                                                 
115 The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2), at paras. 80-82. 
116 Article 310 provides that a state may make a declaration “with a view, inter alia, to the 
harmonisation of its laws and regulations with the provisions of the Convention.”   
117 For the text of the declarations, see www.un.org/depts/los.   
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Iran, Malta, Oman, and Serbia and Montenegro all claim the right to require prior 
notification or authorisation of the innocent passage of warships through their 
territorial sea, this interpretation is strongly denied in the declarations of Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.  Similar differences appear over the 
innocent passage of nuclear powered ships or ships carrying nuclear or other 
hazardous materials, the right to conduct military manoeuvres and exercises in the 
EEZ of another state, and the right to construct installations of a non-economic 
nature in the EEZ of another state.  In such circumstances, declarations do not 
provide a valuable source of evidence to an interpreter.   
That is not to say that declarations are completely irrelevant.  Unilateral 
interpretations and declarations may be relevant to the resolution of a dispute in 
another context.  Courts and tribunals have taken into account unilateral acts and 
statements made prior to a dispute118 or in their oral pleadings in deciding 
disputes.119  It is suggested that declarations made under Article 310 of the LOS 
Convention may play a similar role in litigation, preventing a state from proposing an 
interpretation which is contrary to its declaration.   
The weakness of both travaux préparatoires and unilateral declarations made 
at signature, ratification or accession is that they may include views which are no 
longer be held by states.  Giving too much weight to these sources of evidence may 
lead to a static interpretation of a treaty, fixing the meaning of the text at the time of 
its conclusion. 
   
8. The Principle of Effectiveness in Interpretation 
Given the inherent ambiguity in much of the LOS Convention, a court and 
tribunal should adopt the interpretation that gives the intended effect to the 
Convention.  To do so, it is necessary to look to its object and purpose.120  The LOS 
Convention has a number of different objectives, the most important of which is 
                                                 
118 See e.g., The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2), at paras. 69 and 71. 
119 Dispute Relating to the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf 
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perhaps to create a single, comprehensive treaty settling all issues relating to the law 
of the sea.121    The treaty settlement seeks to balance the interests of various states.  
Therefore, any interpretation should also seek to maintain this balance.   
The importance of balancing competing interests is illustrated by some of the 
decisions of the ITLOS on prompt release.  For instance, in its judgment in The 
Monte Confurco, the Tribunal held that “the object of article 292 of the Convention 
is to reconcile the interest of the flag State to have its vessel and its crew released 
promptly with the interest of the detaining State to secure appearance in its court of 
the Master and the payment of penalties.”
122
  In The Camouco, Judge Treves 
emphasised the need for balance in the following terms: “The Tribunal should not 
give preference to one or the other of these two points of view… both find their 
legitimacy in the Convention.”
123  The balancing of interests can also be seen in the 
Tribunal’s decision in the same case on whether or not an obligation to exhaust local 
remedies should be read into Article 292.  The Tribunal stressed that “no limitation 
should be read into article 292 that would have the effect of defeating its very object 
and purpose … article 292 permits the making of an application within a short 
period from the date of detention and it is not normally the case that local remedies 
could be exhausted in such a short period.”
124  In other words, applying the local 
remedies rule to prompt release cases would tip the balance against shipowners, as 
the safeguard afforded by Article 292 would offer limited protection if it was first 
necessary to pursue a case through local courts.125  Similarly, in The M/V “Saiga” 
the Tribunal refused to accede to the argument of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
that the release of the vessel should be ordered without the posting of any bond at all.  
It held that “the posting of a bond or security seems to the Tribunal necessary in 
view of the nature of the prompt release proceedings.”
126 For the Tribunal, the 
posting of a bond was an important factor in the balance of rights and obligations 
                                                 
121 LOS Convention, Preamble.  See also Oxman, "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea: The Eighth Session (1979)", (1980) 74 American Journal of International Law at p. 35. 
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between coastal states and flag states and the Tribunal rejected an interpretation 
which would have unduly upset one side of that balance.       
The notion of balance introduces a great deal of flexibility into the 
interpretation of a treaty.  It is not always obvious where the balance should be struck 
and competing views may arise.  Such was the case in The Volga, where the 
Tribunal had to decide whether the concept of a reasonable bond should be 
interpreted to permit non-pecuniary conditions.  The Tribunal reasoned that “where 
the Convention envisages the imposition of conditions additional to a bond or other 
financial security, it expressly states so.”
127
  Furthermore, in its opinion, the 
imposition of such a bond would defeat the object and purpose of Article 73(2) 
which was to “provide the flag state with a mechanism for obtaining the prompt 
release of a vessel and crew arrested for alleged fisheries violations by posting a 
security of a financial nature whose reasonableness can be assessed in financial 
terms.”
128  Criticising the decision of the majority, Judge Anderson, however, noted 
that the description of the object and purpose of Article 73(2) was overly one-sided: 
“an additional element in the object and purpose is to provide the safeguard for the 
coastal state…”  He concluded that “to the extent to which there is some sort of 
balance in these provisions between the interests of the two states concerned, that 
balanced treatment should not be tilted in favour of one or the other.”
129  Judge ad 
hoc Shearer, who also dissented, urged recognition of the fact that the context of 
illegal and unregulated fishing had changed since the conclusion of the LOS 
Convention and “a new “balance” has to be struck between vessel owners, 
operators and fishing companies on the one hand, and coastal States on the 
other.”
130  
This case raises the question of how to interpret the Convention in light of 
changes in international law and policy.  Can the balance anticipated by the drafters 
change in light of the evolving values of the international community?   
It is accepted that the intentions of the parties are not necessarily set in stone 
when a treaty is drafted and the circumstances in which a treaty was intended to 
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apply may also change.  In the words of Higgins, “the notion of ‘original intention’ 
has long been qualified by the idea that the parties themselves, because of the nature 
of the treaty that they agreed to, just have assumed that matters would evolve.”
131   
Indeed, interpreting a treaty without regard to changes in the surrounding 
circumstances could threaten the ultimate viability of a treaty settlement.  Yet, a 
change of attitude is not going to be found in the text itself, nor in the travaux 
préparatoires.  The principal question is therefore how to identify the contemporary 
intentions of the States Parties. 
Recognition that an instrument must be interpreted in light of the context at 
the time of its interpretation is found in two paragraphs of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.   
First, Article 31(3)(b) obliges an interpreter to take into account the 
“subsequent practice in the application of a treaty” where it amounts to an 
“agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”  The commentary to this 
Article makes clear that the practice must establish the agreement of all parties to the 
treaty, although it is not necessary for the practice to be attributable to all those 
parties.132   
“Practice” is not defined by the Vienna Convention, but it should arguably be 
considered as a flexible concept, as long as it demonstrates the opinions of the 
parties.  It conceivably includes both physical practice as well as the adoption of 
international instruments, including non-binding resolutions and declarations.   
In particular, the decisions of organs created by the treaty will be highly 
pertinent.  It is on this basis that decisions of the Meeting of the States Parties to the 
LOS Convention may be relevant to the interpretation of the Convention.  Even 
though they have no formal powers of interpretation under the LOS Convention, the 
decisions of the Meeting of the States Parties may still constitute evidence of practice 
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for the purposes of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.133 
In the case of the LOS Convention, it is also appropriate to take into account 
the practice of other international institutions.  In particular the annual resolutions of 
the General Assembly on the law of the sea may provide important context for an 
interpretation of the Convention.  The General Assembly includes all States Parties, 
as well as other important maritime states.134  Other institutions, such as the IMO and 
the International Seabed Authority will be useful in determining the meaning of the 
Convention within their particular spheres.135  For the purposes of Article 31(3)(b) of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is important to show that their 
decisions or other instruments amount to “an agreement of the parties”.    In the case 
of the LOS Convention, a court would be wise to look for a consensus of the 
international community as a whole in order to prevent a fragmentation of the treaty 
and customary frameworks for the law of the sea.   
Nor is it only decisions adopted by intergovernmental institutions that may be 
relevant under this provision.  One illustration is the Rules of the Tribunal adopted 
by the ITLOS.136  The Rules are authorized by Article 16 of the Statute of the 
Tribunal and they were drafted exclusively by the Members of the Tribunal without 
any input from States Parties.  Nevertheless, the rules have been invoked by the 
ITLOS as context for the interpretation of the LOS Convention.  In The Camouco, 
the Tribunal interpreted Article 292 of the Convention by reference to Article 113 of 
its Rules in order to support its conclusion that an applicant must show that its 
arguments are “well founded.”137  In the same case, the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Wolfrum also argued that the Rules guided the Tribunal in what to take into account 
in determining the reasonableness of a bond, because they require the detaining state 
to provide information on the value of the ship and on the amount of the requested 
bond.138 Presumably, the Rules are a valid source of interpretative material because 
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they have been authorised by the Convention and the ITLOS judges are elected by 
the States Parties themselves.  In this context, it is also possible that some decisions 
by the Commission on the Limits of the Outer Continental Shelf may also be taken in 
account in the interpretative process.  These decisions are relevant because states 
have conferred a decision-making power on these institutions.  Yet, such decisions 
are only valid where they are not contradicted by decisions of the States Parties or 
other state practice. 
The role of a court in endorsing relevant decisions of international institutions 
is important in the absence of any other indication in the LOS Convention of who 
can adopt authoritative interpretations.  The value of the judicial decision is therefore 
in its clarification and elaboration of which state practice has influenced the 
interpretation of the Convention. 
It is not only instruments directly related to the LOS Convention that can be 
used to interpret the Convention.  Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties also says that an interpreter shall take into account “any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”  This 
provision promotes the systemic integration of a treaty with other sources of 
international law.139  It also allows a court or tribunal to take into account changes in 
international law, policy or values which may influence the interpretation of a treaty.   
As an example, a so-called evolutionary approach to interpretation was 
adopted by the ICJ in the Namibia Advisory Opinion, where the Court was faced 
with interpreting and applying Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations 
and the text of the Mandate for South West Africa, virtually fifty years since their 
promulgation and in a different institutional context.  The Court held that certain 
concepts connected with the Mandate system were “by definition evolutionary” and 
the parties must be “deemed to have accepted them as such.”140  It followed that the 
Court had to “take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the 
                                                 
139 See McLachlan, "The Principle of Systematic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties", (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279. 
140 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), (1971) ICJ 
Reports 16  at p. 31; see also Case Concerning the Gabíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. 
Slovakia), (1997) ICJ Reports at pp. 76-80. 
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supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the 
subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by 
way of customary international law.”
141   
Higgins notes that “this same trend is discernable across courts, tribunals 
and arbitration tribunals.”
142
  In a more recent decision, the arbitral tribunal in the 
Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration appeared to adopt a more general approach to 
evolutionary interpretation, holding that “in the present case, it is not a conceptual 
or generic term that is in issue, but rather new technical developments relating to the 
operation and capacity of the railway.  But here, too, it seems that an evolutive [sic.] 
interpretation, which would ensure an application of the treaty that would be 
effective in terms of its object and purpose, will be preferred to a strict application of 
the intertemporal rule.”
143  It would seem that the basis of the Tribunal’s reasoning 
in this case is the fact that the treaty was not intended to govern the relationship 
between the two states for a “limited or fixed duration”144 only and therefore it was 
necessary that it was applied in light of contemporaneous concerns.145  The approach 
of the Tribunal in the Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration potentially expands the 
application of evolutionary interpretation to many more modern multilateral treaties.   
Some commentators claim that only those rules of international law which are 
binding on all the parties to the treaty can be invoked in aid of interpretation.146 
McLachlan explains that this is necessary so that an interpretation imposes consistent 
obligations on all the parties to it.147  By contrast, French suggests that the concept of 
uniformity of interpretation, whilst an admirable notion, does not actually match the 
                                                 
141
Namibia Advisory Opinion, at para. 53. 
142 Higgins, "A Babel of Judicial Voices? Ruminations from the Bench",   at p. 798. 
143 Iron Rhine Arbitration (Belgium v. the Netherlands), (2005) available at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/BENL/BE-NL%20Award%20corrected%20200905.pdf <checked 30 
November 2006> at para. 80.  
144 Ibid., at para. 81. 
145 See Ibid., in particular paras. 220-223. 
146 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003) at p. 
257. 
147 McLachlan, "The Principle of Systematic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties",  at p. 315. 
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reality of the international legal system.148  Thus, he argues that Article 31(3)(c) 
refers to all those parties involved in the dispute.   
In practice, it may depend on the type of treaty being interpreted.  It is 
submitted that, at least in the case of the LOS Convention, the latter approach is not 
suitable.  The General Assembly has regularly stressed the need to uphold the 
integrity of the Convention, which calls for a uniform interpretation thereof.149  
Indeed, one of the purposes of compulsory dispute settlement is to guarantee a 
harmonised interpretation of the Convention.  The integrity of the LOS Convention 
would not be protected if it had different meanings for different parties.  At the same 
time, requiring all the States Parties to the LOS Convention to be bound by an 
instrument before it can be invoked in interpretation sets a very high threshold.   
The appropriate approach would appear to be that suggested, inter alia, by 
Pauwelyn, who argues that other instruments may be taken into account in 
interpretation if they reflect the common intention of the parties, whether or not the 
parties are formally bound by the instrument.150  Therefore, the status of the 
instrument being invoked is likely to play a less important role than the way in which 
it was negotiated and whether it is supported by consensus.151   
Nevertheless, the purpose of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties must be borne in mind.  It is fundamental that the rule or 
principle being invoked can shed light on an ambiguous term in the text being 
interpreted.  The ICJ has stressed on several occasions that treaty interpretation 
should not turn into treaty revision.152  Nor should it be assumed that the same words 
in two treaties should be interpreted in the same way.  In the MOX Plant Case, the 
ITLOS stressed that the distinct identities of two instruments is important.  The 
limitations on invoking other instruments in the interpretative process were noted, as 
                                                 
148 French, "Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules", (2006) 55 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly at p. 306. 
149 Note the regular call by the General Assembly for states to ensure the integrity of the Convention; 
e.g., General Assembly Resolution 60/30, 2005, at para. 4.  
150 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms at p. 260.  See also McLachlan, "The Principle of Systematic 
Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties",  at pp. 314-315. 
151 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law at p. 246. 
152 Separate Opinion of Judge Bejaoui in Gabíkovo-Nagymaros Case, at para. 12.  See also 
International Law Commission, "Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Report of the Commission to 
the General Assembly", (1966 - II)  Yearbook of the International Law Commission at p. 219. 
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“the application of international law rules on interpretation of treaties to identical 
or similar provisions of different treaties may not yield the same results, having 
regard to, inter alia, differences in the respective contexts, objects and purposes, 
subsequent practice of the parties and travaux préparatoires.”153   
It follows that other rules and principles of international law may not be 
useful in determining the ordinary meaning of a term in a treaty.  In that case, they 
are most useful for interpreting generic phrases.  Nevertheless, other instruments may 
also be useful in providing an indication of the weight to be given to particular issues 
in determining the meaning of a text and in balancing the competing interests of 
states.   
A study of the few ITLOS decisions to date illustrates that in certain 
circumstances the Tribunal has been willing to take into account other rules of 
international law even when there is no express reference to such rules in the text of 
the Convention.  It did so in The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) when it was interpreting 
Article 94 of the Convention concerning the genuine link between a ship and a flag 
state.154  In support of its decision on Article 94, the Tribunal made reference to the 
1986 Convention on the Conditions for the Registration of Ships,155 the 1993 FAO 
Compliance Agreement, and the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement.156 The Tribunal found 
that these instruments supported the interpretation that was already evident from 
considering the travaux préparatoires.  For present purposes, it is pertinent to note 
that none of these instruments had entered into force at the time of the dispute.  This 
did not seem to matter to the Tribunal, although it did not make clear the basis for 
taking these other instruments into account.       
To take another example, in The M/V “Saiga”, the Tribunal looked to other 
instruments to interpret the phrase “sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and 
manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone” in Article 73 of the 
Convention.  The Tribunal invoked, inter alia, Article 1 of the 1989 Convention for 
                                                 
153 The MOX Plant Case, at paras. 50-51.  See also Dispute Concerning Access to Information under 
Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention, (2003) 42 ILM 118 at paras. 101 and 142; Methanex v. US, 
(2005) 44 ILM 1345 at para. 6. 
154 The Tribunal also referred to the drafting history of the provision; see above, at p. 227. 
155 The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2), at para. 84. 
156 Ibid., at para. 85. 
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the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific157 as evidence of 
the fact that the concept of fishing activities could include the provision of fuel and 
other supplies to fishing vessels.158  However, in this case, not all judges were 
convinced that this instrument was relevant to Article 73.  Vice-President Wolfrum 
and Judge Yamamoto objected to the invocation of the Driftnet Convention, arguing 
that the definition of fishing activities therein was agreed on specifically for the 
purpose of that treaty and it could not simply be transferred to the LOS 
Convention.159  They also noted that Article 1 of the Driftnet Convention concerned 
flag state jurisdiction, not coastal state jurisdiction which was the subject of the 
provision being interpreted.     
In The Monte Confurco, Judge Anderson made reference to the provisions of 
the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources160 and 
particular measures adopted by the parties to that treaty in his analysis of the 
reasonableness of a bond for the release of a ship that had been caught illegally 
fishing in the Southern Ocean.  He noted that “this “factual background” is relevant 
to balancing the respective interests of France and the applicant.  Equally, it is 
material in forming a view of what is a “reasonable” bond within the overall scheme 
of the Convention.”
161  Similar issues arose in The Volga where again Judge 
Anderson, this time accompanied by Judge ad hoc Shearer, suggested that the 
prompt release provisions of the LOS Convention should be interpreted taking into 
account international concern for illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing as 
expressed through instruments such as the CCAMLR and the Fish Stocks 
Agreement.162  They suggested that the Convention should be interpreted in such a 
way as to support and promote the aims of these other instruments.  Judge Anderson 
puts this clearly when he concludes “the duty of the coastal State to ensure the 
conservation of the living resources of the EEZ contained in article 61 of the 
Convention, as well as the obligations of Contracting Parties to CCAMLR to protect 
the Antarctic ecosystem, are relevant factors when determining in a case under 
                                                 
157 Hereinafter, the “Driftnet Convention”. 
158 The M/V "SAIGA" Case  at para. 57. 
159 Dissenting Opinion of Vice-President Wolfrum and Judge Yamamoto in Ibid., at para. 23. 
160 Hereinafter, “CCAMLR”. 
161 The Monte Confurco Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anderson, at pp. 2-3. 
162 The Volga Case, Judge Anderson, at paras. 2 and 21; Judge ad hoc Shearer, at paras. 11 and 19. 
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article 292 whether or not the amount of the bail money demanded for the release of 
a vessel such as the Volga is ‘reasonable’.”
163   
It would appear that the ITLOS has been willing to have recourse to other 
rules and principles of law in order to interpret the LOS Convention.  Yet, it has 
failed to clearly indicate on what basis it was doing so.  Further guidance in this 
matter would not only clarify the applicable principles, but also add greater 
legitimacy to the decisions of the Tribunal by increasing their transparency. 
Reference to other rules and principles of international law does not provide a 
touchstone against which to interpret all treaty provisions.  Nor does it provide an 
authoritative solution to all cases of ambiguity.  It is the role of the court or tribunal 
to weigh up all of the evidence in order to decide what the correct interpretation of 
the Convention should be. Nevertheless, the general rules of interpretation are 
flexible and they allow a court to take into account developments in law and policy 
since the conclusion of the Convention. 
     
9. Applicable Law 
A court may in some circumstances apply other sources of international law.  
Given the overlap between the LOS Convention and other treaties, it is important to 
define the scope of applicable law.   
Article 293 provides that courts and tribunals deciding disputes under the 
Convention may apply both the Convention and “other rules of international law not 
incompatible with this Convention.”  In this context, other rules of international law 
can include other treaties, as well as customary international law.   
It should be stressed that Article 293 does not act as a carte blanche to apply 
any rules that are applicable between the disputing parties.  The concept of 
applicable law does not enlarge the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal to consider any 
legal claims arising between the disputing states.  Such a liberal concept of 
applicable law would have the result of converting the jurisdiction of courts and 
tribunals acting under the LOS Convention into “an unqualified and comprehensive 
                                                 
163 Ibid., Judge Anderson, at para. 2. 
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jurisdictional regime in which there would be no limit ratione materiae.”
164  In this 
sense, applicable law and jurisdiction must be clearly distinguished.165   
What is the purpose of Article 293?  It is suggested that this provision permits 
an adjudicator to apply such rules and principles of international law that are 
necessary in order to decide a dispute under the Convention.166   
Most of the rules that a court or tribunal will have to apply in this way will 
thus be secondary rules of general international law.  The ITLOS has, for instance, 
referred on several occasions to the law of state responsibility in its judgments.  The 
case of The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2) is once again a good illustration of the way in 
which other rules of international law may be applied.  In that case, the Tribunal 
cited the “well-established rule of international law that a State which suffers 
damage as a result of an internationally wrongful act by another State is entitled to 
obtain reparation for the damage suffered from the State which committed the 
wrongful act”
167 and it made reference to Article 42 of the ILC Draft Articles on 
State Responsibility which specifies the forms that reparation may take.168 In 
addition, the law of state responsibility was relevant to the case because Guinea had 
invoked the doctrine of necessity as a defence to the claims submitted against it.169  
In this context, the Tribunal referred to the decision of the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Case as well as Article 33(1) of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility.170  Whilst it did not deny that necessity could be invoked as a 
justification for a violation of the Convention, thus affirming the applicability of the 
law of state responsibility in the proceedings, the Tribunal nevertheless held that 
Guinea had not satisfied the Tribunal that its essential interests were in grave and 
imminent peril.171   
                                                 
164 See Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention, at para. 
85; also cited in Methanex v. US, at para. 5.  See also Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International 
Law  at p. 274. 
165 The MOX Plant Case, at para. 19. 
166 See the dicta of the PCIJ in Mavromattis Palestine Concessions, at p. 28. 
167 The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2), at para. 170. 
168 Ibid., at para. 171.  The rules of state responsibility are “saved” by Article 304 of the LOS 
Convention. 
169 As a subsidiary argument, Guinea cited Article 59 of the LOS Convention. 
170 The M/V "Saiga" (No. 2), at para. 133. 
171 Ibid., at para. 135.   
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These were not the only other rules of international law applied by the 
Tribunal in The M/V “Saiga” (No. 2). In that case, Saint Vincent also asked the 
Tribunal to adjudge several claims that had no basis in the Convention itself.  First, it 
alleged that by citing Saint Vincent as civilly liable in connection with criminal 
proceedings instigated in the domestic courts of Guinea, Guinea had violated its 
rights under international law.172  Although the Tribunal dismissed the claim because 
it did not constitute a violation of international law,173 in doing so it failed to explain 
on what basis it would have had jurisdiction to entertain such a claim if it were 
indeed arguable.  Saint Vincent had also alleged that the Guinean authorities had 
used excessive and unreasonable force when they were arresting the M/V “Saiga.”  
As the Convention does not contain express rules on the use of force in the arrest of 
ships, the claim was necessarily based on customary international law.  Citing the 
application of international law according to Article 293, the Tribunal held that 
“international law … requires that the use of force must be avoided as far as 
possible and where force is unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable 
and necessary in the circumstances.”
174  To support its reference to general 
principles of law, the Tribunal referred to the Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 
22(1)(f) of which confirmed the principles that it thought were applicable.  In other 
words, the Tribunal was not applying the Agreement; rather it was invoking the 
Agreement as an illustration of a general principle of law that was applicable to the 
disputing parties.  In the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal held that use of force 
by the Guinean authorities had violated these principles of international law.175  It is 
again clear from the judgment that the claims on the unreasonable and unnecessary 
use of force were considered as separate from the claim alleging a violation of the 
Convention's provisions on hot pursuit.  Furthermore, the finding of a violation of the 
rules of international law on the use of force in the course of the arrest is contained in 
a separate paragraph of the dispositif.176 Given that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is 
limited to claims made under the Convention, it is not clear from the judgment on 
                                                 
172 Ibid., at para. 160. 
173 Ibid., at para. 162. 
174 Ibid.,  at para. 155. 
175  The Guinean patrol boat had allegedly fired live rounds in their pursuit of the M/V “Saiga” and 
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what basis the Tribunal made this finding.  It is submitted that the Tribunal ignores 
the crucial distinction between jurisdiction and applicable law.  The allegations made 
against Guinea may be serious in nature but the gravity of an alleged action provides 
no basis for jurisdiction.  As noted by the ICJ in Congo v Rwanda, “the mere fact 
that rights and obligations erga omnes or peremptory norms of general international 
law (jus cogens) are at issue in a dispute cannot in itself constitute an exception to 
the principle that jurisdiction always depends on the consent of the parties.”
177  Nor 
does the fact that Guinea breached rules of international law closely related to the 
substance of the LOS Convention confer jurisdiction on a court or tribunal acting 
under the LOS Convention.  Such an approach to applicable law will undermine the 




This chapter has considered the role of courts and tribunals in upholding the 
status quo of the LOS Convention whilst satisfying countervailing pressures for 
progressive development of the legal framework.  The inclusion of compulsory 
dispute settlement provisions in the LOS Convention implies an increased 
willingness to place the development of international law in the hands of independent 
adjudicators.  In doing so, courts and tribunals must be aware of the inherent 
limitations on the judicial function which restricts how far they can develop the law. 
The concept of applicable law would appear to offer few opportunities for an 
adjudicator to develop the law.  The mandate to apply other sources of international 
law arguably does not allow a court to consider claims under other sources of law 
that are not necessary to decide the dispute under the treaty.   
Interpretation, on the other hand, would appear to allow courts and tribunals 
to look beyond the text and to progressively develop the content of the law of the sea 
in light of changes in policy and law.  The aim of interpretation is to identify the 
intention of the parties although it would appear that there is no single method of 
                                                 
177 Congo v. Rwanda, at para. 125. 
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doing so.  Rather, it is a process of weighing and balancing all of the available 
evidence in such a way as to deduce the meaning of the words in their context and in 
light of the object and purpose of the Convention.  It would appear that a wide 
variety of instruments may be invoked for this purpose, including travaux 
préparatoires, the decisions of international institutions, or other international 
treaties.   
Given the status of the LOS Convention as universal law, it would appear to 
be the practice of the international community as a whole rather than the States 
Parties per se that should guide a court or tribunal in its task.  Looking at the 
activities of the States Parties alone would cause fragmentation between the LOS 
Convention as a treaty and as customary international law. 
In deciding which instruments demonstrate the intention of states, a 
pragmatic approach seems to be preferred.  Indeed, the pragmatism of the courts is 
perhaps necessitated by the ad hoc approach taken by states in developing the law.  
Throughout this thesis, the variety of mechanisms and instruments that states use to 
maintain the consensus on the law of the sea has been illustrated.  Courts and 
tribunals play an important role in deciphering, clarifying and confirming these 
various law-making activities.  Subsequent state practice may provide a source of 
interpretation or it may also act to modify the Convention.  Courts and tribunals offer 
a forum in which informal instruments and state practice can be confirmed as legally 
binding, providing certainty to the legal framework.       
However, it is important to maintain the distinction between jurisdiction and 
applicable law.  States have only consented to the settlement of disputes under the 
LOS Convention, not under associated treaties.  Courts cannot incorporate entire 
obligations into the LOS Convention simply because states have accepted them 
through other treaties.178  It therefore remains important that other treaties contain 
their own dispute settlement mechanisms.  It is for this reason that the Fish Stocks 
Agreement is so important in providing wide-ranging dispute settlement system for 
disputes arising under its provisions, as well as other fisheries agreements.179  It also 
                                                 
178 See, however, chapter five on the inclusion of rules of reference in the LOS Convention, at p. 126 
ff.. 
179 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 30. 
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means that a court or tribunal acting under the LOS Convention may be able to do no 
more than order the states to co-operate.  Nevertheless, independent oversight of 
negotiations often proves to make it simpler to arrive at mutually agreed solutions.180 
The contribution of courts and tribunals in developing the law of the sea must 
be seen as part of a wider system of law-making, involving many types of political, 
technical and judicial institutions.  It is only by considering the variety and 
complexity of international law-making mechanisms that it can be seen how states 
strive to maintain the unity and universality of the legal orders of the oceans. 
                                                 
180 Negotiated settlements were reached in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases and the Johur Straits 
Case.  A provisional agreement was reached in the Swordfish dispute before it even reached court.  
See e.g. Tim Stephens, "The Limits of International Adjudication in International Environmental Law: 
Another Perspective on the Southern Bluefin Tuna Case", (2004) 19 International Journal of Marine 







This thesis has addressed the process of international law-making in the 
context of the law of the sea.  The catalyst for the creation of the modern law of the 
sea was the decision by the General Assembly in 1970 to convene a conference to 
negotiate a new international framework on this subject.  Although the outcome of 
UNCLOS III was a treaty, it is generally accepted that the LOS Convention largely 
crystallises customary international law. Apart from the question of deep seabed 
mining, the Convention is widely acknowledged as creating a universal legal order for 
the oceans.  It is this law-making activity that forms the launch pad for this thesis.   
Many lessons can be learnt from UNCLOS III about the creation of universal 
law.  In particular, the consensus decision-making techniques and universal 
participation at the Conference can be highlighted as significant factors in the impact 
of the LOS Convention on customary international law.  Yet, the success of the 
Conference should not be taken for granted.  The law of sea is not immune from 
change.  New challenges will constantly arise which will put pressure on the 
prevailing legal framework.  Therefore, the law of the sea must continue to evolve.  It 
is the progressive development of the law of the sea in the wake of the LOS 
Convention which forms the primary subject of investigation in this thesis.   
A major feature of legal development in this field is the intertwining of treaty 
and custom in the law-making process.  Whilst this process permitted the rapid 
development of universal international law, it also created a fundamental tension 
between the Convention as a treaty and the Convention as a vehicle for the 
crystallisation of customary international law.  This tension surfaces throughout the 
thesis as the available methods of law-making are analysed.   
The starting point for this analysis was the amendment mechanisms contained 
in the Convention itself.  These procedures were perhaps intended by the drafters to 
be the principal mechanisms for altering the content of the treaty.  However, these 
mechanisms have a fundamental limitation because they relate to the Convention as a 
treaty instrument.  Moreover, they confer powers on the States Parties with no prima 
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facie obligation to consider wider interests of the international community.  Invoking 
the amendment procedures could potentially cause a fragmentation of the law of the 
sea.  Indeed, it is significant that in practice the amendment procedures in the 
Convention have been abandoned in favour of other law-making techniques.  
Therefore, it has been necessary to look beyond the Convention for alternative ways 
to develop the law of the sea in a coherent and universal manner.   
What is clear from this thesis is that there is no single mechanism for 
achieving this aim.  Law-making in this field is eclectic.  Nevertheless, it is apparent 
that institutions play a central role in the evolution of the law of the sea.  The thesis 
has considered the activities of a variety of institutions.  In particular, it looks at the 
General Assembly, the Meeting of the States Parties, the International Maritime 
Organization, and the International Seabed Authority.  Some of these institutions have 
a formal role under the LOS Convention, whilst others do not.  Yet, it is concluded 
that they are all able to contribute to the development of the law of the sea.  Indeed, 
they are not alone.  The International Atomic Energy Agency, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, and the International Labour Organization, amongst others, 
also have interests in maritime affairs and they may potentially be involved in law-
making.   
The important question is how do these institutions develop the law of the sea?  
None of them possess legislative powers per se.  It is suggested that their contribution 
to law-making is more often their ability to foster a consensus on the clarification of 
existing rules or on the formation of new rules.  Institutions are important for modern 
law-making because they provide a forum in which deliberations and discussions on 
developments in the law of the sea can take place.  These institutions, and the 
instruments which they adopt, are used as vehicles for the continuing crystallisation of 
the law of the sea.  It follows that resolutions of the General Assembly, decisions of 
the Meeting of the States Parties, and instruments adopted by the International 
Maritime Organization can all have an impact on the law of the sea.  Treaties have 
retained a role in law-making, such as the 1994 Part XI Agreement and the 1995 Fish 
Stocks Agreement.  However, the formal status of all of these instruments is less 
important than whether they are supported by a consensus of the international 
community.  Thus, participation in discussions and the decision-making techniques 
used to adopt instruments are important characteristics of institutional law-making.  
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Indeed, the analysis of institutional practice in this thesis has revealed that the 
consensus decision-making techniques developed at UNCLOS III have been imitated 
by many institutions in the context of the law of the sea, whether or not such 
techniques are reflected in the formal institutional rules of procedure.  In addition, 
institutions have often opened up their discussions and deliberations to all states in 
order to promote universality of participation.  It appears from this analysis that states 
are all too aware of the importance of maintaining consensus in order to promote a 
stable yet flexible framework for the law of the sea. 
Informal law-making therefore permits the evolution of a universal framework 
for the law of the sea.  Consensus on the creation and modification of legal rules can 
be rapidly achieved.  However, it also means that there is a lack of legal certainty in 
the law-making process.  It is necessary to look beyond the formal status of an 
instrument to determine whether or not it is generally accepted.   
The eclecticism of law-making also poses challenges for the coherent 
development of the law of the sea.  There is no single institution which has primacy in 
developing the law of the sea.  Indeed, several institutions may deal with the same 
issue, albeit from different perspectives.  Inter-institutional co-operation is therefore 
vital to the coherent development of the law of the sea.  In fact, institutions do co-
operate, formally and informally.  Nevertheless, the threat of conflict and 
fragmentation is always present.  Indeed, such pressures may be inherent in a legal 
system without a single legislature or hierarchical structure.  It appears that the 
international conflict rules do no more than provide guidance to states in determining 
the applicable law in a particular dispute.  Continuing co-operation is therefore a vital 
tool in maintaining a universal legal framework that is accepted by all states.  To this 
end, transparency and universal participation in institutions involved in law-making 
can also help to promote coherence of the legal order as well as universality of the 
law.  On the other hand, the threat of fragmentation can never be completely 
eliminated.  Even the creation of an International Organization for the Law of the Sea 
with full competence over the development of the LOS Convention would not 
eradicate the threat of fragmentation, as the law of the sea itself is not a self-contained 
regime and it overlaps with other fields of international law.  Ultimately, it is a matter 




One advantage of being able to submit disputes under the LOS Convention to 
international courts and tribunals is that these organs can interpret and apply the 
Convention in light of state practice, clarifying subsequent developments in the law.  
To an extent, legal certainty can be achieved through this process.  Yet, the role of the 
courts and tribunals in clarifying the legal framework is dependent on developments 
taking place through other institutions or other forms of state practice.  In addition, the 
role of judges in this regard is hampered by the fact that they are instructed to 
interpret and apply the Convention as a treaty.  Their competence is further restricted 
by rules of interpretation, jurisdiction and applicable law.  Courts and tribunals may 
therefore be limited in their ability to contribute to the coherent and universal 
evolution of the law of the sea. 
The conclusion of this thesis is that states have succeeded in maintaining the 
consensus over the law of the sea since the adoption of the LOS Convention.  They 
have largely achieved this through informal co-operation and compromise.  
Institutions have been central to this process.  Institutions may not offer legislative 
powers but they are able to provide a forum for co-operation between all states. 
Debates and discussions within international institutions contribute to a continuing 
crystallisation of the customary international law of the sea, maintaining the 
consensus on the applicable legal framework and ultimately developing the universal 
legal order of the oceans.        
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